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How Can We Sing the Lord's Song in a Strange Land? Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the Government's Response in Benue Nigeria

Abstract

The number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) across the globe, especially in developing countries, is increasing on a daily basis. Additionally, the conditions of these IDPs continue to raise questions. Governments across the globe and Nigeria in particular have responded to these challenges, but the situation is far from amelioration. Against this backdrop, this study examined the root cause, nature and challenges of the IDPs, government interventions and the IDPs response in Benue, Nigeria. This paper argues that various interventions are laudable, but is by no means a solution. It is better understood as a specific response to a man-made and natural driven conflict that requires a broader, inclusive and sustainable resolution.

Keywords: Miyetti Allah, Herdsmen/Farmers Conflict, IDPs, Anti-Grazing Bill, Cattle Rustling.

Introduction

One of the challenges facing most developing countries is conflict. This has further led to often overwhelming challenges, varying from loss of lives, livelihood, property, refugees, and human rights abuses to Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), among others. The focus of this study is on the IDPs.

Ominously, the number of IDPs across the globe is increasing. The Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID), revealed that an average of 21.5 million people have been displaced from their homes each year due to the rapid onset climate-related hazards since 2008.⁵ It further revealed that there was

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5 Global Report on Internal Displacement (GRID), *Global Report on Internal Displacement 2016*, Switzerland: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), May 2016, pp. 20–21. <http://www.internaldisplacement.org/assets/publications/2016/2016-global-report-internal-displacement-IDMC.pdf> (accessed 12 January 2018).

an added displacement of 18,780.000 people by disaster and 11,774.000 by conflict in the world; of which, sub-Saharan Africa had 2,561.000 by disaster and 5,472.000 by conflict, thereby contributing 26.3% of the new total IDPs in the world as of 2017.⁶ It furthered that, of these, Nigeria accounted for 122,000, new displacement by conflict, and 279,000 displaced by disaster.⁷ These exponential numbers are coupled with the causes and dimensions associated with it.⁸ Hence, governments across the globe, and Nigeria in particular, have responded to these challenges in divergent ways through policies and peace-building initiatives and interventions. Despite these interventions, the challenges appear to be overwhelming and often insurmountable.

Against this backdrop, the aim of the study is to examine issues surrounding the IDPs in Benue, the objective being to answer the following questions: What are the root causes of the IDPs in Benue? What are the challenges faced by the IDPs? What ways have stakeholders, including the Federal Government of Nigeria, intervened and what have been the reactions of the IDPs to these?

Research Area and Methodology

The study examines Benue, Nigeria. Benue is one of the middle-belt states, situated in the north central region of Nigeria. The people of Benue are from different ethnic groups. They include Idoma, Tiv and Iggede, among others. The 2006 census puts the population of the State at 4,253.641, with a land size of 31,276.71 km² and a population density of 136.0 people/km².⁹ Due to its arable land for agricultural use, it has often been identified as the food basket of the

6 Global Report on Internal..., pp. 1–2.

7 Global Report on Internal..., pp. 2–4.

8 Jakob Kellenberger, 'Root Causes and Prevention of Internal Displacement: the ICRC Full Name Perspective,' Statement by Jakob Kellenberger, President of the ICRC, Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and IDP Full Names in Africa, Kampala, Uganda, 23 October, 2009, <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/statement/displacement-statement-231009.htm> (accessed 12 January 2019); Sarah K. Lischer, 'Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement,' *Civil Wars*, Vol. 9, 2007, pp. 142–155; Patrick Vinck and Ed Bell, 'Violent Conflicts and Displacement in Central Mindanao: Challenges to Recovery and Development,' World Food Programme (WFP), World Bank Group (WBG) & Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), 2011, pp. 1–72, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/926381468333957708/pdf/681780v10WP0P100annexes0Full0report.pdf> (accessed 17 April 2019); Courtland W. Robinson, *Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Development-Induced Displacement*. An Occasional paper. Washington DC: The Brookings-SAIS, 2003; Omar Abdi, *Causes of Displacement and Protection Gaps in Somalia*, Mogadishu: CERPA, 2016, pp. 7–11; Mahendra P. Lama, 'Internal Displacement in India: Causes, Protection and Dilemma,' *Forced Migration Review*, 8, pp. 24–26; Katrina M. Powell, 'Rhetorics of Displacement: Constructing Identities in Forced Relocations,' *College English*, Vol. 74, No. 4, 2012, pp. 299–324.

9 National Population Commission (NPC), *2006 Population and Housing Census: Priority Table*, Vol. III, Abuja, Nigeria, 2010, pp. 35–36.

nation. It is this natural habitat, which endeared Benue to herders not only from the far north of the country, but also as far as West Africa regions.



Figure 1. Map of Nigeria showing Benue State¹⁰

There are eight IDP Camps in Benue. The camps are: the LGEA and UNHCR Shelter Camp, Daudu; Guma Local Government Area; LGEA Primary School, Ugba, Logo LGA; Abeda Camp, Logo LGA; Anyiin Camp, Logo LGA; Abagena or Agan Camp, Logo LGA; Gbajimba Camp and Tse-Ginde Camp, Gumi LGA.¹¹ Two IDP Camps were selected as study areas: the Abagena and Daudu. The first non-participant observation was held in January, while the interviews commenced in both camps in August 2018. Data were translated descriptively. While some respondents gave their names, others did not or were deliberately tagged as key informants owing to being underage. The study is important for many reasons. Aside from the shifting attention of

10 'How Benue APC May have stumbled on completely undercutting Ethnicity,' *Intervention Journalism & Ethnicity*, 9 December 2018, <https://intervention.ng/14000/> (accessed 15 December 2019).

11 Peter Duru, 'Farmers/Herdsman Crisis: 80,450 Children Trapped in eight IDP Camps across Benue,' *Vanguard Newspaper*, 24 March 2018, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/03/farmers-herdsman-crisis-80450-children-trapped-eight-idp-camps-across-benue/> (accessed 12 April 2019).

studies from the North-East¹² to the North-Central, it will add to knowledge on IDPs and their challenges. To achieve these objectives, the study engages in a qualitative methodology. It adopts the use of academic literature, media reports, non-participant observations and interviews.

Conflict, Internally Displaced Persons and Internal Displacement: Conceptual Clarifications

Conflict is an existing state of disagreement or hostility between two or more people.¹³ It is believed to emanate when two or more groups engage in a struggle over values to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals.¹⁴ Though there is a general belief that conflict is as old as man and experienced throughout the world, the case of developing countries, especially in Africa, seems to be peculiar. Conflict has pervaded the African continent for the last three decades. In fact, over half of African countries had been affected by one form of conflict or another as of January 2000,¹⁵ with its causes varying across the globe.

There have also been debates as to a definite and all-encompassing definition for IDPs. Although no comparable international agreement exist for IDPs, a normative framework exists and has evolved. In 1992, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a former Sudanese diplomat, Francis M. Deng as his representative on IDPs.¹⁶ Following years of collaborative work with stakeholders in international and regional organisations, in 1998 Deng presented the UN system with a working definition for IDPs as: “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence,

12 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Internal Displacement in North East Nigeria: Operationalising the Kampala Convention in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States,’ Abuja: ICRC, 2016; Fatima K. Mohammed, ‘The Causes and Consequences of Internal Displacement in Nigeria and Related Governance Challenges,’ Working paper FG 8 April. Berlin, 2017, pp. 1–39; Onaedo C. Ejiofor, Samuel. Oni and John V. Sejoro, ‘An Assessment of the Impact of Internal Displacement on Human Security in Northern Nigeria,’ *AUDRI*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2017, pp. 19–42; UNICEF, ‘WASH as a Cornerstone for Conquering the 2017 Cholera Outbreak in Borno State, Northeast Nigeria,’ 2018, <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/media/1286/file> (assessed 12 April 2019).

13 Michael Nicholson, *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

14 Lewis Coser, *The Function of Conflict*, New York: Free Press, 1956, p. 8; Ho-Won Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies: An Introduction*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000, pp. 3–6.

15 Department for International Development (DFID), *The Causes of Conflict in Africa: Consultation Document* UK: DFID, 2001, pp. 7–8; 13–15.

16 Robinson, *Risks and Rights...*, p. 2.

violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.”¹⁷

Asplet defines Internal Displacement as, “the involuntary or forced movement, evacuation or relocation of persons or groups of persons within internationally recognised state borders.”¹⁸ He posits that it consists of three phases which are: pre-displacement, during displacement and post-displacement.¹⁹ He further defined the pre-displacement stage as when the state’s focus should be on preventing displacement from occurring; During the displacement phase the state focuses on protection and assistance for IDPs and affected communities, as well as steps to resolve the circumstances originally leading to the displacement; and the post-displacement phase is when the state begins to find durable solutions for the affected IDPs, delivering development, and humanitarian assistance and building sustainable livelihoods.²⁰

For this study, we define IDPs as groups of persons who are involuntarily or forcefully evicted from their homes to another place as a result of man-made or natural activities, but still within their national borders. It is instructive to note that conflicts are man-made and that natural disasters are sometimes influenced by human activities.²¹ Thus, we shall examine the causes and challenges of the IDPs in Benue, Nigeria.

The Causes of the Emergence of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Benue

During British colonial rule, grazing routes were confined to the Northern part due to the specificities, in terms of economic survival, and cultural attachments of the Fulani ethnic group to nomadism as well as the incidences of trypanosomiasis in the southern part of Nigeria.²² However, with frequent drought and the desertification of the Sahara, the herdsmen began to move southwards.

After independence, while the administration of the northern region maintained the grazing routes for the group’s nomadic culture, owing to its increasing population, the other regional administrations, which included

17 Francis Deng, ‘Foreword,’ in *Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New York: Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1999, pp. i–iii.

18 Mike Asplet, *Internal Displacement; Responsibility and Action*, Geneva and New York: IPU & UNHCR, 2013, p. 18.

19 Asplet, *Internal Displacement...*, p. 18.

20 Asplet, *Internal Displacement...*, p. 18.

21 Abdi, *Causes of Displacement...*, p.4.

22 Stone Conroy, ‘Land Conflict and Lethal Violence in Nigeria; Patterns, Mapping and Evolution (2006–2014),’ *IFRA Working Paper Series*, No. 38, 2014, pp. 1–38.

western and eastern regions, only created grazing reserves in their respective domains to accommodate the Fulani Herdsmen. After the Civil War, and the creation of states, most of these reserves could no longer be sustained, managed, or increased, hence leading to the roaming of the herders to graze their herds, and a surge in the movement further down the southern part of Nigeria. Studies by the government of Nigeria show that the movement of the pastoralists in large numbers became visible in the 1970s.²³

Although in the course of these movements, the herders became victims of cattle rustlers, with many rustlers accused of killing the herders, stealing the cattle or both. Consequently, the herders became militarised by carrying arms to defend themselves²⁴ as well as maiming farmers who tried to stop them from feeding their herds on farms or who made attempts to scare their herds. Most of these herders, who are mostly Fulani, were under the umbrella of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN), with a suspicion of having formed a Militia group to defend its interests. Though they remain the most populous, they are not the only ethnic group engaged in nomadic culture, as Arabs, Kanuri, Kanembu, Manga, Shuwa etc., are also involved.²⁵ In fact, some ethnic groups, including the Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Igede, Idoma, among others, sometimes, were indirectly involved by contracting some of these Fulani herders to help them rear herds, of which an amount is paid for such services.

The Benue conflict centres on resources, passage and culture. Notably, the most important possession in the Fulani society is cattle, to which many traditions, beliefs and taboos are attached.²⁶ It is in this context that Benue and its indigenous people found themselves. The conflict, known as the Herdsmen-farmers crisis, has over the years become the major source of conflicts in the state and the entire middle-belt region. Other fringe causes of the conflict are

23 Conroy, 'Land Conflict...', p. 6.

24 This should be the responsibility of the state, though the herders have taken it upon themselves and over the years, became un-checked. By this neglect of such illegal possession of arms, some of them became a threat to the communities where they grazed.

25 David Okwor, *The Political Economy of the Conflict between the Farmers and Fulani Herdsmen in the Contemporary Era of Climate Change in Nigeria*, an unpublished research paper in partial fulfilment of a Master Thesis, Institute of Social Sciences, 2016, p. 11; Roger Blench, 'Conflict Between Pastoralists and Cultivators in Nigeria,' *Review paper prepared for Department for International Development, (DFID)*, UK: Cambridge, 9 August 2010, pp. 2–3, <http://www.rogerblench.info/Development/Nigeria/Pastoralism/Fadama%20II%20paper.pdf> (accessed 15 February 2018); Ulrich Braukämper, 'Strategies of Environmental Adaptation and Patterns of Transhumance of the Shuwa Arabs in the Nigerian Chad Basin,' *Nomadic Peoples*, 1996, pp. 53–67.

26 Emmanuel O. Ojo, 'Nigeria's Democracy: the Trilemma of Herdsmenism, Terrorism and Vampirism,' *Inkanyiso: Journal of Hum & Soc. Sciences*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2017, p 15.

population growth, technological and economic changes, crime, political and ethnic strife, cultural changes.²⁷

In recent times, this conflict has led to an unprecedented increase in both human and capital losses. The conflict has largely affected the North-Central and Southern parts of Nigeria, and very few cases exist in the northern part. To be sure, some scholars in a study into the causes of conflicts in 27 communities in North-Central Nigeria, revealed that over 40% of the households surveyed had experienced agricultural land related conflicts, with respondents recalling conflicts dated as far back as 1965 and as recent as 2005.²⁸ To get a wider insight, an Intelligence think-tank, SBMorgen (SBM), revealed that, of the security challenges that faced Nigeria in 2016, the Boko Haram incidents account for 44%, with 38% fatalities; cattle rustling for 7% incidents, 15% fatalities; Fulani Herdsmen accounted for 29% incidents, 44% fatalities; and Niger-Delta Militancy accounted for 20% incidents, 3% fatalities. It further provided a tabular representation of the phenomenon, thus:

Security Challenges	No of Incidents	Fatalities	Average fatalities per Incident
Boko haram	71	1240	17
Cattle Rustling	12	470	39
Fulani Herdsmen	47	1425	30
Pastoral Conflict	59	1895	32
Niger Delta Militancy	32	97	3
Total	221	5127	121

Table 1. Representation of Nigeria's Security Threat²⁹

The table above is instructive, because it shows that the Fulani herdsmen and the pastoral conflict were two major determinants of the security threat facing the country in 2016. Although the Boko Haram challenges may have yielded

27 International Crisis Group, 'Herders Against Farmer: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict,' *Africa Report* N° 252, 19 September 2017, Belgium: ICG, p. 3.

28 Anthony A. Nyong and Charles Fiki, 'Droughts-Related Conflicts, Management and Resolution in the West African Sahel,' *Human Security and Climate change International Workshop*, Oslo; GECHS, CICERO and PR20, 2005, pp. 5–16.

29 'A Look at Nigeria's Security Situation,' *SB Morgen Intelligence*, 2017, pp. 2–3, https://sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/201701_Security-report.pdf (accessed 11 October 2019).

the highest number of incidents, its fatalities and average fatalities per incident were low. Be that as it may, most of these Farmer-Herder or Pastoral-Conflict attacks were caused as a result of reprisal attacks, thereby creating a cycle of recurrent conflict.³⁰ More so, such conflict has evolved from spontaneous reactions to provocations and on to deadlier planned attacks, particularly in the middle belt states of Benue, Plateau, Adamawa, Nasarawa and Taraba.³¹ Hence, a conflict has that arose from arable crop farmers and cattle herdsman has become a recurrent predicament in many parts of Nigeria.³²

Undoubtedly, the herders mostly initiate or instigate the violence. For instance, a study of land use conflict in some northern parts revealed that, the actions of farmers constituted 40.9% and herder's actions amounted to 44.1%, which implies that herders were sometimes the instigators of a farmers-herders conflict. He furthered that intrusions on grazing reserves (31.7%) and encroachment on waterholes for cattle (9.2%) were actions that caused skirmishes, while deliberate grazing of cattle on crops (23.3%), and herders' indiscriminate bush burning (20.8%) often enraged the farmers.³³

These activities have had negative impacts on the farming communities. To be specific, in Benue it was reported that over 3,920 persons lost their lives in the Agatu massacres between 2013 and 2017, while about 2,000 others died at various IDP camps set up for the victims in parts of the state. Furthermore, the report stated that the militia invaded Benue on 12 May 2013 through Oweto and headed to Ekwo Okpanchenyi and Iwali as early as 7am, where women and children were hacked to death in their sleep. Such attacks were repeated on communities like Okwutanobe, Ekwuman, Ogwule Ankpa, Okpagabi, Ello, Ichogolugwu, Ogbagede, Enicha, Ejima 1 and Ejima 2, Ogbayi, Ogwumogbo among other communities between late 2013 and early 2017.³⁴

Consequent upon this, the Benue House of Assembly passed the Anti-Grazing law to resolve past problems of herders-farmers clashes in May 2017, but which came into effect on 1 November 2017. This may have contributed to

30 Mohammed, 'The Causes and Consequences...', p. 21.

31 International Crisis Group, 'Stopping Nigeria's Spirally Farmer-Herder Violence,' *Africa Report* N° 262, 26 July 2018, Belgium: ICG, pp. i, 31.

32 Oluwasegun, A. Adekunle and Solagberu R. Adisa, 'An Empirical Phenomenological Psychological Study of Farmer-herdsmen conflicts in North-central Nigeria,' *Journal of Alternative Perspective in the Social Sciences*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2010, p. 2.

33 Nathaniel O. Adeoye, 'Land Use Conflict Between Farmers and Herdsmen in Parts of Kano, Yobe and Borno States of Nigeria: Nomads' Viewpoint,' *Ghana Journal of Geography*, Vol. 9, No.1, 2017, pp. 127–151.

34 Peter Duru, 'AGATU MASSACRES: We can forgive but won't forget how Fulani herdsmen killed 6,000 of our kinsmen—Locals,' *Vanguard Newspaper*, 5 February 2017, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/02/agatu-massacres-can-forgive-wont-forget-fulani-herdsmen-killed-6000-kinsmen-locals/> (accessed 14 April 2019).

the heightened tension.³⁵ For instance, members of the MACBAN outrightly rejected the law, arguing it was against their culture, economic interest and constitutional rights. They made threats to challenge the law from becoming effective through all legal means enshrined in the country's constitution. Thus, when attacks on the communities started, the herdsmen and their militia arm became the primary suspects by pundits. The attacks further led to loss of life, property and livelihood. For instance, the Benue state government revealed that the state had lost 1,878 lives in 2017 alone to the conflict, 222 disappeared and 750 grievously wounded (this includes 526 women, 200 (38%) of whom were pregnant and another 231 (44%) nursing mothers in the first quarter of 2018), and another 425 lost their lives people between January and May 2018; as well as over N400 billion in property to the Herdsmen attack between 2015 and June 2018.³⁶ To understand this phenomenon, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) revealed that, 60% of the 169,922 people displaced by the conflict (which makes up around 102,000) were children forced out of school in Benue state alone in 2018.³⁷

There have been questions as to how the (Fulani Militias) mobilised themselves, strategised their attacks and left the scenes without being apprehended, even when at times security personnel were aware of such looming attacks or their presence. Some have suggested that the conflict has been politicised in such a way that security personnel and the government often looked the other way when these militias planned their attacks or attacked their targets. One scenario a scholar has painted as most likely, is that when collective identities are mobilised, politicised and 'hardened' by conflict entrepreneurs, such events often take place.³⁸

Quite aside from this, floods have also been a recurrent challenge to residents and one of the causes of the state of displacements in Benue. For example, there were floods in 2012, 2015 and 2017. The flood in 2012 was blamed on the overflowing of the Lagdo lake Reservoir in Cameroon and the last displacement caused by flood was in September 2017. However, the

35 International Crisis Group, 'Herdsmen against...', pp. 13–18; International Crisis Group, 'Stopping Nigeria's...', p. 8.

36 *Global Rights. A Joint Communiqué by a Joint Civil Society Organisation*, 'The Crisis in the Benue Valley and other Parts of Nigeria,' 4 May 2018, <http://www.globalrights.org/ngn/news/the-crisis-in-the-benue-valley-and-other-parts-of-nigeria/> (accessed 23 September 2019); Tunde Ajaja, 'Benue has lost N400bn to herdsmen attacks—Ortom,' *Punch Newspaper*, 8 September 2018, <https://punchng.com/benue-has-lost-n400bn-to-herdsmen-attacks-ortom/> (accessed 23 September 2019).

37 Human Rights Watch (HRW), 'Nigeria: Rising Toll of Middle-Belt Violence: Urgently Step Up Investigations: Hold Attackers to Account,' 28 June 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/28/nigeria-rising-toll-middle-belt-violence> (accessed 12 September 2018).

38 Lucy Hovil, *Refugees, Conflict and the Search for Belonging*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 17–42.

most recent displacement, since January 2018, has been caused by the Fulani Herdsmen-Farmers crisis. Although these crises are not unique to the Middle Belt area of Nigeria, or Nigeria alone,³⁹ as a result of the incessant insecurity in the country,⁴⁰ Benue's situation is mostly underreported, politicised and downplayed. A development which has overshadowed the challenges faced by its teeming IDPs.

The challenges facing IDPs in Benue State

Generally, most IDPs usually suffer lack of basic needs, which are often neglected by government and other stakeholders. Some of these basic needs are portable water, food, lack of shelter and even toilets. Even when some of these services exists or are provided, they are usually not enough, hence lead to discrimination and further abuse.⁴¹

Specifically in Benue, about 300,000 persons were believed to have fled their ancestral lands due to the incessant herdsmen-farmer clashes to live in designated Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in Benue State, North-Central Nigeria in January 2018.⁴² Although, a report stated that about 500,000 displaced local farmers have been created by the crises,⁴³ this included some displaced persons who are squatting in other parts not designated as IDP camps. These numbers were arrived at based on the revelation of the Benue State Emergency management Agency (BSEMA), which indicated that about 175,070 were displaced as at March 2018, together with another 10,940 refugees from Southern Cameroon who were taking refuge in Abande and Imande-Agbatse camps, in Kwande Local Government Area (LGA). The agency revealed that there were 80,450 children, of which 47,353 were males, while 39,909 were females.⁴⁴

However, the issue of managing the IDPs and returning them home remains problematic owing to the fact that most developing countries, including Nigeria, are hardly prepared for such emergency crises. And when preparations are

39 There are evidences in Democratic Republic of Congo, Central Africa Republic (CAR), Mali, and other West Africa regions. See: Chom Bagu and Katie Smith, 'Past is Prologue: Criminality & Reprisal attacks in Nigeria's Middle Belt,' Washington; Search for Common Ground, 2017, pp. 7, 15.

40 Olasupo O. Thompson, Abiodun S. Afolabi and Shola A. Abdulbaki, 'Beyond the 'capture of 'Camp Zero': Terrorism and Insecurity in a Failing-Weak State,' *Indian Quarterly: A Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 75, No. 3, 2019, p.1, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0974928419860922> (accessed 18 September 2019).

41 Asplet, *Internal Displacement*...., p.17.

42 International Crisis Group, 'Stopping Nigeria's...', p. i.

43 Peter Duru, 'O Benue, it is 500 dead in 196 days!', *Vanguard Newspaper*, 15 July 2018, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/o-benue-it-is-500-dead-in-196-days/> (accessed 27 July 2019).

44 Duru, 'O Benue, it is 500 dead...'

being made, management of situations and resources are usually controversial, politicised and complex, thereby, complicating the living, health conditions and survival tendencies of the IDPs. Aside from the challenges of surviving in these camps, there are also some attendant challenges such as disease, lack of social amenities, power supply, including portable water, good nutrition, lack of education and sustainable livelihoods, among other things. Some interviews conducted show that the challenges vary across age, sex, status and group, even though, they meet at a lack of adequate social amenities.

Studies elsewhere have identified inadequate amenities, unconducive and inadequate shelter/accommodation, food, clothing, human rights abuses, their general welfare and conditions, including lack of social amenities, such as access to school, portable water, electricity, toilet, sanitation, poor waste management, among others.⁴⁵ To understand the Benue IDP peculiarities, observations and interviews were held. To wit, the Chairman of the Abagena IDPs camp, Philip Utsatse, corroborated some of the challenges facing the IDPs as including lack of adequate accommodation and even fever caused by rainfall, which permeates the rooms due to lack of windows.⁴⁶ Corroboratively, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), observed that the Nigerian IDPs were facing dire living conditions and enormous challenges including inadequate or lack of food, nutrition, water and sanitation, as well as limited health facilities.⁴⁷

Although the UNHCR study was based on the state of IDPs in Borno State, there is no doubt that this is evidenced among the Benue IDPs, since this seems to be a general situation in developing countries. For example, a key informant said, “it is a shame that I cannot go to school because my mates will be in school now and I am here, where we do not have any school. And if a school is provided here, I will miss my friends, as we usually played together.”⁴⁸ Although one could see some makeshift tutorial strands for some children, they were either non-standard schools or incomparable to what most of the pupils had previously enjoyed back home. To be sure, a key informant

45 Olumuyiwa O. Odusanya, ‘Editorial: The Health of Internally Displacement Persons,’ *Nigeria Postgraduate Medical Journal*, Vol. 23, 2016, p. 159; Grace W. Akuto, ‘Challenge of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Nigeria: Implications for Counselling and the Roles of Key Stakeholders,’ *International Journal of Innovative Psychology & Social Development*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2017, pp. 23–24; Stephen Adewale, ‘Internally Displaced Persons and the Challenges of Survival in Abuja,’ *African Security Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2016, pp. 176–192; Ketevan Sulava, ‘At the Crossroads of Identity, Belongings and the Myth of Return: A Case Study of Georgian internally Displaced Persons of 1992-93,’ MA Dissertation, Graduate School Hague, 2010, p. 9.

46 Interview with Philip Utsatse, Chairman Abagena IDP, 12 August 2018.

47 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Nigeria Situation 2017,’ pp. 4, 9. <https://www.unhcr.org/597704b87.pdf> (accessed 27 July 2019).

48 Interview with an anonymous child, 8years, Abagena IDP Camp, 12 August 2018.

said, “though some people volunteered to teach us, I do not like the school as a result of the environmental condition. It is different from how my teachers taught us. I miss my teachers.”⁴⁹

Aside from children, women are also some of the victims of the violence. Most of the women we held personal discussions with revealed that, apart from their living conditions, they are also confronted with loss of livelihood, which had mainly been farming. Some also decried the loss of their bread winners--- sons or husbands; and others mentioned sanitation and hygiene, theft, as well as lack of privacy. As one woman put it, “I do not know where my husband is since the attack on my village early this year. We are farmers but now, we cannot go to farm, because the herdsmen have taken over our farms. Here, what they give us a week is only rationed and not compared to what I eat in my house a day.”⁵⁰

Another woman complained of unavailability of cash, which would have helped her family purchase whatever they wanted. In fact, a pregnant woman put it thus, “sometimes I have cravings for a certain food but what they bring is not often what I like. My husband is dead and the unborn child I carry is the only memory of him.”⁵¹

In fact, it was reported that three pregnant women had miscarried as a result of a measles infection, though it was later debunked that the miscarriages had been the result of the disease.⁵² Lately, it was reported that the 20,835 nursing mothers trapped in the entire IDP camps in the seven local governments of the state were calling on stakeholders to come to their aid, particularly in returning them and their children to their ancestral homes.⁵³ Furthermore, the aged and physically challenged as a result of conflict or before the conflict have also been victims of the conflict. Aggregately, these groups are the most vulnerable population.

Generally, the health challenges of the IDPs range from malaria, diarrhea, measles, malnutrition and cholera. Though the first three remain the most widespread. Thus, Owoaje et al (2016) in their studies on the health problems of IDPs in Africa through the lenses of existing literature revealed that the major physical health problems and symptoms were fever/malaria (85%

49 Interview with an anonymous child, 13 years, Abagena IDP Camp, 12 August 2018.

50 Interview with Mary Dimta, widow, 39 years, Abagena Camp 12 August 2018.

51 Interview with Priscila Angar, pregnant woman, Daudu Camp, 16 August 2018.

52 Hembadoon Orsar, ‘We want to return to our Homes-Benue IDPs cry out,’ *Leadership Newspaper*, 29 September 2018, <https://leadership.ng/2018/09/29/we-want-to-return-to-our-homes-benue-idps-cry-out/> (accessed 17 July 2019).

53 Peter Duru, ‘20,835 nursing mothers trapped in Benue IDP camps,’ *Vanguard*, 11 October 2019, <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/10/20835-nursing-mothers-trapped-in-benue-idps-camps/> (accessed 11 October 2019).

in children and 48% in adults), malnutrition in children (stunting 52% and wasting 6%), malnutrition in adult males (24%), diarrhea (62% in children and 22% in adults) and acute respiratory infections (45%), and further discovered the prevalence of mental health problems as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder (range: 42%–54%) and depression (31%–67%).⁵⁴ In fact, it was reported that while over 30 people were infected with measles at the Abagena IDP camp in early 2018 it claimed the lives of seven children.⁵⁵

The IDPs are faced with other challenges such as sexual violence, child molestations, rape, gender violence, bitterness, fear, enforced terrorism recruitment, including child soldiering, recruitment into suicide bombings, diseases and epidemics, among others. Some scholars working on the sub region state that other challenges include the lack of institutional capacity and adequate resources at the national level; a lack of coordination among stakeholders, which often led to duplication of efforts; insufficient inclusion of IDPs themselves in decision making.⁵⁶ For instance, a woman said, “we thank the government and other donors for their help since I have been in this camp, but this place is not a safe place for me and my children, especially the female ones.”⁵⁷ Furthermore, there has been allegations that some security personnel were involved in raping some female IDPs, especially children.⁵⁸

Aside from the IDPs, some of the neighbouring communities, where the IDPs are camped, also face challenges. Although, they share similar culture and history with the displaced people, most fear that the situation has posed security challenge to their neighbourhoods.⁵⁹ The majority of the neighbours around one of the visited IDP camps emphasised the issue of public safety, health and inadequate resources to serve the community. A key informant said, “I feel for these IDPs, but I am afraid that some of them may come and rob us in the community because a hungry man is an angry man. Also, some of their children may negatively influence our children.”⁶⁰ Thus, some scholars opine

54 Eme T. Owoaje, Obioma C. Uchendu, Tumininu O. Ajayi and Eniola O. Cadmus, ‘A Review of the Health Problems of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa,’ *Nigerian Postgraduate Medical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, October-December 2016, pp. 168–169.

55 Joseph Wantu and Charles Akpeyi, ‘Measles outbreak in IDP kills seven children,’ *The Guardian*, 6 April 2018, <https://guardian.ng/news/measles-outbreak-in-idp-camp-kills-seven-children/> (accessed 12 April 2019).

56 Jessica Wyndham, ‘The challenges of internal displacement in West Africa,’ *Brookings Institutions – University of Bern Project on Displacement*, 19 September 2006, p. 69, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0919westafrica_wyndham_en.pdf (accessed 12 April 2019).

57 Interview with Ms Alice Osah, 28 years, at Abagena Camp, 12 August 2018.

58 ‘Benue Govt Investigate Rape Allegation at IDP Camps’, *Channels Television*, 5 May 2019, <https://www.channelstv.com/2019/05/05/benue-govt-investigates-rape-allegation-at-idp-camps/> (accessed 17 July 2019).

59 Interview with Mark Ntor, around Abagena Camp, 12 August 2018.

60 Interview with anonymous woman around Abagena Camp, 12 August 2018.

that such high levels of housing mobility leads to a deterioration of the social fabric and causes various problems for the residents of the neighbourhood.⁶¹ Little wonder a study of the IDPs in the country's capital city argued that neglect of IDPs has serious implications for the security of the city.⁶²

Such inability to reach a consensus has aggravated the conditions of the IDPs, owing to the fact that the government does not factor such peculiarities into national policy frameworks, and where these are sometimes factored in, they are usually politicised and/or poorly implemented.⁶³

Lord's Song in a strange Land? Government's Intervention and IDPs Response

Since 1999, Nigeria has instituted various domestic frameworks to cater for the welfare of the displaced and to make sure that the places temporarily designated as 'homes' actually become homelike and give the IDPs a sense of belonging. This framework was done through the establishment of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in March 1999. The Part II, Section 6, of the Act, stipulates some of the functions of the agency to formulate policies on matters relating to disaster management, co-ordinate and promote research activities relating to disaster management; monitor the state of preparedness of all organisations or agencies which may contribute to disaster management in Nigeria, but not limited to preparing an annual budget for disaster management in Nigeria, among others things.⁶⁴ For effective decentralisation, Part 8 (1) of The Act further stipulates that federating units have similar disaster agency to manage disasters in the various states, known as State Emergency Management Committees.⁶⁵ Although, this is popularly called State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) across the federating states over the years.

Evidently, the plight of the IDPs in 2017 was a result of perennial flooding, which affected about 21 local government areas in the state, displacing about 110,000 families. In responding to the Benue IDP case, the UNHCR donated

61 Mahallede A.D. Kaybiand, Yerinden E. Dışlanma, 'Loss of Social Belonging, Displacement and Social Exclusion in the Neighborhood: Urban Redevelopment in Sarigol, Istanbul, Turkey,' *CILT*, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2018, p. 171.

62 Adewale, 'Internally Displaced Persons...', pp. 183–192.

63 In Nigeria, while the government of Benue State pointed accusing fingers at the Federal Government of not preventing the Benue Massacre, allegedly caused by the Fulani-Herdsman, the Federal Government and the All Progressives Congress (APC) leadership fired back that such crisis were caused by its oppositions, and even the Governor, Samuel Ortom after he decamped to destabilise the polity.

64 Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), *National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). Establishment Decree etc.*, 1999, Lagos: FMG, 1999, pp. 542–543.

65 Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), *National Emergency...*, p. 545.

a total of 22,220 relief materials worth over N18 million to the victims of flood in Benue State. The materials included, 2,700 blankets, 5,400 sanitary pads, 1,080 solar lanterns, 2,700 inner wears, 5,400 antiseptic bottles, 5,400 detergent sachets and 540 mattresses in September 2017.⁶⁶ The wife of the President, Aisha Buhari was not left out, among those who donated relief materials to the IDPs camped at the International Market Makurdi. But after the violence between late 2017 and early 2018, owing to the farmers-herders crisis, which resulted in another set of IDPs, other interventions became inevitable.

Nigeria's House of Representatives and other stakeholders, including the Benue state government, and the Federal Government through the NEMA also responded to the Benue IDP cases after a deadly attack which occurred on New Year's eve in Guma and Logo local government areas of the state and other neighbouring communities in Nasarawa state. Subsequently, Director General of NEMA Engineer Mustapha Maihaja, represented by the Director Relief and Rehabilitation of the Agency, Kayode Fagbemi, led staff from the North-Central zonal office in providing succour to the people affected by the attacks in the state on 15 January 2018.⁶⁷ Consequently, the FG launched operation *Ayem Akpatuma*, or 'cat race', to end these incessant attacks, which was supposed to run from 15 February to 31 March, 2018 in Benue as well as, Taraba, Kogi, Nasarawa, Kaduna and Niger States. Meanwhile, the Benue state's SEMA, and the government, despite the challenges posed by paucity of funds, also responded with distributions and management of donations and relief materials for the IDPs.

Year	Total Personnel	Overhead	Total Recurrent	Total Cost	Total Allocation
2017	727,769,699	152,230,385	850,000,084	506,120,212	1,386,120,296
2018	836,552,978	152,230,385	988,783,363	532,120,212	1,520,903,575
2019	847,564,926	152,230,385	999,795,311	444,837,821	1,444,633,132

Table 2. Appropriated Budget for NEMA, 2017–2019⁶⁸

66 Joseph Wantu, 'UNHCR donates to Benue IDPs,' *Guardian Newspaper*, 23 September 2017 <https://guardian.ng/news/unhcr-donates-to-benue-idps/> (accessed 23 September 2019).

67 'NEMA Responds to Humanitarian Situation in Benue State,' *NEMA*, 15 January 2018, <http://nema.gov.ng/nema-responds-to-humanitarian-situation-in-benue-state/> (accessed 25 September 2018).

68 Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), *Appropriation Bill. 2017 FGN Budget Proposal*, Abuja: Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2017, pp.12–13; Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), *Appropriation Bill. 2018 FGN Budget Proposal*, Abuja: Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2018, pp.19–20; Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN), *Appropriation Bill. 2019 FGN Budget Proposal*, Abuja: Ministry of Budget and National Planning, 2019, pp. 1, 12.

The above shows that the total allocation increased between 2017 and 2018, while there was a little reduction in 2019. Some Federal Government agencies, such as the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Nigeria Customs Services, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), also donated relief materials to the IDPs. The presidency also responded by not only donating gifts, but by also promising to return the IDPs to their ancestral land, 'home'. This was put succinctly thus:

"We want to ensure that all villages that have been destroyed and attacked are secured. We want to ensure that IDPs return to their homes but, before then, places that were destroyed are rebuilt. Also, we must restore the farms and farmlands so that farmers can go back to work... To ensure that all these projects are funded, the president and the full Security Council has approved N10 billion already...."⁶⁹

The statement is credited to the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, during a two-day visit to one of the IDPs camps in Benue State on 15 May 2018. Again, the Nigeria Army commenced another full scale operation, known as, 'Operation Whirl Stroke', to restore peace in Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa, and Zamfara states. It was believed that the operation would end the incessant attacks, banditry, and restore peace to the areas, so that the people could go about their lawful duties without fear of molestation.⁷⁰ This shows that aside from monetary intervention, military action was also triggered by the FG, to safely return the IDPs home.

State and Individual Level interventions

Additionally, the governor of Rivers State, Nyesom Wike, during his visit to the state over the killing of 73 people during one of the attacks on some of the communities, also donated N200million⁷¹ to the government for the care of the IDPs in February 2018. Other donor stakeholders included, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), private individuals, anonymous contributors, religious leaders, student bodies, philanthropists, business moguls, artists, among others.

During the Children's Day Celebration on 27 May, 2018, the former Senate President, Dr Abubakar Bukola Saraki, visited one of the camps. His visit was

69 Rose Ejembi, 'Insurgency, Killings: FG approves 10billion for rebuilding in Benue and others,' *Sun Newspaper*, 16 May 2018, <http://sunnewsonline.com/insurgency-killings-fg-approves-n10bn-for-rebuilding-in-benue-others/> (accessed 27 September 2018).

70 John Charles, 'Military starts full-scale operation in Benue, three others,' *Punch*, 19 May 2018, <https://punchng.com/military-starts-full-scale-operation-in-benue-three-others/> (accessed 23 September 2019).

71 \$1=N305/306 official exchange rate.

not only to donate relief materials to some of the children in the camp, but he also took out time to spend the day with them. Subsequently, he donated N8 million for the provision of two classroom blocks of four classes each for the 40,000 person capacity IDPs camp at Abagena in September 2018. Most of the IDPs were happy, not only due to finding a place they could temporarily call 'home', but because they were alive.⁷² Despite this level of intervention from stakeholders, to ensure that the IDPs were well taken care of and make the newly found camps homely, how have the IDPs themselves felt?

Responses of IDPs

Regrettably, most of the IDPs stated that, if not for the insecurity in their ancestral homes, they would have preferred returning.⁷³ This shows that, even as they appreciated the various interventions from donors and other stakeholders, they still did not have the sense of belonging in their new found 'homes'. Little wonder that some scholars found that socially inhibited individuals experience psychological and social problems, and equated belonging as a useful concept for social and psychological functioning.⁷⁴ However, when some of the respondents were asked the reasons for such nostalgia, the majority revealed that they needed a livelihood, where they could sell, buy, hold on to physical cash, and live normal lives.⁷⁵

The most prominent reason given was that there was no place like home.⁷⁶ This undoubtedly shows the importance of place attachment and identity, despite the fact that the areas where they were was within their cultural area. Corroboratively, a father of six, Hyacinth Orji, 57 years old, stated that, "our prayer to God and the government is for the crisis to end to enable us to go back home, and adequate security should be provided too for our safe return."⁷⁷ In fact, a woman captured her experience thus:

"How can we be happy here when herdsmen are invading our lands and occupying our territories, farms and feeding our yams and foodstuff to their cows? This place can never be like home, because we cannot

72 Interviews with most of the IDPs interviewed in Abagena Camp 12 August 2018.

73 Some IDP were even withdrawn or aggressive to be interviewed. One was caught murmuring that despite many interviews that had been granted, their status had remained the same.

74 Bonnie M. Hagerty, Reg A Williams, James C. Coyne and Margaret R. Early, 'Sense of Belonging and Indicators of Social and Psychological Functioning,' *Archives of Psychiatric Nursing*, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1996, pp. 235–244.

75 Interview with some of the IDPs in Abagena and Daudu Camps, 12, 16 August 2018.

76 Interviews with several IDPs in both Abagena and Daudu Camps, 12, 16 August 2018.

77 Cephas Iorhemen, 'Benue: 51 IDPs dies in six months—Commandant,' *New Telegraph*, 5 July 2018, <https://www.newtelegraphng.com/2018/07/benue-51-idps-died-in-six-months-commandant/> (accessed 13 July 2019).

do as we like. We cannot eat, dress and live the way we like. We have become Israelites in our own land. It is like asking us to sing the Lord's song here, despite the fact that it is within Benue. It can never be like my home."⁷⁸

Ultimately, the IDPs are faced with questions of when to return home; if their once called 'home' could ever remain how it used to be and how a camp far away from home could be called home for this long.

Concluding Remarks

The study examined the meaning and nature of Internally Displaced Persons; the causes for their emergence and challenges facing them as well as government intervention and IDP responses in Benue State, Nigeria. The study found out that the displacements in Benue were caused by flooding and resource conflict, mainly between herders and farmers, especially after the state's anti-grazing law in 2017. It further revealed that those most affected were the vulnerable populations, which include women, children, pregnant women, the sick, the aged, the physically challenged among others. More so, the Benue IDPs, like in other parts of the world, faced similar challenges ranging from lack of food, shelter/accommodation, health, sanitation, and malnutrition etc. Among some of their health challenges, malaria, diarrhea, and measles were the prevalent.

Poignantly, some of the IDPs have lost their lives due to their living conditions, either as a result of illnesses contracted before or after getting to the camps. Perhaps as a result of lack of planning, poor and inadequate health and medical care, which in itself is a problem of Nigeria and African continent as a whole. However, to curb these challenges the government and other stakeholders have donated both cash and kind to ameliorate the living conditions of the IDPs and also make them feel at 'home'. It has annually increased the annual budget of the NEMA, except for the 2019 budget. Furthermore, the Federal Government has also reiterated plans to return the IDPs safely home, so that they can live their normal lives. To be sure, the federal government launched several military operations, and also promised financial aid, not only to Benue IDPs but to other IDPs across the country. Despite these promises and interventions, the IDPs are still confronted with numerous challenges, especially on health-related issues, and wanting to return to their ancestral lands. Unfortunately, they still allege that the dreaded herdsman militias still occupy their ancestral lands and that the militias are still backed by government forces.

78 Interview with Mrs Esther Atama in Abagena Camp, 12 August 2018.

The findings of the study further show that no matter the interventions, home, belonging and place identity play germane roles in determining the level of nostalgia. It is hoped that since the root causes of IDPs are better known, especially in the Benue case, this can be holistically addressed, by preventive measures. Such preventive steps, known as the Pinheiro principle, could be applicable to not only resolve the present crisis of IDPs in Benue, but for future cases, across the globe. Furthermore, governments must address the cases of flooding, or natural disasters through early warning or monitoring mechanisms, planning and implementation of the climate change protocol so as to stem the desertification of the Sahara.

On the Farmers-Herders crisis, the government's political will must be animated. This can start when justice is done; by making sure culprits and accomplices, including security agencies and civilians culpable in the conflict, are prosecuted. A policy of social inclusion and good governance should also be instituted, where security of lives, property and rule of law are guaranteed as enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN).

Moreover, a systemic programme by which the herders are educated on best international practices of nomadism should be introduced, borders should be well managed to check illegal inflows of immigrants and weapons. Moreover, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) protocol on movement of people across the sub-region should be addressed, so as to stop the influx of foreign militias and mercenaries alleged to be some of the international perpetrators of the conflict.

Self-Efficacy as a Mechanism for Women's Career Advancement: The Case of Universities of Technology in South Africa

Abstract

This paper focuses on the career advancement strategies of women in higher education. Research has underscored the challenges faced by female academics, but little has been said about the strategies of some women in overcoming these challenges. This study therefore adopts Bandura's notion of self-efficacy to investigate the advancement strategies of women in leadership positions at technical universities in South Africa. The study is qualitative in nature and data was collected through face-to-face interviews. The findings revealed that women's advancement to leadership positions was through self-creativity and self-abilities, as well as through support structures inside and outside their organisations.

Keywords: Self-Efficacy, Career Advancement, Women, Higher Education.

Introduction

Globally, women of all races have been under-represented when it comes to leadership positions in higher education institutions, especially in South Africa. Nevertheless, some institutions have been making progress, which has seen the gradual rise in the number of women into the top structures of executive management. This progress has, however, not been good enough as the ratio of men and women at this level is still uneven, which in turn has driven several higher education institutions worldwide to transform the professional and managerial positions of women in the sector by ensuring equal representation of men and women in leadership positions.² Several actions have been designed worldwide in an attempt to rectify such imbalances. Various countries across the world have introduced legislative interventions such as Employment Equity acts and Affirmative Action policies to address the issue of discrimination and

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2 Karl Hofmeyr and Cindy Mzobe, 'Progress Towards Advancing Women in South African Organizations: Myth or Reality,' *African Journal of Business Management*, Vol. 6, No. 4, February 2012, pp. 1276–1289.

fairness in the workplace, with European countries leading the way in this regard by offering reasonably paid childcare facilities, parental leave, and gender training to administrative staff and faculty members.³ Employment equity legislation was introduced to ensure women and other designated groups are equally represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workplace, while affirmative action is seen as a short-term strategy to eradicate systemic discrimination in the workplace such as the exclusion of women for reasons not related to job requirements.⁴ It could thus be argued that despite the numerous studies that have clarified the challenges faced by women, and the legislative instruments (such as the Employment Equity Act and Affirmative Action) that have been designed to redress these imbalances in the workplace, the pace of change remains slow.⁵ With regard the number of women who occupy senior management and leadership positions globally, South Africa is still lagging behind by 5%, even though it is ranked 15th out of 144 countries on the World Economic Forum (WEF).⁶ The under-representation of women in executive leadership positions in 23 public institutions in South Africa for instance is still a matter of concern.⁷ This researcher believes that using self-efficacy as a mechanism for women's career advancement would provide more effective opportunities in handling the challenges women face in advancing to top positions in higher education. This may possibly inspire women who aspire to be in similar positions to follow the same strategies.

Self-Efficacy as a Mechanism for Women's Career Advancement

This study examined how self-efficacy can be used as a mechanism for women's career advancement in terms of barriers, support and strategies. As previously iterated, the under-representation of women in leadership positions has been a cause for concern and the role of self-efficacy as a facilitator of women in leadership is proposed. Self-efficacy refers to belief in one's abilities to organise and execute the course of action needed to produce a particular

- 3 Heather Boushey and Jane Farrell, 'A Woman's Agenda for the 21st Century: a Dozen Policies to Promote Economic Security for Women and Their Families,' *Centre for American Progress*, 2013, <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2013/05/23/64276/a-womans-agenda-for-the-21st-century> (accessed 10 May 2019).
- 4 Clive Hunters, *Managing People in South Africa: Human Resource Management as Competitive Advantage 2nd* (ed), Pretoria: ABC Printer, 2012.
- 5 Lorene S. Coward, 'Barriers to Women's Progress: Psychology as Basis and Solution,' *Forum on Public Policy*, Vol. 5, 2010, pp. 1–12.
- 6 Grant Thornton International Business Report, *Women in Senior Management: Still Not Enough. an Instinct for Growth*, www.slideshare.net/GranThorntonplbr-2012-women-in-seniormanagement-still-not-enough (accessed 8 August 2016).
- 7 Jill Sperandio, *Gender Equality in Education: Looking Beyond Party*, New York: International Institute for Educational Planning, October 2011, https://genderpolicyforum.files.wordpress.com/.../gender_policy_forum_outcome_rep (accessed 12 January 2018).

goal.⁸ Bandura contends that the behavior of individuals is better predicted by their beliefs than from the actual consequences of their actions. Bandura further argues that having knowledge and skills does not on its own translate into action, because knowledge and action are mediated by self-referential thoughts.

This implies that a person may possess the knowledge and skills required to perform a task, but that person may only perform the action if s/he believes that s/he is capable of performing it. Self-efficacy therefore underscores the fact that competent functioning requires both skills and self-belief if efficacy is to be effective.⁹ This is because self-efficacy beliefs are important in motivating behaviour and reflect an individual's confidence in performing career decision-making tasks, hence increasing human achievement and personal well-being in many ways.¹⁰ In contrast, people who do not believe in their capabilities refrain from difficult tasks because they view them as personal threats. They lack aspiration and commitment, and they give up quickly in the face of adversity because they view insufficient performance as a lack of ability, thus easily losing faith in their capabilities. It is in this regard that this study looks at how women in leadership positions in higher education have managed to overcome such challenges to rise to the top.

Bandura's concept of self-efficacy outlines four sources of efficacy beliefs. The first is *enactive attainment*, which refers to the past experiences of people and how they influence their subsequent belief or disbelief in their abilities. Bandura considers this to be the most powerful contributor to personal self-efficacy, because repeated successes or failures tend to strengthen or lower people's beliefs in their abilities to perform competently. Successful experiences are therefore real evidence that individuals have the capabilities to succeed. Mastery experience is usually developed through self-regulating mechanisms, interaction and cognitive behaviour. These experiences endow individuals with the ability to create and implement the appropriate courses of action needed for success.¹¹

Secondly, *vicarious experiences* are another means of creating and strengthening efficacy beliefs.¹² This can be achieved by observing other people who are similar to ourselves, as this increases individuals' belief in their own abilities to perform similar tasks. Bandura contends that: "Seeing

8 Albert Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977.

9 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*...

10 Fred C. Lunenburg, 'Self-efficacy in the Workplace: Implications for Motivation and Performance,' *International Journal of Management, Business, And Administration*, Vol. 14, No.1, 2011, pp. 221-228.

11 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*...

12 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*...

or visualising other similar people perform successfully can raise self-perceptions of efficacy in observers that they too possess the capabilities to master comparable activities.”¹³

In contrast, observing the failures of others diminishes the judgment of similar individuals of their own efficacy and adversely affects their level of motivation. The relevance of this to career advancement is that people are usually inspired by the success stories of others to undertake certain actions, with the belief that those actions would bring them similar success. This is significant to the empowerment of career women because this researcher believes that the study of the advancement strategies of women who have made it to the top in their careers is likely to reveal factors that could motivate other women to aspire to executive management positions in their careers.

The third source of efficacy beliefs is *Social persuasion*, which refers to the act of verbally convincing people that they possess certain abilities. Social persuasion is one of the abilities needed to master particular activities. When people are persuaded that they are able to master certain tasks, they are likely to put in more sustained effort than if they harbour self-doubts and dwell on personal deficiencies when difficulties arise.¹⁴ This highlights the role that verbal persuasion can play in motivating people towards success in their careers. By contrast, individuals who have been made to believe that they lack capabilities tend to avoid challenging activities that could cultivate their potential abilities.

Finally, people's perceptions of their capabilities can be influenced by physiological and emotional states. In other words, people partly rely on their physical and mental states in assessing their own capabilities. Stress responses, tension and moods are factors that can influence individuals' judgments of personal efficacy. In this regard, a positive mood can enhance self-efficacy beliefs while a depressive mood can diminish judgments of efficacy. The fear of failure is also a feeling that may convince individuals of their inability to perform a particular task. This variable is significant to self-efficacy in the sense that it highlights the importance of people mastering their moods in order to control the adverse effects of such moods on their actions.¹⁵

In conclusion, self-efficacy is therefore relevant to career advancement because it highlights the way people exercise the agency that puts them in control of their own career advancement.¹⁶ This is relevant to the higher

13 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*...

14 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*...

15 Robert Lent W., 'Social Cognitive Career Theory in a Diverse World: Guest Editors' Introduction,' *Journal of Career Assessment*, Vol. 25, Issue 1, 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1069072716657811> (accessed 15 July 2017).

16 Paul Pintrich, 'A Motivational Science Perspective on the Role of Student Motivation

education context in that through the observation of the environment combined with one's own thoughts and behaviours, an individual can alter their own self-regulatory purposes with the aim of attaining particular goals. It is in this regard that the current study adopts Social Cognitive Theory as an appropriate framework to understand the career advancement of women in leadership positions in higher education in terms of their interests, goals, choices and performances.

Application of the Social Cognitive Theory

Social Cognitive Theory has been used by various scholars to demonstrate agency in different areas of human activities.¹⁷ In this regard, Uzunboyly et. al have underscored Social Cognitive Theory notions of self-efficacy and outcome expectations in the career choices that people make. Through a quantitative study of the career decision-making of pre-service special education teachers in North Cyprus, they argued that self-efficacy and outcome expectations have a significant influence on the decisions made by teachers with regard to their career development. They then recommended that interventions that aim at increasing self-efficacy and outcome expectations amongst teacher candidates would go a long way to improving their ability to make decisions for their career development.¹⁸

In a similar study, Kelly used Social Cognitive Theory to look at the causal factors underpinning the disproportionate representation of male and female undergraduate physics students in the USA. Her findings revealed that less than 20 percent of physics graduates in the USA are women.¹⁹ She argued that one of the reasons that female students have lower perceptions of their efficacy in physics than male students, was that they lack many female role models from whom to gain inspiration.²⁰

Also, the Social Cognitive Theory notion of outcome expectations was applied to the study of adolescents pursuing careers in STEM. The study

in Learning and Teaching Contexts,' *Journal of Educational Psychology*, Vol. 95, No. 4, December 2003, pp. 667–68.

17 LaTonya R. Jackson, *The Self-efficacy Beliefs of Black Women Leaders in Fortune 500 Companies*, Theses and Dissertations, 2012, <http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/337> (accessed 24 June 2017).

18 HuseyinUzunboyly, BasakBaglama, NadideÖzer and TugbaKucuktamer, Marina V. Kuimova, 'Opinions of School Counselors about Bullying in Turkish High Schools,' *Social Behavior and Personality*, Vol. 45, No.6, August 2017, pp. 1043–1055.

19 See. Angela Kelly, 'Social Cognitive Perspective of Gender Disparities in Undergraduate Physics,' *Physic Review Physics Education Research*, Vol. 12, No. 2, August 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330045318_Social_cognitive_perspective_of_gender_disparities_in_undergraduate_physics (accessed 3 April 2018).

20 Kelly, 'Social Cognitive Perspective...'

revealed that the expected outcomes that the students imagined for themselves were motivating factors in their interest in STEM or the absence thereof.²¹ A significant finding of the study was that girls had more negative expectations with regard to a future in STEM. The authors argue that the reason for these negative expectations on the part of the girls could result from the fact that adolescence is a period in which girls usually exhibit fears for what the future holds for them. He recommended that there should be interventions in schools to guide adolescents to have more positive expectations by helping them to manage the issue of uncertainties about their future.²²

Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory has also been used to study the way women perform in their careers. In this regard, Social Cognitive Theory was applied to study the impact of domestic violence on the career achievements of women. They assert that there is a correlation between domestic violence and self-efficacy beliefs and the outcome expectations of women who are victims of such situations.²³ This is because an abused woman's self-efficacy belief and outcome expectation for education, or career-related activities, are likely to be influenced by the anticipated negative response of her abuser.²⁴ They then recommend that the Social-Cognitive approach is necessary for the understanding of the situation of abused women and for designing models to empower such women in their careers. Significant in this study is that it highlights the fact that individual will without a facilitating context is not enough to help women advance in their careers. It is in this regard that this researcher believes that the career advancement of women is the result of the mutually-influential relationship between the individual efforts of women and the contexts within which they operate.

In a similar light, Iroegbu has underscored the influence of Bandura's self-efficacy on workplace performance. Through a review of various studies, he reveals that the level of self-efficacy of individuals has an influence on the way they performed at the work place. He, however, argues that such an influence is not found in isolation, but rather in correlation with other contextual factors.²⁵ In other words, for self-efficacy to be effective in enhancing the career

21 See Marie F. Shoffner, Debbie Newsom, Casey A. Barrio Minton and Wachter Morris, 'Young Adolescents' Outcome Expectations: a Qualitative Study,' *Journal of Career Development*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2015, pp. 102–116.

22 Shoffner, Newsom, Minton, Morris, 'Young Adolescents...'

23 See Krista M. Chronister and Ellen Hawley McWhirter, 'Applying Social Cognitive Career Theory to the Empowerment of Battered Women,' *Journal of Counseling and Development*, Vol. 81, 2003, pp. 418–425.

24 Chronister, McWhirter, 'Applying Social Cognitive...'

25 Manasseh N. Iroegbu, 'Self-Efficacy and Work Performance: a Theoretical Framework of Albert Bandura's Model. Review of Findings, Implications and Directions for Future Research,' *Psychology and Behavioral Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2015, pp. 170–173.

achievements of individuals, other facilitating factors must also be involved. This highlights Bandura's triadic concept of Social Cognitive Theory in which individual agents operate in a dialectic relationship with their environment.²⁶ It is also significant to this study because the researcher is looking at how contextual factors and the individual efforts of women in higher education have enabled them to advance to leadership positions.

With regard to the application of Social Cognitive Theory to leadership studies, McCormick et al (2002) explored the link between Social Cognitive Theory's notion of self-efficacy and the performances of people in leadership positions. Through a survey of leadership capability perception of psychology students in a US university, they assert that the functional behavior of individuals in leadership positions is influenced by their perceived self-efficacy.²⁷ This implies that leaders with more self-confidence in their capabilities tend to perform better in their leadership roles.

The study also revealed that women in leadership positions had less confidence in their abilities to perform than their male counterparts of the same age and educational levels. This implies that female leaders tend to have lower levels of perceived self-efficacy than their male counterparts. The researchers attribute this difference to the influence of contextual factors in developing self-efficacy for men and women, and argue that it is this difference that makes women less likely to take up leadership roles than men. This study is significant in that it sheds light on the impact of perceived self-efficacy on leadership performance, as well as how the difference thereof could affect the way men and women advance in their careers. This shows the need for professional women to develop their self-confidence if they hope to as advance to leadership positions in their careers.

In her part, Jackson examined how the careers of black women in leadership positions in the USA have been influenced by their self-efficacy beliefs. Through a survey of black women working in fortune 500 companies in the USA, she revealed that black women in leadership positions have high levels of self-efficacy, which enable them to advance in their careers, despite the challenges encountered in their work environment. The study also revealed that through their achievements, these successful women are influencing and impacting their environment.²⁸ This is significant in the sense that it shows how the actions of individual agents contribute in shaping the environments within which they work. It is in this regard that this researcher believes the success

26 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*...

27 Michael McCormick J., Jesus Tanguma, and Anita Sohn Lopez-Forment, 'Extending Self-efficacy Theory to Leadership: a Review and Empirical Test,' *Journal of Leadership Education*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002, pp. 34-49.

28 Jackson, *The Self-Efficacy Beliefs*...

stories of women in leadership positions in higher education can create a better environment for other women to be motivated to aspire to leadership positions in their own careers.

In conclusion, Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory has been widely applied to different studies to show how individual and environmental factors combine to influence the actions of people. Therefore, this researcher is confident that it is a reliable tool with which to study the strategies that women in higher education use to advance to leadership positions. The fact that the theory has been widely used would also enable this researcher to compare her findings with those of other studies.

Methodology

The study was conducted at all the Universities of Technology in South Africa using non-probability sampling technique. Non-probability sampling focuses on sampling techniques where the units that are investigated are based on the judgment of the researcher.²⁹ Census sampling procedures were used to select women in leadership positions at Universities of Technology in South Africa. It is called a census sample because data is gathered on every member of the population. A census study occurs if the entire population is very small and data is collected from each member of the population. Since there are fewer women (34%) in executive management positions (vice-chancellors and deputy vice-chancellors, registrars and deputy registrars, directors and deans) at UoTs in South Africa, it was reasonable to include the entire population.

The sample size for the study was 37 out of a target population of 37. The study used qualitative research design, whereby semi-structured interviews (telephone and face-to-face interviews) were used to collect the data. A thematic method was used to analyse data and themes that emerged were organised and coded accordingly.

The rights of human subjects and their freedom was taken into account. Their confidentiality, anonymity and voluntary participation was clearly explained to them in the letter of informed consent before the research was conducted. As such, no names of any sort were required on the questionnaires. Those who failed to answer the questionnaires or were not willing to participate in the research were not forced to do so. Ethical approval was sought as per all UoTs' research protocols.

The limitation of this study is that the population to be studied was female staff only. Male staff viewpoints were not included, which can be investigated in a broader study of the same topic. Additionally, the fact that the study is

29 Uma Sekaran and Roger Bougie, *Research Methods for Business: a Skill-building Approach*, Rome: Trento Srl, 2013.

limited to Universities of Technology in South Africa implies that the results can only describe the career advancement strategies of female staff at UoTs and no other higher education institutions. Lastly, the results of the findings were limited to the period in which the study was conducted.

Findings

This section of the paper presents the results and discusses the findings obtained from the interviews in this study. This paper will focus more on the findings that revealed the perception of women and leadership aspirations at Universities of Technology in South Africa.

Perceptions of women and leadership aspirations

The aim of this section was to analyse how women's perceptions of themselves and their roles shaped their leadership aspirations. The following questions were asked under this section:

1. What motivated or inspired you to become a leader?

To begin with the first question, participants noted that what motivated or inspired them to become leaders were their role models, the monotony of lecturing, reading management books, nurturing qualities and psychometric tests. The themes are discussed in detail.

1.1. Role models

Most participants noted that their role models (parents) had motivated them to become leaders. For example, one participant noted that: "My father was a principal in a school and later became an educational specialist. I admired what I saw him doing all the time. And my mom was also a professional nurse. I grew up in a family of leaders and I just decided that I liked what I saw in these people and I wanted to be like them as well. So, and for some reason, I had in me to always be at the forefront of things even at school."

This implies that a role model not only comes from the workplace or elsewhere to motivate someone to advance in their careers. Parents also have a significant role to play in their children's lives so they can look up to them just like this participant did. This view is contrary to what most research has suggested.³⁰ They noted that what facilitates the advancement of women into leadership in higher education was having senior leaders who promote women

30 See Sunny Collings, Lindsey Conner, Kathryn Mcpherson, Brenda Midson and Cheryl Wilson, 'Learning to be Leaders in higher education: What Helps or Hinders Women's Advancement as Leaders in Universities,' *Educational Management Administration and Leadership*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2011, pp. 44–62.

into leadership roles. The importance of mentoring was also confirmed by Blackwood and Brown-Welty and April in studies of women of colour and African-American women.³¹ They noted that mentors encourage women to be more positive about seeking new positions and can assist women who aspire to be in leadership positions.

1.2. Monotony of lecturing

On a different note, some of the participants explained that they started as lecturers but then got bored because challenges were very little and they wanted to move to the next level. The finding of this study is contrary to what other researchers have argued about women's willingness to apply for leadership positions in higher education.³² They noted that women do not apply for promotion posts because they lack the confidence to venture into leadership roles. Similarly another participant notes that major constraints to their career progression is the choice made by women in deciding not to go for promotions, while men are always ready to apply for higher positions even when they lack the official requirements.³³ It is however the contention of the researcher that the decision to strive for career advancement is that of women themselves, and if women are committed to their own advancement just like this participant, more women would be represented in leadership positions.

1.3. Motivated by books

Respondents explained that they read a lot about management and aspiring leaders' books and how they dealt with downfalls. Most of the works they read were on aspiring leaders and motivational speakers. They focused on this kind of reading because they wanted to be successful in leadership. This indicates that developing a culture of reading is a great strategy for career advancement for women, because reading can expose people to experiences other than the ones that they have experienced in real time, and these other experiences can also have an influence on their career actions. Hence, there is need for women to read more leadership books that would guide and provide them with different strategies on how to rise or handle leadership positions.

31 Jothany Blackwood and Sharon Brown-Welty, *Mentoring and Interim Positions: Pathways to Leadership for Women of Color*, Bingley: Emerald Group, Vol. 10, 2011.

32 See. Poutanen Seppo and Anne Kovalainen, 'Gendering Innovation Process in an Industrial Plant – Revisiting Tokenism, Gender and Innovation,' *International Journal of Gender and Entrepreneurship*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2013, pp. 257–274.

33 Margaret Grogan, 'Conclusion: Women around the Reshaping Leadership for Education,' *Journal of Education Administration*, Vol. 48, No. 6, 2010, pp. 782–786.

1.4. Nurturing qualities and psychometric tests

According to Luthra and Dahiya, a leader should have many qualities, such as the ability to inspire confidence, good communication skills and leadership experience. Some participants in this study have similar opinions that leadership is something that grows within a person and sometimes a person could be born with leadership qualities.³⁴ One participant explained that: "For me, nurturing other people has always been something I grew up with, even as a child and taking care of others. What fulfils me in life is to see somebody I met at a particular position, growing to the next." This implies that the personal traits of women are also influential factors in their career actions. It is in this regard that³⁵ assert that the effectiveness of an organisation is linked to qualities such as empathy, warmth, genuineness, concreteness and nurturing traits, which are recognized as women's strength in leadership. Women therefore need to understand how their personal character as women could influence their behaviours, so that they are able to use those personal factors to good effect.

On a different note, it was also noted that the psychometric test was one of the factors that motivated some women to become leaders. One participant said the following;

"I went for psychometric tests on my own to find out if I am a leader because I don't want to waste people's time. I had quite high leadership qualities and that to me was impressive and interesting. The interesting thing when I did the psychometric test, I could see a business person leading big business. Then with that asset I thought it can come in education because education is business and needs a business mindset and that is how I lead. So, I was fortunate in that manner that I am a forward thinker, So I decided that if I want to be in leadership, let me check if I am a leader."

The answer to this question is in line with Bandura's assertion that having knowledge and skills does not on its own translate into action, because self-referential thought is what mediates the relationship between knowledge and action. The response to this finding shows that women possess the knowledge and skills required for a task to be performed, but lack the belief that they are capable of performing that action. Self-efficacy therefore emphasises the fact that competent functioning requires both skills and self-beliefs of efficacy in order to be effective.³⁶

34 AnchalLuthra and DahiyaRicha, 'Effective Leadership is all about Communicating Effectively: Connecting Leadership and Communication,' *International Journal of Management and Business*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2015, pp. 43–48.

35 Grogan, 'Conclusion...', pp. 782–786.

36 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory...*

2. When and how did you become a leader?

This question was posed to find out whether the timeline for the participant to rise or to be involved in leadership was the same for all the participants. This would shed light on the different factors that could influence the rise of women to leadership in different contexts. The following responses were provided:

“The first time that I became a leader, it was at a university as head of department at the old Edgewood College of Education at the time... this is 1995. I think it may have been and after my first pregnancy, I think. And then, it’s been leadership at departmental level... then I was a director of a center... Gender Studies. Director of Research Institute... Dean.”

Another participant said the following:

“When I finished my PhD in 2003, I got nominated for the position of HOD. But just when I was getting ready, the guy who had been appointed Dean approached me saying he liked the way I worked and my work ethics and he said he would like me to work with him and that was how I was set up for leadership. And also the fact that I got my PhD in my early 30s, it was a big thing for a young black woman to attain that and be deputy dean and want to control old men that had been at the university for 30 plus years without their PhDs... it was hostile. I was able to maintain that because getting my PhD actually said to me that I was not stupid. I just said to myself that I had the skills, I could do this, I was not there by default, I didn’t have to bribe anyone or sleep with anyone. But of course I applied like everyone, there was no corruption.”

The above responses imply that the career advancement of women takes different timelines and is influenced by different factors. This implies that even if women have the same aspirations and put in the same efforts, their career advancements may not follow the same pace because the different environments in which they find themselves would facilitate or constrain their advancement in different ways. It is in this regard that this researcher argues with Bandura that environmental factors are instrumental in shaping human action.

3. What advice would you give to someone going into a leadership position for the first time?

The following recommendations were made by participants to women going into leadership positions for the first time: Integrity and humility, hard work and publications, subtlety, training in management, mentorship, networking and courage. The explanations to these recommendations are as follows:

3.1. Integrity and humility

The first piece of advice from the participants was that of integrity and humility. Participants believed that integrity would help women excel in their careers. They recommended that women must be humble enough to ask for direction, but proud enough to say no when things are not correct.

3.2. Hard work and publications

The second recommendation was hard work and determination. They noted that women who are lazy cannot get anywhere or fit into leadership positions, so they must prepare to work hard and do their jobs themselves.

3.3. Subtlety

Another recommendation was that women should be subtle about what they do because once they start questioning and being vocal about what they are doing in terms of discrimination; they may end up actually doing more than what they are fighting for. The following response was what one participant said:

“My advice learning from my own experience is to be subtle...try and be part of it and softly, gently and consciously be very subtle about what they are doing, but once you start tackling it and being a serious advocate and vocal about it, they don't take you seriously then you will get very little done.”

3.4. Training in management

Women were encouraged to do or study management courses because when they are promoted to go into management positions as academics, they have to go as leaders not only as a subject expert.

3.5. Mentorship and networking

Additionally, women were advised to have and to learn from a mentor. They believed that this would help them advance fast in their careers. They also recommended that women should join active women and other leadership development network groups as a means of broadening their horizons and creating a supportive network outside of the organization to grow their leadership potential. The opportunity to network with other women in the industry is a great asset to their growth and development.

3.6. Courage

Women were encouraged to be brave. Participants noted that women should try something totally new in their career, have faith in their own abilities to grow, adapt and have the courage to face their challenges head on.

The responses to this question were very inspiring and the information or suggestions that were given were considered.

Summary of the Findings

One of the objective of this study was to identify the perceptions of women occupying leadership positions in the workplace. This objective aimed to analyse how women's perceptions of themselves and their roles shaped their leadership aspirations. The study revealed that what motivated or inspired women to become leaders was the fact that they had role models, some were bored with lecturing, some wanted a change of level and some were inspired through reading management books, nurturing qualities and psychometric tests. The findings show that women possess the knowledge and skills required for a task to be performed, but lack the belief that they are capable of performing that action. This could be due to the fact that women are still confronted by numerous challenges both at home and at work. Therefore, there is a need for women to change their perceptions and believe more in their abilities and skills because perceptions and skills are required to overcome challenges that stand in the way of advancement. This is in line with Iroegbu's view that the self-efficacy of individuals has an influence on the way they perform at the work place. He however argues that such an influence is not found in isolation, but rather in correlation with other contextual factors.³⁷ In other words, for self-efficacy to be effective in enhancing the career achievements of individuals, other facilitating factors must also be involved.

Conclusion

This paper has examined self-efficacy as a mechanism for women's career advancement. It also examines Albert Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory and its relevance to analysing the career advancement strategies of women in higher education. This focus was inspired by the fact that a vast number of women occupy lower position in higher education in many societies. Their failure to advance to decision-making and leadership roles is disadvantageous to improving economies. This researcher believes that more women taking up leadership responsibilities makes a difference in society in general and higher education in particular. The literature in this chapter revolves more around Social Cognitive Theory, with a specific focus on how self-efficacy can enable women to occupy leadership positions. This is because to a large extent, efficacy belief can determine what challenges individuals choose to undertake; how much effort they spend in pursuit of a goal and how long to persevere in the face of obstacles and failures.³⁸ Participants in this study reported greater

37 Iroegbu, 'Self-Efficacy and Work...', pp. 70–173.

38 Bandura, *Social Learning Theory*...

application of academic self-regulation behaviours known to be associated with school achievement. Specifically, women exerted more effort in their PhD studies, and they were more likely to seek help if they needed it. Also, the findings of this study confirm a body of evidence where females reported lower self-efficacy and lower levels of critical thinking.

In addition, it is recommended that higher education institutions (especially UoTs) should design and offer graduate programmes that reflect the needs of women leaders. This could be achieved if gender-related issues are included in the courses that they offer by all the departments or rather have a degree programme in Gender studies. This is because not all the universities in South Africa offer a degree in gender studies (for instance UoTs) or courses that address gender-related issues in all departments. This would provide women with appropriate career planning and opportunities for the future. Moreover, women should be encouraged to attend training and programmes, such as conferences, workshops and other short courses to widen their knowledge, skills and attitudes. This would help to empower them to advance to the top. It would go a long way in changing the way women perceive themselves and gives them confidence in their own capacity to be effective leaders. Lastly, this study has applied Bandura's Social Cognitive Theory to the study of career advancement strategies of women in leadership in higher education. It would be beneficial for further research to apply the same model to study other aspects that can enable women's advancement to leadership positions.

The Content of Egyptian Textbooks for Islamic Education in Primary Schools²

Abstract

Egyptian textbooks are a source of guidance for what the model Egyptian child, and, in turn, adult should be like. The content of the textbooks *Islamic Upbringing*, used in primary schools during the school year 2015/2016, is wide ranging. They not only teach the basics of religion, such as its dogma or history, but also – among other things – behaviour, respecting work and time, the treatment of animals and care of the environment. Analysis of the content of such textbooks is important when referring to the problems faced by a growing population. The aim of this article is to present how textbooks can be seen as a way to build the basis of a cooperative society and what type of citizen they might create. This is important due to the fact that the books are mainly directed towards Egyptians Muslims.

Keywords: Islamic education, Islamic Upbringing, Egypt, textbooks, primary schools.

Introduction

In every country, textbooks are a part of the educational system which generally contain particular knowledge and behavioural models or other details connected with bringing up children. However, there are different forms of distribution and access to textbooks. For example, in Poland they are approved by the Ministry of Education and later on the teacher or school chooses the specific titles from a list and even sometimes teachers in the same school will pick different books³ and parents are able to buy the books in bookshops.⁴ However, in Egypt the government provides textbooks for pupils at the beginning of each school year or term. The children are given books at school for each subject on their first day.

In this research some books have been selected from Egyptian textbooks for Islamic education in primary schools from the school year 2015/2016, and questions whether such teaching can be understood as developing the basis of a cooperative society and creating citizens aware of civil attitudes.

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2 This article was written as a result of research project financed by the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw as a part of the grant for young researchers (DSM).

3 The personal experience of the author of the article.

4 See list of textbooks: <https://podreczniki.men.gov.pl/> (accessed 11 July 2018).

The entire Egyptian primary education system consists of twelve textbooks (two for each class year) for Islamic education called *Al-tarbiyya ad-diniyya al-islāmiyya*^{5,6} which can be translated as *Islamic Upbringing*. We acknowledge the use of the word “upbringing” as more appropriate than ‘education’. Following the Arab Knowledge Report of 2010/2011, its author considers upbringing as “a consistent process carried out by society through specific mechanisms and methods to give its members all the cultural elements that shape their identity and maintain their knowledge, attitudes, values, standards, and perceptive models, affecting their behaviour in all walks of life (Mohsin, Mustafa, in Arabic, 1997). Moreover, upbringing involves developing a person’s self-image, providing the individual with the elements of social identity, raising awareness, integrating into the cultural and social environment, and preparing for the social and professional roles as an effective and full member of society.”⁷

Governmental textbooks for *Islamic Upbringing* in primary schools (*al-madāris al-ibtidā’iyya*) are the same for every public school. The governmental educational system is supervised by the Ministry of Education. They prepare all religious textbooks, which are later reviewed by a committee from Al-Azhar, the Egyptian Church and Egyptian Ministry of Culture.⁸ The same for Islamic as well Christian ones.⁹ The books are also provided for pupils by the Ministry of Education and this is why in research we consider the Ministry as the publisher, and Egypt as the place of publication. It has to be mentioned that we treat the year in which they are used as the same as the year of publication. However, one should bear in mind that the ultimate goals set out in the books will not be evaluated in accordance with everyday life in Egypt, as there are still many other influences and the education process is not limited to schooling.

The young Egypt society

The Arab Republic of Egypt is one of the most important Middle Eastern countries because of its geographical location and its religious importance,

5 It should be precisely translated as: *Islamic Religious Upbringing* but we use the term *Islamic Upbringing* while talking about these textbooks.

6 All Arabic words written in the article will be presented according to the rules of ISO transcription (International Standardization Organization) except for quotations, which will be presented as the original text.

7 ‘Social upbringing and preparations for the knowledge society,’ *Arab Knowledge Report 2010/2011*, <http://arab-hdr.org/akr/AKR2010-2011/English/AKR2010-2011-Eng-Chapter3.pdf>, p. 47 (accessed 10 July 2018).

8 ‘No abusive words to Christians in Islamic religion school curricula,’ *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 16 December 2016, <https://www.egyptindependent.com/NO-ABUSIVE-WORDS-CHRISTIANS-ISLAMIC-RELIGION-SCHOOL-CURRICULA/> (accessed 20 September 2019).

9 ‘No abusive words...’

connected with Al-Azhar.¹⁰ Egypt is also a very important player on the political map of the Middle East. As Bradley James Cook said: “Egypt’s position as a social, cultural, political leader in the Islamic world places it in the centre of the Muslim debate on Islamic education. Egyptian education, therefore, provides a barometer with which to observe the various forces acting on education in the Islamic world generally.”¹¹

There are more than 97 million Egyptians and the population is growing rapidly.¹² One striking fact is that between 6th December 2015, and 23rd May 2017 the population increased from 90 million to 93 million.¹³ This is one of the most sensitive issues in contemporary Egypt, which will have effect on many other issues. In the future this could have a domino effect, impacting various areas such as the economy¹⁴, society, housing¹⁵, and so on. The Egyptian authorities are also noticing the importance, and potential dangers, of this growth. ‘Abd al-Fattāh as-Sīsī¹⁶ said: “Population growth is a big issue and is a challenge no less dangerous than the challenge of terrorism.”¹⁷ Further noting: “poverty drives people to extremism.”¹⁸

Most of the Egyptian population, 52.23%, are young people, up to 24 years old¹⁹ and of the total 33.29% are children between the ages of 0–14.²⁰ About 90% are Muslim, although it is difficult to gather accurate data for the

10 The most important Islamic (Sunni) institution in the world established in Xth century.

11 Bradley James Cook, ‘Egypt’s National Education Debate,’ *Comparative Education*, Vol. 36, No. 4, November 2000, p. 479.

12 At the time of sending this article for editing, the total was exactly 97,099,996. It is expected that by the time of publication this number will be higher; Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, <http://www.capmas.gov.eg> (accessed 11 July 2018).

13 Hana Afifi, ‘Egypt’s population to reach 91 million in June, up from 90 In December,’ *Ahram Online*, 4 April 2016, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/198714/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-population-to-reach--million-in-June,-up-fr.aspx> (accessed 10 July 2018); ‘Egypt’s population officially reaches 93 million: CAPMAS’, *Ahram Online*, 23 May 2017, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/269352/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-population-officially-reaches--millions-CAP.aspx> (accessed 10 July 2018).

14 See, e.g.: Richard P. Cincotta, Robert Engelman, *Economics and Rapid Change: The Influence of Population Growth*, https://pai.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Economics_and_Rapid_Change_PDF.pdf (accessed 10 July 2018).

15 Especially if we will note that approx. 95% of Egyptians live in less than 5% of their country because of geographical conditions; United Nations Development Programme, <http://www.eg.undp.org/content/egypt/en/home/countryinfo.html> (accessed 10 July 2018).

16 President of the Arab Republic of Egypt from 2014 – present.

17 ‘Population growth is no less dangerous than terrorism: Sisi’, *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 2 May 2017, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/population-growth-no-less-dangerous-terrorism-sisi/> (accessed 10 July 2018).

18 ‘Population growth is...’

19 *Index Mundi. Egypt Demographics Profile 2018*, https://www.indexmundi.com/egypt/demographics_profile.html (accessed 10 July 2018).

20 *Index Mundi...*

exact number.²¹ Danish researcher Henrik Lindberg Hansen draws attention to this point: “The precise number of Copts in Egypt is hard to determine partly because of a lack of statistics, but also because these numbers are highly politicised.”²² He adds as well: “The numbers vary between 5 and 20%; an estimate of 6–10% seems likely. Some recent scholars estimate the number to be as low as 5–6%.”²³

Therefore, analysing Egyptian textbooks in Islamic education is critical as it provides a clue as to what kind of society we can expect in the future, and the values passed on to the majority of pupils (Muslims) in such books. Especially as children make up one third of society. Hence, it should be kept in mind that they will soon grow and they will decide the future of their country – they will build it and maybe one day create a new vision of their homeland. So, what they are taught now will return in the future. Of course, nobody can ever be sure how much of what they learn in school will be taken on and impact the future, but if we think in this way any research (not just into the books) would make no sense. We believe that the first stage of a child’s growth in any country is to provide them with materials that may be useful for them and that give them a start in life by clarifying some issues. That is why research about textbooks is important for providing the basic information that might be needed for the future and building a cooperative society.

The cooperative society in this case means one in which all citizens (Muslims and Christians) cooperate in all fields. They not only accept their mutual existence but fully support each other, work together, help each other, celebrate important events (national and private ones) together and are real friends. They work together not only to gain money and exist. They work

21 There are no accurate statistics for 2018. Most sources suggest that there are approx. 10% of Christians in Egypt (e.g. *Central Intelligence Agency*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg/print_eg.html (accessed 10 July 2018) or *Index Mundi*, https://www.indexmundi.com/egypt/demographics_profile.html (accessed 10 July 2018). Kari Mageed in her article on *Egyptianstreets.com* from June 2017 informed that Christians make up 15 to 23% of the population (source: Kari Mageed, ‘Egypt’s Christian and Muslim Communities Share Ramadan Meals,’ *Egyptian streets*, 23 June 2017, <https://egyptianstreets.com/2017/06/23/egypts-christian-and-muslim-communities-share-ramadan-meals/> (accessed 10 July 2018).

22 Henrik Lindberg Hansen, *Christian-Muslim Relations in Egypt. Politics, Society and Interfaith encounters*, London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2015, p. 72, quoting Andrea Zaki Stephanous, *Political Islam, Citizenship, and Minorities: The Future of Arab Christians in the Islamic Middle East*, Lanham: University Press of America, 2012, p. 119.

23 Lindberg Hansen, *Christian-Muslim...*, p. 72; Rachel M. Scott, *The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslim and the Egyptian State*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 8, and quoting Cornelis Hulsman (ed.), ‘Christians Victims of the Growing Islamist Non-Islamist Divide; the Urgent Need for Peace and Reconciliation,’ *Arab West Report*, 2013, pp. 71–72.

together to grow their country, to make projects together without thinking who prays in which way. Religion is important for them but does not identify them and what is more and crucially – does not divide them. They also protect their homeland and united when faced with danger and rally together in times of happiness and sadness. As has been said many times, Egypt is *id wāḥda* – ‘one hand’. The cooperating Egyptian society is society elaborated from “one hand”. All its citizens have a common interest – developing their country to be a better place to live and to raise their children.

Evaluating the content of textbooks

In Egypt, as was noted above, the government provides textbooks for pupils at the beginning of each school year or term. The cover of each book is directly connected with the subjects and also states the particular school year. The content of each book is, in theory and practice, updated every year. Needless to say, not all the content is changed, but it is possible for the government to make updates to some books every few months or years. Naturally, it provides the chance to update the information according to the latest scientific discoveries, but it also allows the authorities to react to current situations and the country’s particular needs. This point is even less surprising when we learn that every school child studies the same books and teachers do not have the opportunity to make any kind of selection. Differences in books can only really be seen in different kinds of schools, e.g. government-run or private ones. It must also be added that children study all their subjects together. The only exception being religious studies – Muslims study Islamic religion in one place and Copts (or any other Christian religion) in another. Logically, these lessons have different study materials prepared by the government.

Methodology

This research into the textbooks is interdisciplinary. All the textbooks presented were collected and analysed using a qualitative methodology. The results were grouped by creating thematic categories. This method was chosen because a holistic study was felt to be important. The article is a fragmentary presentation of the research results from the author’s PhD dissertation. In the other part of this research different methods were used (e.g. comparative analysis, quantitative analysis and inductive reasoning).

Content of *Islamic Upbringing* in the school year 2015/2016

While talking about the content of the Egyptian *Islamic Upbringing* in primary schools, there is the need to underline one important issue. The topics featured in the textbooks were divided into; a) typically religious and

b) universal in character which is called here “non-religious.” In Islam, all knowledge stems from Islamic teachings, so it is clear that according to the authors of such textbooks, the topics talk about religion directly or some of them result directly from it. Nevertheless, we decided to make this distinction as it is believed that such a division could aid scientific analysis of the content of the books. It can also demonstrate how they are a source of education for normative behaviour in Egyptian society. In this scientific division, religious content includes topics that are connected with typical religious education – its history, information about God and the prophets, rituals etc. The non-religious content includes any other information that matches various fields of science or can be treated as universal messages for the upbringing of children all over the world and not just Muslims. The non-religious content below combines such topics as, for example: lessons about expected behaviour, the importance of patience, personal hygiene, patriotic education, combating extremism, fanaticism and terrorism and the importance of science.

Religious content: Pupils, as might be expected, learn about the rituals and dogmas of Islam and the stories of the prophets, including Muḥammad.²⁴ They are also given basic knowledge of the Quran. The majority of Quranic quotations are used as a source of knowledge, or they confirm the information that the children are taught. Some of them have to be learnt by heart, as, for example, ‘sūrat al-Fātiḥa’ (The Quran 1²⁵), ‘sūrat an-Naṣr’ (The Quran 110), ‘sūrat al-Ihlās’ (The Quran 112), ‘sūrat al-Falaq’ (The Quran 113) or ‘sūrat an-Nās’ (The Quran 114).²⁶ The children also learn about the basics of prayer and ablution before it. The first time they are confronted with this is in the second term of the first year.²⁷ They learn also about the creation of the world. An example can be found in the first book to *Islamic Upbringing*, where pupils are first confronted with the Quranic text. There they learn that God created the sun, moon, air, sky, earth, people, trees, animals, seas and rivers. The people should thank God for His creation and follow His rules.²⁸

24 See more: Edyta Wolny, ‘Historia w egipskich podręcznikach do wychowania muzułmańskiego (2013/2014 do 2015/2016) jako czynnik kształtujący postawy uczniów’ [History in Egyptian textbooks to Islamic Upbringing (2013/2014 till 2015/2016) as a factor shaping pupils’ attitudes], *Przegląd Orientalistyczny*, No. 1–2, pp. 257–258, 2016, pp. 231–240.

25 In this way we cite the Quran – with the reference number following: The Quran and then the number of *Sura* (chapter) and after it would appear the number of *Aya* (verset), for example: “(The Quran 1:2)” would mean: the first *Sura* of the Quran and *Aya* number 2.

26 Al-Ḥusaynī Muḥammad al-Maddāḥ, Muḥammad Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Aḥmad Yahyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya al-islāmiyya li-aṣ-ṣaff al-awwal al-ibtidā’ī. Al-faṣl ad-dirāṣī al-awwal*, Egypt: Wizārat at-tarbiyya wa-at-ta’līm, 2015, pp. 1–2.

27 Muḥammad al-Maddāḥ, Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Yahyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya*..., pp. 5–13.

28 al-Maddāḥ, al-Ḥusaynī, al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya*..., pp. 15–18.

As has been observed, some topics in the textbooks for *Islamic Upbringing* pass typically religious information to the young – in this case connected, of course, with Islam. A lot of chapters include various topics cleverly mixed into the religious ones. Sometimes one prevails, sometimes another.

Religious facts and people presented to students can be featured for one of two reasons. From one side, it could make children aware of religious matters. From the other, there is a design to show them ideal examples of behaviour or thought. An example worth mentioning is the story about Bilāl – the first muezzin of Islam. Children read in the textbook that he was the Ethiopian slave of a rich man from Quraysh²⁹ living in Mecca. He was black-skinned, had the noblest features and a beautiful voice that was later appreciated by the prophet Muḥammad. After deciding to become a Muslim, he needed to defend himself against his owner, who did not accept his decision and was angry because of it. Bilāl was strong in faith, and even after the owner took him to the desert and put a heavy stone on his chest he did not leave Islam. Abū Bakr³⁰ tried to help him, but it did not work and so he eventually bought the Ethiopian and liberated him.³¹ The lesson of Bilāl's life and its importance in the history of Islam is also a chance to teach children about discrimination. The author underlines the fact that the prophet singled Bilāl out because of his voice. It shows that Islam does not accept defining somebody because of the colour of their skin.

Preventing discrimination: Ways of preventing discrimination are also shown in other stories about a man who loved his homeland – Egypt. He spent a lot of time with children from his village and taught them about the Quran and other books, and how to love their motherland and other people. He also taught any visiting doctors and teachers to treat people well, regardless of their gender, religion or the colour of their skin.³² The same lesson is given in patriotic education. The character presented declares his great love and respect for his country and history, and also how he supports it (e.g., by offering land for the school and hospital to be built upon).³³ As is underlined in the book: “All Egyptians are brothers in love of God and the homeland.”³⁴

29 North-Arabian tribe ruling Mecca from the beginning of VIIth century; source: Marek M. Dziekan (ed.), *Arabowie. Słownik encyklopedyczny* [Arabs. Encyclopedic dictionary], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2001, p. 241.

30 Caliph in the years 632–634, friend of prophet Muḥammad and father of his wife ‘Ā’īsa. He was the first of four caliphs who ruled after the death of Muḥammad, known as: ‘Al-Ḥulafā’ ar-rāṣidūn.’

31 Ḥasan Ṣaḥāta, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya al-islāmiyya. Aṣ-ṣaff al-tānī al-ibtidā’ī. Al-faṣl ad-dirāsī al-awwal*, Egypt: Wizārat at-tarbiyya wa-at-ta’līm, 2015, pp. 11–12.

32 ‘Abd al-Ḡalīl Aḥmad Ḥammād, Ṣakīr ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Muḥammad, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya al-islāmiyya. Aṣ-ṣaff al-ḥāmis al-ibtidā’ī. Al-faṣl ad-dirāsī al-awwal*, Egypt: Wizārat at-tarbiyya wa-at-ta’līm, 2015, pp. 27–28.

33 Aḥmad Ḥammād, ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Muḥammad, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya...*, p. 35.

34 Aḥmad Ḥammād, ‘Abd al-‘Azīm Muḥammad, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya...*, pp. 27–28.

The same behaviour toward Christians is shown in different textbooks for *Islamic Upbringing*. Pupils learn that Muslims and Christians should visit each other, share happiness and help in times of difficulty.³⁵

Generally, according to the textbooks, everybody all over the world should live together in peace as all of them are creations of God. They should cooperate, love each other, motivate each other to do good things and work together. This is what God wants from the people.³⁶ A part of the Quran was quoted to prove this statement.³⁷

Proper behaviour: Proper behaviour seems to be a very important part of Egyptian *Islamic Upbringing* books. Appropriate attitudes are mentioned in many lessons.³⁸ Examples include: proper behaviour after waking up and before sleeping, during eating, towards different people, greeting others etc.

The important people for the Islamic religion are also given as examples of proper behaviour. In contrast, those against Muslims and Islam are symbols of bad behaviour. The prioritisation of a polite attitude is also presented in the example of Abū Lahab.³⁹ One day, when the prophet Muḥammad gathered people and invited them to believe in God, Abū Lahab (the prophet's uncle) was rude in his response. Pupils who study the *Islamic Upbringing* must understand that such behaviour is unacceptable. They learn that the prophet did not react to him, as he was polite and did not want to abuse anyone. They study as well that he then defended his uncle and wife from harm, even as they had lain thorns in Muḥammad's way. This example should be followed by all. Children learn that they have to remember that every person who hurts another will be punished by God, and nothing will help them. This statement is confirmed in textbooks by the quotation from the Quran.⁴⁰

Family: Textbooks lay stress on the family and relations within it. A good example of this can be found in a textbook from the second term of the first

35 'Abd al-Ġalīl Ḥammād, Maḥmūd As-Saqārī, Sābir 'Abd al-Mun'im Muḥammad, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya al-islāmīyya. Aṣ-ṣaff' ar-rābi' al-ibtidā'ī. Al-faṣl ad-dirāsī al-awwal*, Egypt: Wizārat at-tarbiyya wa-at-ta'lim, 2015, p. 33; Wolny, 'Historia w egipskich...', p. 235.

36 See: The Quran 5:2. The authors do not cite the whole verse from the Quran in the textbook. They start from: "Help you one another..."; All the quotations of the Quran in the article are rewritten from *The Noble Qur'ān. English Translation of the meanings and commentary*, Madinah: King Fahd Complex For The Printing Of The Holy Qur'ān, 1430 A.H. [2008/2009 A.D. – Edyta Wolny-Abouelwafa's comment].

37 Muḥammad al-Maddāḥ, Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Yahyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya...*, pp. 17–18.

38 Chapters in the textbooks for *Islamic Upbringing* are divided into smaller parts called 'lessons'.

39 Uncle of prophet Muḥammad who was against Islam and his nephew.

40 See: The Quran 111; Muḥammad al-Maddāḥ, Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Yahyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya...*, pp. 20–21.

class.⁴¹ The first point made is that children should love and listen to their parents (so father and mother). The textbooks stress that parents do a lot for their children. The mother has cared for the child throughout nine months of pregnancy, suffered great pain whilst giving birth to them and then breast fed them. Fathers work hard to buy food, clothes and everything the child needs. The unique and special place of parents is also shown in the Quran⁴² and Hadith:

“A person came to the Messenger of Allah and asked, “Who among people is most deserving of my fine treatment?” He said, “Your mother”. He again asked, “Who next?” “Your mother”, the Prophet replied again. He asked, “Who next?” He (the Prophet) said again, “Your mother.” He again asked, “Then who?” Thereupon he said, “Then your father.”⁴³

Respecting the elders: The story of Al-Ḥasan and Al-Ḥusayn is an interesting example of the way in which religious knowledge and universal values are passed on. At the beginning of a lesson, children are told who these two people are – they are the grandsons of the prophet Muḥammad (who raised them) and the sons of ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib⁴⁴ and Fāṭima Az-Zahrā’.⁴⁵ They are told that, once upon a time, while performing their ablutions, they saw an older man who was not performing his ablutions in the proper way. The boys did not want to make him shy, and so Al-Ḥasan asked the old man to judge which of the brothers performed them best. After doing so, the man realised his own method had been wrong and that the boys had wanted to show him politely. He thanked them for the lesson.⁴⁶ This shows that even a short story can contain many hidden messages – for example, proper behaviour among others. By combining religious and universal values, children can learn a lot. Firstly, they memorise one of the most important people from their religion and how to appropriately perform their rites. Further, they learn that they should respect their elders and talk with them politely, help people to act appropriately and thank them for lessons learned – even if they are younger than us. Furthermore, it also proves that younger people can sometimes be right, so before making any decisions, one has to consider if they are or not.

41 Muḥammad al-Maddāh, Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Yahyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya*..., pp. 25–26.

42 The Quran 17:23.

43 Muḥammad al-Maddāh, Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Yahyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya*..., p. 26; Translation of the Hadith was rewritten from: <https://sunnah.com/riyadussaliheen/1/316> (accessed 10 July 2018).

44 Caliph in the years 656–661, cousin and son-in-law of prophet Muḥammad. He was fourth and last of ‘Al-Ḥulafā’ ar-rāšidūn’.

45 Wife of ‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib, daughter of prophet Muḥammad and his first wife Ḥadiḡa.

46 Muḥammad al-Maddāh, Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Yahyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya*..., pp. 17–18; Wolny, ‘Historia...’, p. 233.

Importance of work: The next example shows how a student can be taught things about other areas of knowledge. People from the history of Islam will not be found here, but rather a boy called Ḥālid who went with his father to Friday prayers at the mosque. They both entered the mosque calmly and sat down to listen to a sermon. The Imam was talking about the value of work for the happiness of people and the advancement of society. After leaving, the boy reminded his father of the man who fixed their fridge – if he fixed it properly the first time, the fridge would not have broken again and the man would not need to return. Such information is confirmed in the Hadith: “Verily, the God loves one of you who performs his work properly”⁴⁷, and a few verses of the Quran.⁴⁸

This short description shows how many topics can be found in one lesson. From religious information (aside from knowing and reciting the Quran): the duty of Friday prayers, the duty of going to the mosque to do so, entering the mosque calmly so as not to disturb others, the value of doing a good job, etc. The universal value taught here is that one should complete any work to the best of one’s abilities, making good and useful things and wishing and working for the progress of society. All of which can be achieved by hard work and studying. Children learn that doing something badly only wastes time and stops people from trusting you – as happened with the man repairing the fridge.

Behaviour towards animals: Combining these different types of content is not the only way to teach non-religious values – and sometimes it is difficult to find anything other than universal ones. Textbooks often have the clear message that good Muslims⁴⁹ not only act kindly towards other people, but to animals too. An excellent example is a lesson taught about a cat that entered a stranger’s house. The owner of the house was unhappy about this and wanted to hit the cat. The woman then shut the cat inside one of the rooms. It tried hard to escape, or even just find something to drink or eat, but could not. Finally the cat died. Children are taught to be aware that animals feel pain and suffering, just as humans do. This message was passed on with even greater strength by the Hadith given by Al-Buḥārī and Muslim⁵⁰: “A woman entered the (Hell)

47 Ḥammād, As-Saqārī, ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Muḥammad, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya...*, pp. 17–18; Translation of the Hadith was made by author of this article.

48 The Quran 9:105 and 18:30–31; Ḥammād, As-Saqārī, ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Muḥammad, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya...*, p. 17.

49 Actually it could be written simply “good person” or “good people”, but the word “Muslim” is used because we are talking about the textbook to Islamic education, so the words are addressed to Egyptian Muslim pupils. It has to be added as well that the textbook sometimes makes a division between a good and a bad Muslim. This shows that the authors of the textbooks teach children that every person can be good or bad, can act good or bad and that everybody can make mistakes. The goal is to reach the best – be a good person. That is why the pupils have to learn their own religion and follow the rules of Islam.

50 Al-Buḥārī and Muslim – prominent scholars from IXth century, authors of collections of Hadiths called *ṣaḥīḥ* (true).

Fire because of a cat which she had tied up, neither giving it food nor setting it free to eat from the vermin of the earth.”⁵¹

Behaviour during discussion: In one lesson, called “Do not raise your voice”,⁵² some children were having a loud discussion. One of them wanted to hear the story of the prophet Nūḥ (Noah) and the others did not, as they had already heard it in school. Their father overheard the commotion and disciplined the children, thus reminding them that God forbids the raising of one’s voice.⁵³

Respecting time: In the last book of the *Islamic Upbringing*, children read about the importance of respecting time. The reason for reaching such a conclusion is the story of the pupil Kamāl, who read in a newspaper that his country wanted to place greater focus on tourism.⁵⁴ He also read that a lot of tourist sites had been renovated in the Cairo Governorate – he then decided to propose his school go on a trip to the Japanese Garden.⁵⁵ The school accepted and the day of the trip was chosen. The children were told not to be late. On the day of trip, everybody except Kamāl arrived on time. The boy was twenty minutes late and his teacher was very worried about him. When he eventually arrived, he apologised to the teacher and explained that the car he had been travelling in had broken down. The teacher accepted his apology and said that it had been out of the child’s hands, but the teacher also reminded him that breaking a promise is forbidden in Islam. As proof, the authors of the textbook cited the Hadith: “Three are the signs of a hypocrite: When he speaks, he lies; when he makes a promise, he breaks it; and when he is trusted, he betrays his trust”⁵⁶, and Quran.⁵⁷

Caring for the environment: The same lesson teaches children another very important thing – protecting and caring for the environment, with the teacher asking the children to care about the beauty and cleanliness of the Japanese Garden.⁵⁸ Interestingly, the same topic is mooted in the above

51 Hasan Šaḥāta, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya*..., p. 27; Translation of the Hadith was rewritten from: <https://sunnah.com/bukhari/59/124> (accessed 10 July 2018).

52 Šaḥāta, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya*..., p. 23.

53 The Quran 31:19.

54 Needless to say that at the same time the importance of tourism is presented and citizens should be aware of it.

55 See more: ‘Helwan’s Japanese Garden’, *Daily News Egypt*, 12 September 2012, <https://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/09/12/helwans-japanese-garden/> (accessed 10 July 2018).

56 Muṣṭafā Kāmil Muṣṭafā, Ismā‘īl Muḥammad ‘Abd al-‘Āṭī, Fu‘ād Zidān Bidrān et al., *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya al-islāmiyya. Aṣ-ṣaff as-sādis al-ibtidā‘ī. Al-faṣl ad-dirāsīyat-tānī*, Egypt: Wizārat at-tarbiyya wa-at-ta‘līm, 2015, pp. 16; Translation of the Hadith was rewritten from: <https://sunnah.com/riyadussaliheen/2/9> (accessed 10 July 2018).

57 The Quran 3:9 and 30:6; Kāmil Muṣṭafā, Muḥammad ‘Abd al-‘Āṭī, Zidān Bidrān et al., *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya al-islāmiyya*..., pp. 14–16; The whole verse of the Quran was not cited in the textbook. The missing is: “but most of men know not.”

58 Kāmil Muṣṭafā, Muḥammad ‘Abd al-‘Āṭī, Zidān Bidrān et al., *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya al-islāmiyya*..., p. 16.

mentioned lesson about the creation of the world. The students read about their job with regards to the river Nile. They learn that they have to protect the Nile, do not foul it and throw nothing into it.⁵⁹

Conclusions

All things considered, Egyptian contemporary textbooks for Islamic education in primary schools combine the teaching of Islam with various fields of education, such as *savoir-vivre*, history and social studies, etc. In the textbooks, many values of a universal character are also presented. These are, among other things: respect for the old and the young, prevention of discrimination, proper behaviour towards people and animals, peaceful coexistence with Christians, patriotic education and taking care of the environment. The authors did not forget about tourism – showing the importance of tourism teaches children to respect anything connected with this field. They should respect tourists (and so respect other cultures, other ways of thinking, other religions) and be respectful and proud of their history and its products, of which Egypt is full of. Egyptian Muslims know that their history is made up of all its eras – ancient, Christian and Islamic. That it must not be ignored. On the contrary – they are proud of it and teach it to their children.

The examples given by teachers are appropriate for children – the language is easy (every difficult word – especially from the Quran or Hadith – is explained) and the heroes of the stories face similar problems or situations as those faced by the children who read them.

Clearly, textbooks can be considered as a basis for the development of a cooperative society and a tool for teaching citizens about civic attitudes. They can be treated as one of the many ways to find and create solutions to problems Egypt might face in the future. From big problems, like extremism and terrorism, environmental pollution and feuds between citizens, down to the small details that might help people and the country, such as being on time or being an open and polite person. Finally, this way of teaching children enables them to build their own identity – they can be a good Muslim following the rules of their religion, and a good Egyptian, respecting and loving his land, history and people.

One of the main roles of the textbooks – which has been observed – is to raise an educated person who, on the one hand, follows Islamic values and, on the other, is a devoted citizen. Such a person will take care of more than just his country – he will be more responsible and work harder, will respect time and other people, will be ready to help his fellow citizens at any time – not only

59 Muḥammad al-Maddāh, Al-Fātiḥ al-Ḥusaynī, Yaḥyā Nūr al-Ḥaḡḡāḡī, *At-tarbiyya ad-dīniyya...*, p. 17.

with force (when danger appears) but also with good words and actions, and with all the knowledge received throughout their education.

This kind of teaching is not accidental. The Egyptian Ministry of Education is aware of the problems the country is facing now and may face in the future. The textbooks can be one of the tools for solving difficulties which might appear. This way of leading the educational policy is connected with the policy of the country. Finally, it should be added that the Egyptian government is preparing a reform of the educational system. The new system is planned for implementation in September 2018,⁶⁰ with the current system disappearing completely by 2026.⁶¹ It is interesting and necessary to observe these changes in relation to the subject of the mentioned research, especially that some noteworthy proposals have appeared in the media. An excellent proposal is the idea of combining Al-Azhar school curriculums with government school programmes,⁶² and establishing new textbooks (approved by Al-Azhar and the Coptic Orthodox Church) as a way for religious education in schools that avoids the need to separate Muslim and Christian pupils.⁶³ And how will the new education system influence Islamic education? We will have to wait and make a new analysis later.

60 'Egypt prepares for 'education revolution' launch in September, *Al-Masry Al-Youm*, 2 May 2018, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/egypt-prepares-education-revolution-launch-september/> (accessed 10 July 2018).

61 Hend El-Behary, 'The current educational system will end by 2026: Education Minister', *Egypt Independent*, 30 May 2018, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/the-current-educational-system-will-end-by-2026-education-minister/> (accessed 10 July 2018).

62 'Egypt studying possibility of merging Al-Azhar school curricula with regular school programme: Minister,' *Ahram Online*, 16 April 2018, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/297806/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-studying-possibility-of-merging-ALAzhar-scho.aspx> (accessed 10 July 2018).

63 Jana Bou Matar, 'Same Textbook for Muslim and Christian students in Schools Despite Opposition,' *Egyptian Streets*, 25 May 2018, <https://egyptianstreets.com/2018/05/25/same-textbook-for-muslim-and-christian-students-in-schools-despite-opposition/> (accessed 10 July 2018).

The modern role of traditional Hausa literature. An insight into the Nigerian education system

Abstract

Oral literature, apart from its entertaining qualities, has important functions as a guardian of the social order and harbinger of educational values. Its role in the development of pre-writing societies is indisputable, but as far as social progress goes, traditional orality gradually fades into obscurity of cultural oblivion. This is the case most common in the Western Hemisphere, where traditional forms of literary entertainment have been mostly eradicated during the triumphant march of written sources. Reduced to the form of secondary orality, Western folklore still partially maintains its role as material for formal and informal education. However, mostly reduced to letters, it lacks some important elements that characterise traditional folklore. The following paper tries to evaluate the role of the oral literature in a society where traditional storytelling is still vivid and present. It provides an insight into the evolution of a certain approach towards orality within the Nigerian education system and seeks to underline the implications of this process for the condition of Hausa folklore.

Keywords: Hausa, Nigeria, orality, folklore education, cultural heritage.

Introduction

Oral literature is as old as society itself and the development of the former was always related with the progress in the latter. Over time, orality became a synonym of cultural diversity and a distinctive feature of various cultural groups. This is reflected in its primary function as a guardian of myths, legends and customs, the bearer of the tradition and folklore. Hausa oral literature is no different. It is a multidimensional phenomenon, which in time became able to reflect various cultural functions. Some of them were based on an ancient traditional setting often readapted to reflect changes and cultural transitions, while others reflected the changes in linguistic substrata linked to the development of both oral and more classical literature. However, due to the eradication of traditional beliefs, the mythological and religious aspects of Hausa folklore disappeared over the ages and are today limited only to secluded communities of traditional believers, which tend to have minor social significance and influence in modern day Hausaland. This is a result of the early Islamisation that led to the transmission from traditional beliefs, which

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can be found in modern-day *bori*² rituals, to the organised, but still syncretic Muslim religion, which itself was later “upgraded” into a conservative form by Usman Dan Fodio jihad from the beginning of the 19th Century. As a result, Hausa oral literature in its broadest sense tends therefore to exclude some elements linked with this area of literature, which is frequently addressed by other cultural groups inhabiting modern day Nigeria. Despite the lack of religious elements, Hausa oral literature maintains its social role as a guardian of legends, stories and folktales. The latter, commonly known as *tatsuniyoyi* (fables), have especially strong and indisputable educational potential and as such are the main subject of this particular study on the education and folklore in Hausa society. Apart from the above-mentioned “story based” content, Hausa oral literature also features numerous short forms, such as the proverb (*karin magangana*) and the riddle (*labari/tatsuniya ka cici ka cici*), which have significant educational value and can be linked generally with any form of speech-related social form of amusement that requires wit and knowledge about the society and its common values. It is, needless to say at this point, clear that any short forms of orature can be successfully incorporated into longer ones, which concentrate on telling the story, and this fact is linked directly with the most important principle that defines oral literature – its vernacular assets and how it is presented.

Theoretical and conceptual framework

African folklore in general and Hausa oral literature in particular smoothly fit into the broad concept of cultural heritage, as defined by Brumann as a cultural repertory that includes “sites, movable and immovable artifacts, practices, knowledge items, and other things that a group or society has identified as old, important, and therefore worthy of conscious conservation measures, often in the hands of specialised institutions”³ or, more precisely, defined by Baker as a repository which “includes: cultures, customs, beliefs, rites, rituals, ceremonies, indigenous knowledge, social customs and traditions [...] that influence culture and behaviour”.⁴ As a follow up to this second definition, the current view on the social and cultural potential of African folklore corresponds with the practice theory formulated by Bourdieu in 1977⁵ and later added to by Ortner.⁶

2 Hausa term for spiritual possession, commonly used as a reference to religious practice.

3 Christoph Brumann, ‘Cultural Heritage,’ in *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, James D. Wright (ed.), Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015, p. 414–419.

4 Karen Baker, *Information Literacy and Cultural Heritage. Developing a Model for Lifelong Learning*, Oxford: Chandos Publishing, 2013.

5 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, (Tr. Richard Nice), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

6 See. Sherry Ortner, ‘Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties,’ *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, No. 26, 1984, pp. 126–166.

For the purpose of this study we will concentrate on Nigeria, as it is a country with a strong and indigenous Hausa community and also with significant achievements and measures for the promotion of orality and folklore. What has to be expressed here, in regard of the above-mentioned theories, is the common fact that the theories and social concepts developed in the Western Hemisphere are not always directly applicable to African cultural reality, thus the application of a particular theory requires a certain flexibility of approach. In this particular case, we will build on the general theoretical fundamentals by quoting Duve Nakolisa's definition of folktale in Africa. He states that the tales "are the history of the ethnic group and the ethnic portrayal of social interactions, within the environment of that history".⁷ This definition can be followed up by the statement of Bukar Usman, who claims that the "folkloric tradition is a very rich and fertile legacy that Africa bequeathed to many parts of the world, especially North America, South America and the West Indies"⁸ and this statement clearly summarises the significance and potential of African folklore and the oral tradition.

In this particular study, theory influences the approach towards the folkloristic material, but the application of the proper methodology is more tricky. Although such analyses are, to some extent, included in the paper, the article is not designed as a full evaluation of the Nigerian education system nor as a complex study on Hausa folklore. It will use the folktales as the basis, but will concentrate on the potential of oral literature for the purposes of the modern educational system. The application of the former within the latter on the general level has a simple binary character and in most cases will be presented as such. The paper itself concentrates on the abstract construct of "potential" and this approach requires an open structure for the article and some flexibility in presentation. To achieve this goal, the paper was divided in two main sections. The first one explores the traditional place of oral literature in Hausa society, while the second shifts focus to the Nigerian education system. Particular sections of the paper will be followed by preliminary conclusions as it will give the possibility to refer to the presenting topics in an orderly way. Final conclusions will be given at the end of the paper, after the evaluation of modern perspectives for the development of Hausa folklore and related studies.

7 Duve Nakolisa, *Introduction*, in *Girls in Search of Husbands and Other Stories*, Bukar Usman (ed.), Abuja: Khlamidas Books, 2006, pp. x–xi.

8 Bukar Usman, *Folklore and History. The Twin Rivers of World's Heritage*, Abuja: Khlamidas Books, 2013, p. 12.

1. Hausa oral literature and traditional setting

Traditional Hausa oral literature was a multidimensional phenomenon that served many purposes, while the most important was education and transmission of social values. The legends, such as the Story of Bayajidda, with their quasi-historical approach, serve as chronicles of historical events. They provide explanations for the social order and shed light on the genesis of cultural influences. Here, education comes from the story itself, as the legend simply presents the facts based on pre-colonial “research” and tradition. The Story of Bayajidda shows not only the deeds of the cultural hero, but also the process of creation of the Hausa city-states, the transmission of rulership and the migration from traditional beliefs towards the Muslim religion, which came from the east.⁹ This is undoubtedly an educational feature, that makes oral literature useful not only for the perseverance of the cultural history of the particular group, but also for the general, academic, study of the history of Hausa emirates. However, this type of sources remains scarce and the dominant among story-based emanations of orality are folktales and fables, which in turn give more freedom and are more vivid than the structured, national epic or oral chronicles. The presentation of the folktale is dynamic in nature as it mixes various cultural elements in a form of performance that relies on literature (a story), but also depends on theatrical presentation (drama). However, the dynamic aspect exceeds the general definition of the dramatised presentation of the story, which itself requires expressive and engaged delivery of the content by the presenters. The presentation of African folktale is dynamic not because of the fact that a performer is following some script, which requires his energetic performance, but because of the fact that the uniqueness of the idea of oral literature lies in its changeable nature and the creative approach of the performer.

1.1. Folktale and informal education

It can be said that in old times, before television came and reshaped society’s cultural habits, the world was full of storytellers. Most of them were locally based, but some were skilled and fortunate enough to carry their talent and tales to faraway lands and actually become immortalised by their stories or at least became famous enough to profit from their performative skills. History knows many examples of wandering bards, skalds or griots, however travelling artists tended to be regional, and Africa was no different. However, a part of the group that made storytelling or praise singing their profession, the

9 The story of Bayajidda is widely known in Northern Nigeria and although it is available in many, slightly different versions, the core remains the same and most of them point at Baghdad as a place of origin of the cultural hero. For example see: Malam Hassan, Malam Shuhaibu, *Chronicle of Abuja*, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1952.

presentation of the folktale was always and above all the main form of child-focused entertainment in the pre-literate societies, or simply in any society before the advent of the modern media. It is because the folktale by design is not only funny and interesting, it is also educational, as it transfers important social values that are sown into the story. Although both the elements – the performance and transmission of the tale – are considered important, it is the story that is crucial as it carries an educative message through the ages as the folktale is passed to younger generations. An important feature here is the flexibility of the folktale presented and preserved in its oral form. The importance of the performers' improvisation attempts saves the folktale from stagnation, which would be a result of the early transcription.

In contrast, folktale in its natural, oral environment can develop and adapt to changing reality, when some elements are added to the story to reflect social structure and modernise the content. At the same time, the message remains unchanged and its universal character brings some flexibility to interpretation of otherwise outdated values. Here various Hausa folktales that more or less directly refer to the slave trade can serve as an example, but what is worth noticing is the fact that the stories with a setting too different from the modern social environment are not frequently repeated and their extinction seems to be eminent. The above statement is based more on the lack of resources rather than significant literature support, but the lack of almost any reference to pre-Islamic Hausa beliefs in most of the published selections of Hausa fables, including the most recent study from 2014, is significant. Even if the *bori* cult is still practiced by small groups of traditional believers, the related stories are not popular and limited to particular groups rather than widely available and commonly repeated in modern society.

However the universal aspect of the folktale still stands and it is visible if we trace the evolution of some of the fables that are present in various compilations published over the span of almost one hundred years. One of them is the story of the *Water of Ladi*,¹⁰ which shows the folktale's adaptability to the changing social environment manifested in the inclusion of new elements and topics into the storyline, while at the same time it proves the stability of the educational message, as the latter remains almost intact despite the adaptive changes in the content. This shows the dynamic aspect of Hausa folktales and their ability to maintain an educational functions through the evolution of their

10 Well preserved in the various compilations of Hausa folklore. Transcriptions in: Robert S. Rattray, *Hausa Folk-Lore. Customs, Proverbs etc.*, Vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913, pp. 14–22; Sa'idu Babura Ahmad, *Narrator as an Interpreter: Stability and Variation in Hausa Tales*, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2002, pp. 42–43, 126–129, 220–227; Abdu Yahya Bichi, *Hausa Folktales*, Research Project 2A, January 2014 (unpublished report), pp. 66–67; show the evolution of Hausa storytelling and the inclusion of the modern influences within same topic.

entertaining elements. It is possible, in contrast to the recitation based on the written scriptures (where it is required), that the storyline of the oral folktale can be considered as a background for the transmission of the values that are important for the group or the society as a whole. Following this statement it can be said that a successful study of Hausa folktales should be multidimensional and include all the important elements linked to the performance, storyline and educational message.

However, it is still possible to analyse any particular fable on the basis of its transcribed content and to synthesise the indisputably universal values, which were always present in this form of education through entertainment. Thus, traditional folktale can become a pre-made and widely available source for formal education especially on the primary level when the allegorical character of the folktale makes it more approachable for the younger generation of students. This, in fact, can in turn recreate another traditional aspect of pre-literate storytelling and affiliate modern education, with the bonding-binding elements of the traditional commonly present during the evening time presentation of folktales in the pre-colonial household. Apart from this fact we can refer to some general statements about the importance of folktale in the early stages of a child's development and quote Amy Spaulding, who underlines the importance of the presentation of folktales as one of the best stimulants of a child's brain. It not only helps to develop their imagination and the ability to think abstractly, but also stimulate memory and concentration.¹¹

This statement can be extended if referred to Hausa oral literature or to the African folktale in general. Folklore's traditional role as a guardian of social structures, cultural norms and history of a particular ethnic group is indisputable. It is also enhanced by the rich language full of expressions and parallels and the multitude of the short, oral forms ever present in the presentation of the folktale, as each performance includes not only the opening and closing sentences, but is also enriched by proverbs, riddles and tongue twisters, that add more flavour to the story.¹² For these reasons, the inclusion of oral literature in the modern school environment seems an obvious choice, as they may be useful not only as a general tool, which, when used according to Spaulding's definition, develops the mental capabilities of the children, but can also become useful as an introduction to studies on the society's own heritage, culture and history. Moreover, it can be used at any level of language education, either European or African. It is more obvious for the latter, as the African language will more likely follow the structure and linguistic content

11 Amy E. Spaulding, *The Wisdom of Storytelling in an Information Age*, Lanham: Scarecrow Press 2004, p. 74.

12 Walter J. Ong, *Osoba, świadomość, komunikacja. Antologia*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009, p. 245.

of the African folktale, but also the process of teaching the foreign language can be facilitated by references to the familiar, local setting. Finally, due to the presence of the above-mentioned shorter oral forms, which can be easily transcribed along with the storyline, the folktale can become useful at any level of linguistic study. These elements show the huge potential of Hausa folktale on any level of education and all that is needed here is a willingness from the authorities and careful transcription, which follows the spirit of the oral performance.

1.2. Translation of folklore

In the case of oral literature, faithful transcription becomes an invaluable asset for any adaptation. As suggested by Ong, orality can be divided in two types – primary and secondary. The latter is closely linked to the modern day products of the information age, most likely the transcription of stories for the purpose of books or compilations of child stories¹³, but it can be extended and include adaptations for television, radio and other media. Here, the presentation of the actual folktale is limited and defined by the source material and most likely results with a reading of the story from a book with limited attention towards expression and improvisation. In contrast, primary orality follows the idea of the direct, face-to-face presentation of the story. The difference in approach to the presentation results with a different reception of the cultural product. It can be said that primary orality is in fact limited, when it comes to its interactivity, while the primary remains a multi-purposeful tool for education and entertainment. Although it is hard to argue with Ong's definition, it is not always possible to mark the borders between the two, as even the secondary oral product such as a book, while carefully prepared and presented, can become a basis for direct presentation, while the secondary product is used as source material and the storyteller's first-hand knowledge of the source material and its cultural context will make it more successful.

Looking from this perspective, African oral literature should be easily translatable for the purposes of the education system, and the orality's cultural potential accompanied by wide social recognition testifies to its universal value as an educational and entertainment tool. However, despite the above-mentioned qualities of orality, the reality is slightly different.

2. Oral literature and the Nigerian education system. The evolution of an approach

Oral literature's role in the educational system is ambiguous at best and can be analysed from two different angles – on the basis of its common use and institutional support.

13 Ong, *Osoba, świadomość...*

First of all, Hausa oral literature is present in the modern educational system in Hausa speaking areas. Its presence ranges from primary or even pre-school education and reaches as far as College or University. Field research conducted¹⁴ in Northern Nigeria's Bayero University Kano in 2014 showed that, despite the fact that folktales were not part of the scripted curricula, their inclusion into the lectures on Hausa literature resulted in a generally positive response from the students. Most of them eagerly engaged in the preparation of presentations of traditional tales, songs or child games. It is worth mentioning that the presentation itself exceeded the mere idea of recitation, as among the necessary requirements was the preparation of costumes and stage decorations. As a result, most of the presentations illustrated not only the effort and enthusiasm of the students towards the dramatised approach to the educational material, but the presentations also testify to the group's sympathy for oral literature. They proved that the students knew the material and that they were willing to share their knowledge with the rest of the group, thus starting a discussion about regional variations of the particular stories or songs and actually recreating the spirit of the traditional gatherings.

However positive it may be, this case cannot serve as an illustration of the actual process of orality's adaptation into the modern educational environment, but can be seen as an example showing that this kind of adaptation is possible and any effort in this direction will most likely receive positive feedback. The same can be said about the use of the oral material on the lower rungs of the educational ladder, but additional research would be required to properly analyse this wide topic. What can be said at this moment, that as in the case of the above-mentioned example on Bayero University's lectures on Hausa literature, the use of the oral material in the educational system has a more or less unofficial character and depends mostly on the creative approach of the particular teacher or lecturer.

2.1. An institutional approach towards education and folklore. Early implications and results

To support this thesis we will reach into the second aspect that defines oral literature's role in the educational system, that is institutional support or, to be more specific, the governmental approach towards the inclusion of oral literature in the modern school environment.

¹⁴ In the form of participation observation and open interviews conducted between February and July 2014. Field research, although conducted on the occasion of a different project, proved other findings expressed in the paper, especially the shift in entertainment habits and lack of traditional storytelling performances in urban areas. Quite surprisingly it also showed a high level of familiarity with traditional music and related folklore among all the respondents from across all generation groups.

To visualise this we will refer to the example of Nigeria, as it is the country with the highest number of Hausa speakers and the country with a strictly defined educational policy. Nigeria's National Policy of Education was issued for the first time in 1977 under the military rule of Olusegun Obasanjo. The preparation and release of this document was a comemorable act that can be seen as a positive move towards regulation of the country's educational policy after the turbulent events of the post-independence era, although the work was far from completed. The document was updated many times after its first release, as almost all governments that were ruling the country had their own visions of and made their own corrections to the existing educational policy. However, the initial idea behind the updates was far from the particular interests of the ruling elites, as the new editions of educational policy were issued to "keep up with the dynamics of social change and the demands on education".¹⁵ As a result, the document, called the National Policy on Education, was re-released every few years and the one published by the National Educational Research and Development Council (NERDC) in 2004¹⁶ is still widely accessible online.¹⁷ Although it is now obsolete, it will be good to focus on this document as, from the perspective of our study, it provides very interesting material. At the time of its publication it was crowning achievement of almost three decades of work by Nigeria's educators, so it shows the evolution of educational policy in general and its approach towards oral literature in particular. The results of analysis of this document are hardly positive. Despite the importance of folklore oral literature and orality in general and despite the endorsement of folktale's educational role expressed by scholars with international recognition, this document generally avoids any kind of direct reference towards oral literature in folklore within its "subject" section. This is a great surprise if we locate this within an understanding of the pan-African tradition of oral storytelling and the rich folkloric heritage of Nigeria itself. As stated above, folktales and oral literature in general, if carefully used in the education system (both standardised and informal) stimulate the creative capabilities of a child's brain and the capacity for abstract thinking, so their inclusion into the curricula should be an obvious move for a country with such a deeply rooted tradition of orality used as an educational tool on the domestic level. Although imperfect and obviously misleading in this matter, the above-mentioned document about national education policy was also quite flexible and left some space for the creative approach of teachers. This is visible in the section that covers primary

15 Federal Republic of Nigeria, *National Policy on Education – 4th Edition*, Lagos: NERDC Press, 2004, p. 4.

16 *National Policy on Education...*, p. 4.

17 For the reasons that will be specified below, it is arguably easier to obtain this curricula than to get access to the more recent one, released in 2015.

school education. Here, the policy explicitly says that “the teaching shall be practical, exploratory and use experimental methods”.¹⁸

One of the examples of such an experimental method at the university level was described above, and the results of the unconventional approach in this particular case were so good that they deserve to be given wider consideration. As a result of this flexible policy, even before the publication of the analysed document that describes nationwide guidelines for education, some folktales were included in the textbooks designed for literature or language education at the primary level. For example – in the first half of 2010s and prior to 2015, the Capital Primary School in Kano included books 1-5 of the Bukar Usman’s series of stories in its curriculum¹⁹ and IRENE Sahel, a German NGO proposed similar material for education in Qur’anic for girls in Niger.²⁰ However, the lack of official acknowledgement led to the neglect of storytelling and folklore in the public sphere.

The results of this approach soon started bearing fruits, first of all in a diminution of oral literature’s social importance, which was at the time accompanied and closely linked with expansion of the modern media. As a consequence, evening time storytelling had lost its social importance as a usual activity with strong bonding-binding features. It was replaced by ready-made and often imported entertainment²¹ broadcast by state-owned TV stations, or easily available on DVD or simply on-line. The difference between an American cartoon and a folktale told directly by the household’s elder seems to be quite obvious, but it is worth pointing it out anyway. First of all, foreign entertainment products lack cultural and social references to the local reality and are less able to teach values that are important for the society. That is, assuming that the product in consideration has educational goals and is not made just for entertainment purposes.²²

Secondly, it is possible and it will always be greeted as a positive move to produce locally made entertainment products that not only feature a familiar environment, but also promote important social values. This is a fact, and both the Nigerian movie industries – Nollywood and Kanywood – can give us enough examples to support this claim.²³ However, even if the local movie industry is very productive, or if TV owners suddenly decide to broadcast only

18 *National Policy on Education...*, p. 15.

19 Usman, *Folklore and History...*, p. 5.

20 Usman, *Folklore and History...*, p. 5.

21 The case of *Tom & Jerry* cartoons in Northern Nigeria serves as a perfect example.

22 Usman, *Folklore and History...*, p. 5.

23 However hard would be to follow all the releases as Nigeria as the industry produces more than 50 movies per week. See: Rebecca Moudio, ‘Nigeria’s film industry: a potential gold mine?’, *Africa Renewal*, May 2013, <https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-2013/nigeria%E2%80%99s-film-industry-potential-gold-mine> (accessed 12 August 2019).

products of the highest quality and moral standard, it will still not be enough to beat the good old-time storytelling in terms of educational value. This is because any kind of broadcast leaves the audience in the position of mere receivers of pre-recorded content and not as participants in the entertainment event as it happens in the case of the storytelling experience. Of course, the difference in approach doesn't obviously imply differences in results as the content is served in both cases and in both cases an educational message is delivered. The diversity in approach will most likely be visible in the level of absorption of the educational content. Direct participation requires constant attention from the audience. The participants can ask questions and receive answers, thus their understanding of the narrative or even the language of the presentation will be much better. Also, and above all, any story presented directly to the audience, if the storyteller is skilful enough, keeps the attention of the listeners from the beginning to the end and this cannot be said of all modern video products, and especially not about most of the Nollywood movies, with an average length of four hours.

That is why it would be so important to encourage the endorsement of folklore in general and oral literature in particular in the modern school environment. Without the official acknowledgement of the educational system, oral literature slowly drifts into obscurity and in time will no longer be valued as a part of the treasured cultural tradition, but become a synonym of the backwardness and a vestige of rural customs not suitable for the modern, urban environment.

2.2. Social and academic responses at the “grassroots” level

This state of affairs did not come unnoticed and Nigerian folklorists have been raising concerns over the condition of folklore and the place of storytelling in the public sphere. In 2014, the Nigerian Folklore Society was awakened from its long-time hiatus and its 11th NFS Congress, which was held in Kano between 2nd and 4th April 2014 gathered numerous participants from Nigeria and abroad. The conference theme was *Dynamism in Folktale in the Past, Present and Future* and the two-day gathering resulted in the presentation of an impressive number of 56 papers, which later became the basis for a printed publication. The book *Folktale in Nigeria*,²⁴ across a huge variety of topics, can be considered as a modern day compendium that describes the state of oral literature in this West African country. Apart of such success from the academic point of view, the Congress became a chance for the gathering of the newly elected NFS board members and that in turn resulted in a discussion

24 Abubakar Rasheed, Sani Abba Aliyu (ed.), *Folktale in Nigeria*, Zaria: Zaria University Press LTD, 2015.

of the Nigerian Folklore Society's policy towards "rehabilitation" of folklore in modern social consciousness. The Congress and the conference became annual events and 2019 welcomed the 5th Annual Congress and 14th NFS Conference, held in Abuja on 29th-30th April 2019. These dates are presented here to show the consistency in realisation of the NFS's goals and every year, the conference covers a more specific field to address the problems of folklore in modern times. From the perspective of our study, the event in 2018 was the most important, as the council meeting resulted in the preparation of a memorandum and press statement about the condition of folklore.²⁵ In this document, the NFS board urges more action, which has to be taken to preserve the folkloristic traditions of Nigeria and underlines the need for solutions which will re-introduce folklore into the wider entertainment sector. A similar way of communicating with the public and ruling elites was undertaken in 2019 when the updated *Communiqué* was released by the NFS board in reference to the current condition of folklore in Nigeria.

It is hard to say much about the impact of the actions of the Nigerian Folklore Society on the decision makers in the country's educational sector. One can say that it is needless to follow the development of the NFS, as it is an institution with purely academic value, but this statement does not seem to be valid. Thanks to the support of renowned Nigerian scholars, charismatic leadership resulting in a constant²⁶ media presence, it has become a body that has to be treated seriously as it is governed by the nation's experts in cultural studies, who in turn are backed not only by their publication record but also by their affiliation to major universities, both from the Northern and Southern parts of the country. This multiethnic and multicultural group of advisors can only be considered as an asset in a country where careful ethnic and religious policy is a necessity for the survival of the Federation. The number of state awards given to the society's leader Dr. Bukar Usman in recent years may be seen as a sign of the recognition of this fact.

2.3. Institutional approach towards education and folklore. The current situation

The year 2015 brought another evaluation of the Nigeria's National Policy of Education, although it is hard to say whether the changes implemented were coincidental or were the direct result of the above-mentioned initiative of folklorists and scholars. However, the new curricula published by the NERDC widely covers topics related to oral literature, as it is now directly listed among the subjects for education in primary schools and above.²⁷ The details of the

25 Abdu Yahya Bichi, *Communiqué*. Nigerian Folklore Society, Kano May 4th 2018.

26 As far as any kind of scholarly activity can get.

27 National Education Research and Development Council (NERDC) official website, <http://nerdc.org.ng/eCurriculum/> (accessed 21 September 2019).

curriculum as presented on the NERDC website are hidden behind a paywall for the 12,500,000 Naira and this is an unfortunate fact, as it limits access to educational materials only to those schools with significant governmental support and excludes smaller, private schools from smaller towns and rural areas. Despite this fact, the curriculum has undergone some remarkable changes, as it now includes a variety of culturally significant topics mainly in the Primary level of Hausa language studies. It introduces a section called *adabi* (literature) that evaluates folktales, songs, children's plays and other elements widely related to orality and folklore. The topics continue to be unveiled until secondary level, as long as education in Nigerian Languages is continued within a specific subject.

It would be reasonable to say that official backing by the main governmental educational body provides the tools that will help to preserve the idea of oral storytelling and its social functions. Even if the actual performances will not likely occur during lessons, the use of the source material will support the teaching process and the presentation of the storyline can leave a lot of space for free reenactment and thus can even help to develop the old topics. This process is already happening as recent studies on the folktales from Northern Nigeria show some influences from popular culture on the old folkloric substrata. The version of the *Water of Ladi* included in the Abdu Yahya Bichi's report from 2014 can serve as an example, as in the presentation made for the purpose of the research by 9-year old Kano resident Ummi Abba, which includes some fantasy elements taken straight from Nollywood movies.²⁸

2.4. Oral literature and modern reality

Substantial official support, either through the regulated policy on education, or by the actions of the non-governmental organisations will increase the chances for the growing acquisition of oral literature in the modern world of entertainment, which is closely linked to the modern media. However, even without this kind of support it is reasonable to assume that there would be enough interest from the private sector to fill the niche and supply the market with the products inspired by oral literature. This is quite obvious as oral literature is an infinite repository of open-source material, which is widely recognised and full of regional or cultural references. As long as oral literature in the wider social context does not slip into the obscurity of cultural embarrassment and "backwardness", it is reasonable to assume that there will always be someone who is at least trying to fill the gap and look for the cultural inspiration of entertainment products. What is important here is to underline the fact that only cooperation between the experts and scholars with business

28 Hausa Folktales, Research Project 2A, Unpublished Report, January 2014, p. 66.

entities can lead to a successful adaptation of the cultural material that is oral literature. It is worth pointing out that success here cannot be defined only by the amount of the revenue made by the entertainment industry. Careless use of the source material can lead to entertainment products assuming a dominant place in mass conscience and marginalising the source material, which is still available, but not that recognised. The case of Thor, the old Scandinavian god of thunder and Thor, the character from comic books and blockbuster movies, is a perfect example, as the latter became better known than his mythological ancestor and has shifted the paradigm of recognition from the dominant person of the local, pre-Christian, pantheon towards a pop-cultural icon. It would be unwise to underestimate the power and influence of mass media.

As this example clearly shows, the argument in support of cooperation between the entertainment industry and the folklorist is as universal and reasonable as it is idealistic. In a world dominated by media it is not possible to prevent reckless adaptations of cultural material and this fact will most likely also affect to some extent African oral literature.

This process is actually already happening. Ananse, the trickster spider from Akan mythology is a main protagonist of the Ghanaian video game *Ananse: The Beginning* (still in production by Ghanaian company Leti Arts) where he is depicted as a super hero. Here, the inspiration from Thor and other characters from comic books from the United States of America is clearly evident, but the same trickster is one of the characters of the book *Anansi Boys* written by Neil Gaiman.²⁹ The trickster, known here simply as Mr. Nancy, is the father of the main protagonist and his brother – Spider.³⁰ The book received wide recognition, receiving the British and Locus Fantasy Award in 2006 and climbed into the New York Times recommendation list in the year of publication. The inspiration here is loose, as both siblings do not have much connotation with the “real” mythological children of the Anansi, but the book follows some patterns of oral literature by including some animal characters straight from African folktales.

Both these adaptations can be considered as a form of homage towards African tradition and culture and they certainly show oral literature’s potential as a source material for modern products, which is a positive sign. What is important here is to maintain the integrity of the local cultural heritage by the release of some products that are faithful to the source material and yet competitive on the media market. As is clearly visible in the examples presented above, the inclusion of oral literature into the modern entertainment industry

29 Neil Gaiman, *Anansi Boys*, New York: William Morrow, 2005.

30 The same author has also taken on in his workshop the Scandinavian gods, Thor included, in his previous novel *American Gods* published in New York by William Morrow in 2001.

is already happening and will continue to happen whether the guardians of the African heritage like it or not. Now it is a moment to give a clear response with the use of the same, media-related, tools.

The efforts to introduce oral literature into the media industry started years ago with the introduction of some TV or radio programs that were trying to recreate the storytelling experience, but eventually failed due to the incompatibility of the medium used or simply because of the poor production value.³¹ However, the development of the media itself, technological progress and the cultural exchange related to the globalisation and accessibility of the internet, have provided new tools for the promotion or simply for the adaptation of stories or just the general idea of the storytelling and oral literature.

Here, we can distinguish three main patterns: adaptation, inspiration and transmission.

Adaptation will be considered as a direct and (more or less) faithful conversion of the source material into a media product. Here, the story is preserved with limited changes and just the language of the media is different. The main and the most modern example here is an upcoming digitally animated movie *Dawn of Thunder*, which is currently being produced by Komotion Studion based in Nigeria and presents the story of Ogun, Yoruba god of thunder. In this case, the story is more important than the storytelling *per se* and the way of presentation is not trying to recreate the spirit of the original storytelling experience, as it lacks the interactivity and some structures important for the performance.

Inspiration follows similar patterns, but it does not emphasise the story itself, but takes some elements or characters from oral literature and creates new products loosely based on the source material. The above-mentioned videogame about Ananse-superhero is a perfect example.

Transmission is certainly the most interesting and the widest category of the three. Here, the source material is not the most important, but it can still become one of the elements of the final product. By definition it would more likely be a form of translation of the local oral literature into a different social environment with the emphasis on recreation of the storytelling experience, either through “conscious” or “subconscious” adaptation of the idea of oral literature. The main representative of this trend is modern Hausa hip-hop, which can be considered as a modern form of oral literature,³² as this popular trend in Hausa music shares enough elements with traditional oral literature to

31 Ahmad, *Narrator as an Interpreter...*, p. 225.

32 For the detailed analysis of this phenomenon and wider description of the theory of “conscious” and “subconscious” adaptation check: Mariusz Kraśniewski, *In Da Haus. A Story of Hip-Hop and Oral Literature in the Hausa Society*, Warszawa: IKŚiO PAN, 2016.

support this claim. It introduces many elements traditionally linked to orality, like self-praise proverbs etc. and mixes them into a final product. It serves similar purposes, as by addressing important social topics like the need of education or the dangers of drug abuse, Hausa hip-hop educates and entertains at the same time. Moreover, it covers the same social sphere and the concert becomes the modernised form of evening-time entertainment and has a strong bonding-binding feature, either between the artist and the audience or by the members of the audience themselves. The performance itself is interactive as the participants of the event can directly contribute to the concert, either from their place in the audience or through direct participation onstage. And last, but not least, some of the hip-hop tracks like *Na je je* by MixerBash directly follow the lyrics and riddim of the traditional songs. Similar verses are used as an introduction to the recent track by Nomiis Gee and Just Paul entitled *Wonder Woman* and released in October 2019.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to show the potential of Hausa oral literature as an educational tool and this was evidenced by the examples presented above. The traditional role of oral literature, not only in Hausa society, but actually in any society, is undeniable. Folktales preserve history and cultural norms and are able to transmit them to the younger generations in an approachable and entertaining way. Moreover, its dynamic nature results in the fable acting like a mirror, which reflects the changes in society as all the major religious and cultural processes will most likely be introduced to the content of the stories. This is because within oral literature, the huge importance attached to improvisation by the storytellers implies constant updates, which can also be related to influences from the dominant forms of popular culture.

On the academic level, even if the folktale, proverb or oral song is “taken away” from society, knowledge of the social context can make it an invaluable source for any kind of historical, cultural or linguistic research.

The main question here is how this potential can be put to use in the modern school environment. As was shown above using the Nigerian example, the introduction of orality into the school curricula is not an easy task, and folktales are not always the obvious choice when national policy on education is created. Neglect of the folkloristic heritage on the national and official level can lead to the decline of the social position of folklore. This would be a long process, as traditions die hard, and Hausa oral literature has already survived almost intact the period of the conservative revolution of the Dan Fodio period. However, during the 19th Century jihad, there were no dangers carried by modern popular culture and globalised media. As such, it is easy to assume

that without official support at the educational level and careful supervision of the production of cultural products, some elements of popular culture can mutate into impoverished entertainment forms and thus lose their potential as harbingers of social values. This can be prevented if schoolchildren actually learn about their cultural heritage and, from this perspective, the inclusion of folklore into the school curriculum is certainly a reassuring step in the right direction.

Ibadism in the Studies of ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar²

Abstract

The studies of ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar on Ibadism and his approaches and contributions on the subject are examined in this paper. ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar, who grew up in Libya, is an important researcher on Ibadism. He played a leading role in the transmission of Ibadi culture and tradition and wrote many important studies. We believe this study will contribute to an understanding of the subject from the inside. In addition, it is aimed at contributing to Ibadi literature in our country, a subject that is insufficiently studied. In this context, the life and ‘scientific personality’ of ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar is the focus. His opinions about Ibadism are then analysed in terms of the different dimensions they offer and some assessments made.

Keywords: Ibadism, ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar, Algeria, Scientific Reformist Movement, al-Ibadiyyah fi Mawkihi al-Tarikh.

Introduction

Algeria and Tunisia and particularly Libya are key centres of Ibadism and have existed for centuries as such. Ibadism survived around Berber-origin tribes throughout history. Important scholars and authors who have adopted the Ibadi faith, thought and tradition such as Ibn Sallam al-Ibadi, Darjini, Barradi, Warjilani, Shammahi and Mazati lived in this region. ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar is one of the recent representatives of scientific tradition in this area.

‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar is one of the most important scholars to have grown up in the most recent period, as are Abu Ishak Atfayyish, Bayyud Ibrahim Umar, Sulaiman al-Baruni, Amr Khalifa al-Nami, Faruk Umar Fawzi, Ibrahim Fakhhar, Muhammad Ali Dabbuz, Nur al-Din Salimi and Salim Hamd al-Kharisi.³ There are significant studies by these authors on this subject, offering important information and contributions on the historical development of Ibadism as well as its beliefs and teachings. These authors have sought to

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2 I would like to thank my friend and colleague Dr. Ibrahim Hakkı Inal who read and made some contributions my article.

3 See: Iwaz Muhammad Khalifat, *Nash‘at al-Harakat al-Ibadiyya*, Oman: Wizarat al-Turath wa-l-Thaqafa, 2002, pp. 40–43; Amr Khalifa al-Nami, *Dirasat on al-Ibadiyya*, translated by Mihail Huri, (ed.), Muhammad Salih Nasir, Mustafa Salih Baju, Tunisia: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 2012, pp. 39–40.

explain Ibadism better and correctly to other Muslim groups, both Sunni and Shiite.

‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar was a student of Bayyud Ibrahim Umar from Algeria. Among this Ibadi research, his studies are remarkable and give us important information about the formation and historical development of Ibadism, the spread of Ibadism in North Africa, Ibadi sub-sects in North Africa, its belief system and opinions, its relationship with Kharidjite in terms of the history, political opinions of Ibadites, critiques and accusations against Ibadites, their current situation and their relations with other religious groups and neighbours. On the other hand, he gives us important information about countries and geographical regions where Ibadis live today.

‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar as an effort to gain insights into Ibadism has moved from both classical to more contemporary sources. In this context, it examines in detail information given about Ibadis in studies by contemporary authors like Ali Mustafa al-Ghurabi, Muhammad Abu Zahra, Abd al-Qadir Shayba, Yahya Huwaydi, Izz al-Din at-Tanuhi and Ibrahim Muhammad Abd al-Baqi as well as studies by classical authors like Ash’ari, Baghdadi, Ibn Hazm, Shahrastani and Isfarayani. It seems he aims to correct some generalizations found in earlier works and the various prejudices that emerged over the centuries. On the other hand, he gives us important information about the biographies of Ibadi scholars and authors who lived in North Africa. He also examines and criticises views put forward about Ibadism by some Orientalists such as Carlo Alfonso Nallino.⁴

The aim of this article is to analyse the place and contributions of ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar. I will be very happy if I am able to contribute to the discussions within “Ibadi Studies” worldwide. My paper consists of two parts. In the first, I will present the life of ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar, his development and his important works on Ibadism. In the second part, I will investigate his opinions related to Ibadism. Not all studies of him will be under investigation; I will focus more on his opinions about Ibadism.

1. ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar: His Life and Scientific Personality

‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar was born in the village of Tekvīt near Nālūt city in the Libyan region of Jabal Nafūsa, in 1919. He grew up in a middle-class family, his family devoted to religious values, which is why the culture of Jabal Nafūsa had a serious impact on him.

He memorised surahs of the Qur’an at a young age in his village and learned reading and writing rules from Shaykh Abdullah b. Mas’ud al-Bārūnī

4 ‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firq al-Islamiyya inda Kuttāb al-Maqalat fi l-Qadīm wa-l-Hadīth*, Oman: Maktabat al-Damri li l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi, 2014, pp. 13–85.

al-Kabāwī in 1924. He was then enrolled in primary school established by the Italian Colonial Government in 1925. His teacher there was Isa b. Yahya al-Bārūnī and his level of intelligence and logical capabilities were evident even then. His teachers began to treat him with special attention from an early age.

Meanwhile, he read various disciplines, especially fiqh, together with formal training from Shaykh Ramadan b. Yahya al-Jarbi in his spare time. Shaykh Ramadan was a student of Shaykh Muhammad b. Yusuf Atfayyish, a prominent scholar in the region. Shaykh Ramadan returned to the Island of Djerba in 1927, where he continued his education by attending his teacher Ramadan's circle in the same year. During this time, he trained for a little over a year in Djerba. Then he moved to the University of Zaitune in the capital of Tunisia. He trained in various branches of science, especially akaid and fiqh, under important scholars such as Shaykh Muhammad b. Salih as-Samini. Training at the University of Zaitune had a serious impact on him as he not only educated himself he also developed his sense of morality and civilisation.⁵

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār moved to Algeria during the next period of his life and became a student of Shaykh Bayyud Ibrahim in 1937. He did many things connected with education and training, staying seven years in Algeria. Firstly, he studied many sciences, especially tafsīr (the exegesis of Qur'an) under Shaykh Bayyud. He took part in the *Scientific Reformist Movement (al-Harakat al-Ilmiyya al-Islāhiyya)*, led by Shaykh Bayyud. Moreover, he entered the *Institute of Life (Ma'had al-Hayat)*, which had been founded by Shaykh Bayyud. He participated in some social and cultural activities as well as courses there. He also participated in the activities of the *Youth Association (Jam'iyyat al-Shabab)*. He presented at conferences and recited poems, participating in many social activities.⁶ He published several articles and poems in Arabic newspapers in the Youth magazine. He exhibited two plays, *Zū Kār* (The pitch owner) and *Muhsin* in this period. While here he worked as a student and as a teacher at the same time. The period he spent with his teacher Shaykh Bayyud in Algeria was during the period of French colonisation between 1937 and 1943, when he benefited from the knowledge, culture and experiences of his teacher.

He returned to Nalut in Libya in 1944, and began to put make serious inroads in the field of culture and education. Firstly, he gave lessons at elementary school, then high school level. He conducted public conversations in mosques outside the official structures and established good communication

5 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn...*, p. XI–XII.

6 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq...*, p. XII–XIII.

with the public. In addition, he learned the skills of management by establishing an institute for teachers there. Meanwhile, he was appointed public inspector to oversee the education system in Libya's eastern regions.⁷ He started working at the Ministry of Education in the capital of Tripoli in 1968 and he continued this mission until 1980. He worked in the Centre for Educational Research as well as dealing with education policy, a process that enabled him to apply his ideas. He contributed substantially to the educational life of the country by working at all levels of the education system.

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār sought to upgrade the intellectual and moral level of young people in the latter period of his life in his country. He ran courses and conducted conversations with young people in different places, especially mosques. At this point, he also published several books and magazines. He died at the end of a busy life at 27 Safer 1400 on 15 January 1980.⁸

Besides useful activities, he was also a prolific writer during his working and scientific life and had a versatile personality, training many students with his knowledge and culture. He addressed the minds and hearts of people with an effective and attractive method, penetrating their inner world. He left behind various investigations and works, including deep and comprehensive analyses of his own in various fields such as history, Islamic thought, jurisprudence and literature. These studies are shown below:

- *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawḳib al-Ta'rikh I: Nash'at al-Madhhab al-Ibadi*: This study is one of the most important of its kind and deals with the emergence and historical development of Ibadism.
- *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawḳib al-Ta'rikh II: al-Ibādiyya fī Libya*, deals with the spread and historical development of Ibadism in Libya, the activities of the first Ibadi groups in North Africa, traditional institutions, the geographical regions where Ibadites live in Libya today and some current problems.
- *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawḳib al-Ta'rikh III: al-Ibādiyya fī Tunis*, deals with the spread and historical development of Ibadism in Tunisia and their traditional institutions.
- *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawḳib al-Ta'rikh IV: al-Ibādiyya fī l-Jaza'ir*, deals with the spread of Ibadism in Algeria, the Rustamī state and activities, Ibadi sub-sects, traditional institutions, prominent personalities who grew

7 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq...*, p. XIV.

8 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq...*, p. XV, XVI; for the life of 'Ali Yahya see: Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun Islamiyyun Mu'tadilun*, Oman: Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs, 2011, pp. 3–7; Baba'ammī (ed.), *Mu'jam A'lam al-Ibādiyya min al-Qarn al-Awwal al-Hijri ila l-Asr al-Hadis*, Bairut: Dar al-Ghḥab al-Islamī, II, pp. 296–297.

up there and the geographical regions where Ibadites live in Algeria today.

- *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq al-Islamiyya inda Kuttāb al-Maqalat fil-Qadīm wa-l-Hadīth*: 'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār argued here that Ibadism had been described wrongly in both classical and contemporary sources. He surveys the information about Ibadis found in the studies of contemporary authors like Ali Mustafā al-Ghurābi, Muḥammad Abū Zahra, Abd al-Qādir Shayba, Yahya Huwaydī, Izz al-Dīn at-Tanuḥi and Ibrāhīm Muḥammad Abd al-Baqī, outside of the studies of classical authors like Ash'arī, Baghdādī, Ibn Hazm, Shahrastānī and Isfarayānī.
- *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun Islamiyyun Mu'tadilun*: This study is his last work, so presents his latter opinions and deals with the historical development of Ibadism, the geographical regions where Ibadites live today, the relationship between Ibadism and Khāridjīte, the belief system of Ibadism and various religious, political and juridical views.⁹
- *Samr Ustratin Muslimatin*: This study describes the religious basis of Ibadism in a fictional style. In the study, which means 'the night conversation of a Muslim family', he dealt with such issues as faith in God, Tawḥīd (Monotheism), the belief in prophets and books, the hereafter, chance and predestination.
- *al-Fatāt al-Libiyya wa-Mashakīl al-Hayat*.
- *al-Islam wa-l-Qiyam al-Insaniyya*.
- *Falastin bayn al-Muhajirin wa-l-Ansar*.

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār also wrote short books and treatises such as *Ajwiba wa fatāwā* (Answers and Fatwās), *Ahkām Salāt al-Jumu'a* (The Provisions of the Friday Prayer), *Ahkām al-Safar fi l-Islam* (The Provisions of Travel in Islam), *Baḥth fi Hukm al-Tadhīn* (Research on the Provision of Smoking), *Muslim Lakinnahu Yahliq wa Yadhīnu*, (With Participation of Shaykh Bayyud), *al-Mithaq al-Ghaliz* (The Exact Promise), *al-Aqānīm al-Thalatha aw Aliha min al-Halwā* (The Main Idols from halvah, sweet) ile *al-Amr bi l-Ma'ruf wa-l-Nahy an al-Munkar* (Commanding the right and Forbidding the wrong). Moreover, he also wrote commentaries on works entitled *Kitab al-Sawm* (Fast) and *Kitab al-Nikah* (Marriage) of Abū Zakariyya al-Jannawūnī. He also wrote many articles and studies published in Arabic magazines such as *Majallāt al-Shabāb* (Youth magazine), *Majallāt al-Muslimīn*, *Majallāt al-Adhhār*,

9 'Ali Yahya completed this study on August 12, 1979. See: Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, p. 7, 51.

al-Risāla, *al-Uṣbu al-Siyāsi*, *al-Muallim* (Teacher). His correspondence and letters with his teachers and students such as Shaykh Bayyud, Shaykh Abu'l-Yaqẓān, Shaykh Adun Sharifi and Amr Khalifa al-Nāmī¹⁰ are also known. For a recent history of Ibadism, these correspondences are of significant value.¹¹

2. The Opinions of 'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār on Ibadism

It seems that 'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār examined Ibadism from various aspects when his studies are looked at as a whole. He emphasises especially the formation and historical development of Ibadism in North Africa, the spread of Ibadism in Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, Ibadi groups that emerged in this region and the geographical regions where Ibadi groups lived. Besides, issues such as the belief structure and opinions of Ibadis, their traditional institutions like Dīwān al-'azzāba, the scholars and authors who grew up in this region and the relationship between Ibadism and Kharidjite are important issues on which 'Ali Yahya works. At this point it cannot be said that he emphasised only doctrinal, that is the belief structure, of Ibadism.

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār, one can see from his training style, aims to reveal Ibadism, moving from both classical to contemporary sources. In this context, he surveys information on Ibadis in studies by contemporary authors like Ali Mustafa al-Ghurabi, Muhammad Abu Zahra, Abd al-Qadir Shayba, Yahya Huwaydi, Izz al-Din at-Tanuhi and Ibrahim Muhammad Abd al-Baqi outside of the studies of classical authors like Ash'ari, Baghdadi, Ibn Hazm, Shahrastani and Isfarayani. He aims to explain Ibadism better and away from incorrect generalisations and prejudices that emerged over the centuries.

2.1. The Formation and Historical Development of Ibadism

The Opinions of 'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār about the formation and historical development of Ibadism can be seen in the studies *al-Ibadiyya fī Mawḳib al-Tarikh Makibi't-Tarih* and *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun Islamiyyun Mu'tadilun*. He gives priority to Ibadi sources here.

Ibadism, first of all, is a moderate sect of Islam, has a distinctive principles, procedures and *furu* (details) like other sects, according to him. Therefore Ibadism, as some authors posit, is not an innovation or heretical sect among Islamic sects. Ibadism emerged historically in the early period compared to other Islamic sects. Ibadis call themselves *Ahl al-Da'wā*. In addition, there

10 For his correspondence to his student Amr Khalifa an-Nāmi see: al-Shaybani, *al-Nami*, pp. 279–284.

11 For the studies of 'Ali Yahya see: Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq...*, pp. XV–XVI; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp.5–6; Baba'ammi, (ed.), *Mu'jam A'lam*, II, pp. 297–298.

are two important features of Ibadism. The first is that it is a sect which is clearly connected to the religion of God and acts with him. The second is their ambition to wage Holy war and make efforts in the path of God with perseverance.¹²

There are some important names in the formation and development of Ibadism. The first of these is *Jābir b. Zayd al-Azdi* (93/712), the founder of Ibadism. He believes that Ibadism is associated with the death of Jābir b. Zayd. However Ibadis are connected to Abdullah b. Ibād. Different social groups, especially some of the Umayyad Governor, also joined him because of a treatise which he sent to Abd al-Malik b. Marwan (86/705), which had a big impact because he invited the governor of the state and was open to discussion, unlike the majority of Kharidjites. The sect was named such by the name of Abd Allah b. Ibad rather than Jābir b. Zayd because of his coming to prominence in the political sphere and he was older than him. Moreover, he rebelled under the reign of Marwan b. Muhammad and was killed in the war of Tabāla, according to many historians. This information is incorrect; he died at the end of the reign of Abd al-Malik b. according to Marwan.¹³

Jābir b. Zayd had many intelligent students within his circles. These included Abd Allah b. Ibad, Abu Ubayda Muslim b. Abu Karima, Rabi' b. Habib, Dimam b. al-Saib, Abu Nuh Salih, Qatada, Ayyub, Ibn Dinar, Hayyan al-A'raj and Abu Mundhir Tamim b. Huways. All were active students. Jābir b. Zayd was not satisfied with the general condition, alongside Hasan Basri (110/728) and Said b. Jubayr (94/713), both of whom were his friends and opposed the power of Umayyad. The political power s also followed them and their students, accusing them of excesses and interfering in Kharidjites from the beginning. Such an accusation by the Kharidjites meant betrayal at that time. It seems that the reason for the spread of this claim was to make them feel they were under observation.¹⁴

The leader of Ibadism after Jābir b. Zayd was Abu Ubayda Muslim b. Abu Karima (145/762–63). Abu Ubayda grew up next to Jābir and Ibadism spread in the majority of Islamic Countries during this period. Students of Abu Ubayda played a big role in this process and they are known as *Hamalāt al-ilm* (science carriers). The students whom he trained passed on the style and knowledge they had learned from their teacher to their students. At this point 'Ali Yahya argues that Salama b. Sa'd was the most hardworking of this group as he was attacking cruel and oppressive people in their works. Salama b. Sa'd was not

12 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkih al-Ta'rikh IV: al-Ibadiyya fi al-Jazair*, Cairo: al-Maṭba'a 'l-Salafiyya, 1979, pp. 17–19, 321–328; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 9, 36, 43.

13 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 9, 44.

14 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 44–45.

satisfied with the situation of Muslims at the time and believed that political power had deviated on to the wrong path. He demanded the implementation of the provisions of God, adherence to the Sharia and the prevention of evil. The activities of Salama took place on two fields: Firstly, explaining the religion of Allah to the people, with Muslims holding with the religion of God and practicing his provisions. Secondly, young people with intelligence, purity and other notable features were chosen. They should go to the East and take lessons from the scholars there in order to complete their education. Salama b. Sa'd sent a group of students and then other groups to Basra for this purpose. These groups returned to their country and made successes of themselves.¹⁵

2.2. The Belief System of Ibadism and Religious Opinions

‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar gives us some basic information, although not very much and not very detailed about the belief system of Ibadism and religious opinions. He states that Ibadis adopted the basic structure of the Islamic Faith and its essential tawhid (Unity of God). He tells us about the religious discourse of Ibadism and its sources:

- The main source of religion on issues such as faith, worship, application and ethics is the Qur’an. In this context, the people who denied anything of the Qur’an are regarded as idolaters and apostates.
- Ibadis are on the opinion that the second source of Islam is ‘*authentic Sunnah*’. Authentic Sunnah refers to knowledge and requires action. In this point, mashur, a famous sunnah, is slightly weaker than the mutawatir sunnah, but is stronger than ahad (single) report. This is also requires action. Ahad’s report is a report from one person, but it also may require actions.
- The third source is *Icmā* (consensus), according to Ibadis. The occurrence of icmā is possible in every century and it is reported to people with the valid requirements.
- Ibadis are of the opinion that the fourth source is *Qiyas* (analogy). The provisions related to Qiyas are expressed in procedural books.
- The fifth source is *Istidlāl* with different species. Ibadis also gave special consideration Masalih-i Mursala (Istislah).¹⁶

15 Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta’rikh IV...*, pp. 20–24.

16 Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 27, 45–47; Mu‘ammar, *Samr Ustratin Muslimatin*, Algeria, Muassasat Tawalt al-Thaqafiyya, nd, pp. 191–196.

In this point he puts forward his approach by saying “*Jadal* (discussion) is done in the necessary matters, not in the principles of faith matters”, related to theological thought activities.¹⁷

In this context, he emphasises the *faith of walāya and barāa*. He considers that *walāya* and *barāa* are important for Ibadism. *Walāya*/Tavallā means to love the believers and to make them friends. This is a command of the Qur'an. *Barāat*/Tabarrā is about getting away from infidels. *Barāat* occurs in the case of processing a great evil that eliminated the *walāya*. This belief in Ibadism is both located in the principles of faith and has a regulatory function in social life. It is understood that the Ibadis as a closed community have survived through this belief during the period of *kitmān* (secrecy) and have maintained the main beliefs in this way without impairing them.¹⁸

If we focus on *jurisprudence* in connection with the belief structure, according to 'Ali Yahya, Ibadis stand between Hanafis and Hanbalis. Ibadism relied on Sunnah after the Qur'an in terms of evidence. When the hadith narrations contradict the *Qiyas* (analogy), the tradition is preferred even over *Ahad* or *mursel*. In addition, *Qiyas* (comparison), *Istishab* and *Maslahat Mursala* is accepted in detail.¹⁹

In the point of *looking at sahāba/companion*, he says that Ibadis have positive opinions. Moreover, ‘as some suggest, don't curse the companions.’²⁰

2.3. The Spread of Ibadism in North Africa

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār speaks of remarkable things related to this issue. Ibadism's arrival to this region was through students of Jābir b. Zayd and Abu Ubayda at the end of the first century and at the beginning of second century. Among them, as mentioned above, especially Salama b. Sa'd's place is different. He traveled the whole of North Africa and the Maghreb countries, formed a scientific (*Hameletu'l-Ilm*) group, involving individuals such as Asim as-Sidrāfī and Abd al-Hamid b. Mughtūr. Ibadism spread in this region with the activities of this team.²¹

The spread of Ibadism in this region is almost equivalent with the date of the entry of Islam. For example the arrival of Ibadism to Algeria was in years 50 and 60 AH. This is the date that the Islamic conquests start and Muslims

17 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh II*..., pp. 329–335.

18 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh IV*..., pp. 255–257, 292–298; Mu'ammār, *Samr Usratin*, pp. 211–212; moreover see: Sabri Hizmetli, 'İbadilik'de Velâyet ve Berâet İnancı', *AÜİFD*, Vol. 28, 1986, pp. 180–204.

19 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun*..., pp. 27–30, 48; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh IV*..., pp. 292–306.

20 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq*..., pp. 246–247.

21 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh IV*..., pp. 20–24.

arrive in Algeria. At this point Ibadism spreads to regions such as Tunisia and Algeria, particularly Libya in North Africa. Ibadism spread by the activities of figures such as Abu'l-Khattab Abd al-A'la, Jannavuni, Amr b. Yamtakin, Haris b. Tulayd, Abu Ubayda Abd al-Hamid and Abu Mansur Ilyas especially in Libya and Algeria. In this context it seems that Ibadism spread in regions such as az-Zab, the valley of Arīgh, the valley of Savf, Tajrīt, Warjilan, Ajlu, al-Rimal, the mountains of Bani Mus'ab, al-Aghwāt and the valley of Mzab (the province of Gardaya) in Algeria.²²

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār provides important information about *the Rustami State*. The Rustami State is the first Muslim state the Berbers established in the region. This government lived just about 140 years (160-297/777-909). The first president is Abd al-Rahman b. Rustam al-Fārisi. 'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār puts forth information given by Ibn Sağır al-Maliki, who is a contemporary of Rustamis, but is not Ibadi, is from the sect of Mālīki and evaluates them about the Rustami State. Ibn Sağır has a separate study called *Ta'rīh al-a'imma al-Rustamiyyīn* (The History of Rustami Presidents) about Rustamis. Ibn Sağır tells that Rustami State is a powerful and advanced state in many ways, for example, social justice has spread and weak communities have strengthened during this period. Moreover the Rustami State gave life to the poor people.²³

The Rustami State is an example of rightly guided caliphs, according to 'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār. The Rustami State, that is big, strong and one of the most advanced states, is neighbours with Ağlebis in the South and Idrisis on the Maghreb. It is managed by a president called Amir al-Mu'minin (The Leader of Worshipers). Some leading people and religious scholars chose the president based on features such as knowledge, understanding, experience, justice and mercy in this period. If a deviation is seen in the president, he would be was overthrown in a hard way, not with a soft method. So the presidents dominate especially with justice, they set an example to the community with their simple and modest lives. Judicial authority, separate from political authority, was held in the courts, which were the highest institutions of law in this period.²⁴

There were two important institutions providing security for people in this period; the organisation of the police and the organisation of hisba. The policemen who are responsible for security in the cities performed the duties besides the judges, who ruled on legal issues. In addition, the organisation of hisba, a special community, were performing important tasks. The members of hisba commanded right and forbade wrong, trying to solve the people's

22 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh IV...*, pp. 15-19; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh II: al-Ibadiyya fi Libya*, Cairo:al-Maṭba'a 'l-Salafiyya, 1964, pp. 27-60, 100-155.

23 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh IV...*, pp. 12-14, p. 27.

24 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta'rikh IV...*, pp. 25-26, 30-34, 64-125.

problems, especially in a spiritual and moral sense by visiting the bazaar. For example, this community when they saw a camel carrying a load more than it could carry, they would order its owner to decrease the load. They were also ordering cleaning up when they saw dirt on the roads.²⁵

The Rustami State is a one where there are significant developments in scientific ways. It has grown the scholars such as Abd al-Rahman b. Rustam, Āsim as-Sidrātī, Abu Ubayda al-A'raj, Abu Yusuf at-Tarafay, Abu Sahl al-Farisī, Abu Nuh Said b. Yahlaf al-Mazātī, Abu Zakariyya al-Huvvārī, Abu Ammār Abd al-Kāfi and Abu Ya'qub Wārjilānī in this period. This period was also a time when trade and agriculture, alongside urbanisation developed. There were many great and advanced buildings. So there was also advanced life. Many cities, especially the capital Tahert, was in the same situation. In addition, different groups who came from distant places like Kufa and Basra, were living side by side. Ambassadors from neighbouring countries also arrived and this led to significant cultural exchange.²⁶

Ibadism developed well in the region and spread. But this situation changed with the collapse of the Rustami State after the Manu war. For example, the links between Libya and Algeria severed in this process. The Ibadis who lived in cities migrated to the villages.²⁷

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammam gives us solid information about the Later History of Ibadism, especially *Ibadis who lived under Ottoman rule*. Ibadis were living in places like the Mزاب valley and Wārjilān when Algeria came under Ottoman rule. They discussed among themselves: should they stay under Ottoman domination by rethinking their position or live independently? At this point, after they had remained undecided for a while, the majority of Ibadis decided to join this powerful Muslim state. They thought they would be in safety and security. So it was decided to ally with and participate in the Ottoman Empire. In the event, an alliance with the Ottoman Empire took place in return the annual tax. There was Ottoman rule during this period but this was not just a form of domination. In fact, Ibadis were living independently, resolving all kinds of internal and external problems themselves, especially with the institution of *Azzāba*, that is their traditional institution. Moreover, especially Ibadi traders from Mزاب were going to and trading with the different regions of

25 Mu'ammam, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawqib al-Ta'rikh IV...*, pp. 30–34.

26 Mu'ammam, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawqib al-Ta'rikh IV...*, pp. 12–14, 127–150; moreover, for the activities of education and training see: Maryam Ba'ra, 'al-Ta'lim inda l-Ibadiyya bi-bilad al-Maghrib: Madinat Tihart Anmuzajan', *Islami İlimler Dergisi*, Vol. X/1, 2015, pp. 315–326.

27 Mu'ammam, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawqib al-Ta'rikh II...*, pp. 83–85, 156–157; In addition, for the Rustami State see: al-Warjilani, *Kitab al-Sira wa-Akhbar al-A'imma*, Abd al-Rahman Ayyub (ed.), Tunis 1405/1985, I, pp. 85–277; Darjini, *Kitab Tabaqat al-Mashayikh bi l-Maghrib*, Ibrahim Tallay (ed.), Algeria, 1974, II, pp. 48–49.

North Africa in this period. The Ottoman government viewed them like other Islamic sects.²⁸

2.3. Ibadi Sub-sects in North Africa

‘Ali Yahya Mu‘ammar tells us remarkable things about Ibadi sub-sects in North Africa. In this context, firstly conflicts among Ibadis continued from the first century. Important groups among Ibadis also emerged in the process. He says that they divided into six groups. The most important of the sects, he says, is *Nukkār*. *Nukkār*, or the sect named *Nukkāriyya* as a political division. It emerged due to a power struggle taking place within the Rustami State. Abu Qudamah Yazid b. Fandin launched this movement. They did not accept the imamate of Abd al-Wahhab b. Abd al-Rahman after Abd al-Rahman b. Rustam with the justification that they were more virtuous people. According to ‘Ali Yahya, *Nukkār* became a religious sect that had certain principles in the subsequent process. Abu’l-Ma‘ruf Shu‘ayb made this transformation in the sect. Some opinions were put forward on the procedure and subordinates in the next process.²⁹

Another sect is *Naffāsiyya*. *Naffāsiyya* emerged under the leadership of Faraj b. Nasr al-Naffās. Faraj b. Nasr who had read many sciences from Rustami leaders in Tahert, had extensive knowledge and was one of the leading scholars of his time. His justification for leaving was avoidance of Aflah, the president of Rustami from the war against Aḡlabis. So he went to the eastern region. This Tunisia-based movement lives in the Jabal Nafūsa region of Libya as a small group today. *Naffāsiyya* have moderate features and no extreme views.³⁰

The sect called the *Khalafiyya* emerged under the leadership of Khalaf b. Abu’l-Khattāb al-Maāfirī in Tripoli. His father was scholarly man and governor in Eastern Libya in the period of Abd al-Wahhab b. Rustamī. When his father died, the people wanted him to manage that region instead of his father, but they did this without consulting the government. Khalaf accepted this and began applications. But Rustamī authorities did not accept this situation and refused his governorship. Rustamī authorities appointed another governor. This time Khalaf didn’t accept this situation and declared his independence. Although his movement continued for a long time the central government prevailed against him and ended his dominance. *Khalafiyya* maintained their presence in Tripoli because they found support there during the next process. ‘Ali Yahya says that

28 Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya fi Mawkib al-Ta’rikh IV*..., pp. 329–341.

29 Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq*, pp. 227–232, 245; Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun*..., pp. 38, 41–42.

30 Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq*..., pp. 232–239, 245; Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun*..., p. 40.

there is not a different opinion of this sect in terms of faith, but in the political dimension.³¹

Another sect is *Husayniyya*. The founder of this sect is Abu Ziyad al-Husayn at-Trāblusi who lived in the third century. 'Ali Yahya tells us that his opinions are mixed with Umariyya, one of many other sub-sects. Many opinions of this group are mentioned in the books of Maqālāt. This group has an intellectual dynamism. However, other than what their opponents write about Husayniyya there is no trace.³²

The sect called the *Sakkakiyya* emerged under the leadership Abdullah al-Sakkāk al-Lavātī, the founder of this sect. When Abd Allah al-Sakkāk opposed Ibadis on some issues, the majority of the Ibadis cut off their relationship with him. According to 'Ali Yahya, they denied tradition, ijma and qiyas. In addition they saw azan (the call to prayer) and Friday prayer as innovation, so they were beyond Islam. The Sakkakiyya disappeared in the next process. However, beyond what their opponents wrote about Sakkakiyya there is no longer any book like Husayniyya.³³

Another sect is *Farsiyya*. The founder of this sect is Abu Sulaiman b. Ya'qub b. Aflah. Abu Sulaiman b. Ya'qub issued interesting fatwas on various issues, and contemporary scholars moved away from him. He had interesting opinions, such as that the meat of animals to be eaten should be dirty and the blood in the veins be forbidden even after cleaning.³⁴

It is interesting that 'Ali Yahya does not mention *Wahbis*, one of the essential sub-sects of Ibadism here while he is referencing the sub-groups of Ibadis. He does not mention Wahbis who constituted the majority of Ibadis, although he mentions all other sub-groups other than Wahbis. This must be due to the fact that Wahbis formed the main body of Ibadis in North Africa, 'Ali Yahya seems to associate the Wahbiyya with Ibadism here.

2.4. The Political Opinions of Ibadites

The political opinions of Ibadites are among the issues that 'Ali Yahya is interested in. Ibadis think the imamate is assumed by the command of God according to him. That is why they think the president would be elected by a shura (council). However, the presidency is not limited to Quraish or any

31 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 40–42; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firq...*, pp. 239–240.

32 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firq...*, pp. 240–242; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 39–42.

33 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 39–40, 42; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firq...*, pp. 242–243, 245.

34 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 40–41; Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firq...*, pp. 243–245.

tribe of the Arabs. Everyone who has the right conditions, such as knowledge, justice and righteousness, can be president. However, Quraishness or Arabness is preferable in case of overlapping conditions here. The president is also responsible for the practices of governors.

It is not right to revolt against a just president, according to Ibadites. It is not wajib (obligatory) to revolt against a cruel president, as Kharidjites posited. In addition, this case isn't forbidden, as Ash'arīs and Salafis say. So, justice is primarily demanded from cruel rulers. If he does not answer, his dismissal is requested. If he still does not answer, revolt is no longer unlawful against him and he should be dismissed by force.³⁵

2.5. The Relationship Between Ibadism and Khāridjite.

‘Ali Yahya has important and remarkable ideas about the relationship between Ibadism and Kharidjite. He considers that Ibadism is outside of the Kharidjite; so he does not accept them as Kharijis. He refers to the subject with the title of *Ibadis are not Kharidjites* in his study *‘al-Ibādiyya Madhhabun Islamiyyun Mu‘tadilun’*. He says that the books of Makālāt written in Islamic heresiography accept Ibadis as a sect of Kharidjites, but that it was wrong. It shows them as rude, extreme and inconsiderate people in this way. Whereas ‘Ali Yahya believes that Ibadis are the most remote people to Kharidjites. Ibadis were never badly behaved throughout history, according to him. They progress by inviting and persuasion, even when they change some state institutions. The places where the other sect members live is regarded as a Muslim town, even if the president is cruel. So it is not true hostility towards a Muslim state.³⁶

‘Ali Yahya tells us that Ibadis, although they criticised the Umayyad administrators, didn't join revolts against the Umayyad as the movements against the Umayyad did, such as Shiites, Kharidjites, Tawwabun, Abdullah b. Zubayr. According to him, leading Kharidjite leaders tried to convince them to revolt with them, but he prevented it and reported that an uprising could not be made for a nation whose azan (the call to prayer) rises from their minarets and the Qur'an rises from their mosques.³⁷

35 Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 21–24; Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya fı Mawkıb al-Ta'rih IV...*, pp. 364–373; for the political views of Ibadis see: Ethem Ruhi Fıđlalı, *Ibadiye'nin Doğuşu ve Görüşleri*, Ankara: AÜİF. Yay., 1983, pp. 108–125; Harun Yıldız, *Kendi Kaynakları Işığında Hāriciliğın Doğuşu ve Gelişimi*, Ankara: Araştırma Yay., 2010, pp. 172–175; Zuhayr Taghlat, 'al-Imamat al-Ibadiyya,' *İslami İlimler Dergisi*, Vol. X/1, 2015, pp. 252–270.

36 Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, p. 24.

37 The first actual movement that was put forward by Ibadis is the movement launched by Talibu'l-Hakk Abdullah b. Yahya al-Kindi in Yemen with defensive reasons. Perhaps the first and last actual movement that Ibadis have put up against their opponents who they attacked the region in which they live. See: Mu‘ammar, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, p. 22.

Ibadites have been divided into countless sects and a leader appointed for each sect, according to him. However, both these sects, both these leaders and their sayings are not true for Ibadis, because they are far from these kinds of things. For example, the sub-sects such as *Yazidiyya*, *Hafsiyya* and *Harithiyya* are connected to Ibadis. But none of these sects are related to Ibadism.³⁸

2.6. Critiques and Accusations Against Ibadism

'Ali Yahya explains his ideas about critiques and accusations against Ibadism. This is regarded as an effort to defend Ibadism, using both classical and contemporary sources. He states that Ibadis had faced various accusations since the Umayyad period and notes with sadness that the faithful and historians of other sects have had a major role to play as they sided primarily with the view that that Ibadis are Kharidjites and that Ibadis are incorrect when they have searched for proof related to this provision. At this point 'Ali Yahya indicates that this effort is not to know the truth.³⁹

'Ali Yahya primarily surveys the works of classical authors such as Ash'arī (324/935–936), Baghdadi (429/4037–38), Ibn Hazm (456/1064), Isfarayani (471/1078) and Shahrastani (548/1153) and evaluates the information given about Ibadism by them.

'Ali Yahya tells us that Ash'arī does not know Ibadism well and he wrote many things that have no relationship with them. The information given by Ash'arī about the sub-sects of Ibadism such as Yazidiyya, Hafsiyya and Hārisiyya are not true either, according to him. He criticises Ash'arī again because of not giving information related to important scholars like Jābir b. Zayd, Abu Ubayda Muslim b. Abi Karima, Rabi' b. Habib, Ja'far b. as-Simāk, Suhār al-Abdi, Dīmām b. al-Saib, Abdullah b. Yahya al-Kindi, Abu'l-Khattab al-Maafiri, Abd al-Rahman b. Rustam and Hūd b. Muhakkam al-Huvvārī at all. He thinks that Ash'arī was right at this point and tells us that Ibadism does not spread in many Islamic countries like Iraq, Hijaz, Egypt and the southern Arabian peninsula in his time. On the other hand, some figures that Ash'arī shows us leaders, authors and theologians of Ibadis like Muhammad b. Harb and Yahya b. al-Kamil who did not live according to 'Ali Yahya. Ibadites and do not know these figures and their sects and are not therefore informed of their opinions. So the opinions that attributed to Ibadis are complex. All this indicates that Ash'arī does not mention the genuine Ibadis.⁴⁰

The leading thinkers of the Sunni thought such as Baghdadi, Ibn Hazm, Shahrastani and Isfarayani similarly make mistakes according to 'Ali Yahya.

38 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya Madhhabun...*, pp. 18–19.

39 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq...*, p. 8.

40 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firaq...*, pp. 13–19, 29–30.

Some of the opinions that they have attributed to Ibadis need to be refuted. He accuses especially Isfarayani, because he thinks that Isfarayani entered into this subject like a warrior and brought accusations against Ibadis. He tells us that some information given by Shahrastani are wrong and he also criticised him. The view of Shahrastani that Abdullah b. Ibad was killed in Tabala during the period of Marwan b. Mohammad is an example of this. In fact, he died at the end of the period of Abdulmalik b. Marwan. Additionally, 'Ali Yahya is of the opinion that Shahrastānī also relied on other sources, not Ibadi sources, while he gives information about Ibadism.⁴¹

Conclusion

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār is one of the most important researchers of Ibadi origin in the last period. He devoted his whole life to Ibadi studies. His studies are significant and remarkable. It seems that he examined Ibadism in various aspects including both historically and theologically and current. In this point he has studies related to the theological dimension such as belief system and religious opinions of Ibadites and political opinions as well as studies related to the historical dimension such as the formation and historical development of Ibadism, the spread of Ibadism in North Africa, Ibadi sub-sects in North Africa and its relationship between Khāridjite in terms of history. He also studied issues such as critiques and accusations about Ibadites. Thus he dealt with many aspects of this subject.

Information given by 'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār about the formation and historical development of Ibadism, the spread of Ibadism in North Africa, the belief system and opinions of Ibadites and the different Ibadi sub-sects is based on the main Ibadi sources. In this context, he has relied on the works of important Ibadi scholars such as Darjini, Barradi, Wārjilani and Shammahi. So he has based his work on first-hand sources related to the subject and has made an important case-determination.

'Ali Yahya Mu'ammār's answers that the critiques and accusations about Ibadites are remarkable and thought-provoking. 'Ali Yahya makes an effort to reveal Ibadism, moving from classical to contemporary sources. It seems that he aims to explain Ibadism better and correctly, leaving aside some incorrect generalisations and a set of prejudices that emerged over the centuries. Because it is based on his personal observations significantly. He has contributed seriously to knowledge and understanding of the current situation of Ibadism with his studies in this field.

The studies of 'Ali Yahya provide important contributions to eliminating misunderstandings and prejudices among different religious groups and sects

41 Mu'ammār, *al-Ibadiyya bayn al-Firqā...*, pp. 45–54.

that live in the Muslim world. The members of different sects will understand each other better because of this. Muslim groups will get to know each other better and more accurately. Such studies will also be strengthened with studies by today's young researchers.

Resolving Intractable Conflicts: The Case of Forum

Abstract

This paper presents a pragmatic model of intractable conflict resolution that is an adaptation of John Burton's approach and Kelman's work. The Sequential Interactive Forum (SIF) focuses on the process and result of the forum and towards specific and creative solutions towards a valued change in society. It has been observed that parties in conflict often bring a lot of baggage in terms of their demands and issues into any mediation or negotiation environment. Some of these issues have become intractable over time and are not amenable to a one-touch easy resolution. The facilitators and conflict experts are challenged to analyse underlying causes and dynamics of conflicts in order to apply adequate instruments to facilitate the process. A theoretical framework towards this end will be presented later. Pertinently, the nature of intractable conflict will be examined, followed by a conceptual definition of the SIF, a new integrative approach of inter-group conflict transformation which is also an effective tool for groups and practitioners in conflict resolution.

Keywords: Intractable conflict, Coaching, Conflict resolution, Cultural competency, forum.

Introduction

The emergence of intractable conflict in the international system is a potential threat to world peace and development. Entangled in the web of intractable conflict, nations and communities find it very difficult to negotiate themselves out or disentangle themselves because of the unresolved identity or value differences involved. Some studies agree that much of the violence in international relations can be related to the way nations interact or express their conflict. According to Kelman,² unresolved issues pertaining to value differences, culture, and identity create a zero-sum view of the conflict where one's very existence seems inextricably connected to the negation of the other. Therefore finding ways to manage or transform such conflict is of great importance for harmonious coexistence.

Although rich case studies exist in the literature about how to change destructive elements and incompatibilities such as beliefs, feelings, claims and identity, conflicts have stubbornly eluded resolution, even when the best

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2 Herbert Kelman, 'Social Psychological Dimension of International Conflict,' in *Peace Making in International Conflict*, William I. Zartman and Jens.L. Rasmussen (ed.), Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1997.

available approaches are applied. The factors that lead to failed intervention during conflict resolution are not yet properly understood. The aim of this paper is to identify reasons why parties cannot easily resolve underlying issues in intractable conflict effectively. This failure to engage constructively often complicates processes, threatening a relapse into further conflict. To address this gap in the field, I will suggest in this paper a complimentary, but distinct, approach to resolving intractable conflict.

The SIF is a process of healing and transformation of conflict through unfettered communication between parties. Pertinently it also represents an incremental or one-step-at-a-time approach to problem solving that might lead to restoration of strained relationships and change in each party's perception of the other. The SIF is attractive as, a process of rediscovery, reflection and return, which assists disputants to understand their conflict, venting emotions, and reframing issues underlying the discontent. This represents an extended model of problem-solving that borrows from early works of Herbert Kelman,³ John Burton⁴ and Ronald Fisher⁵. But for any problem solving to be effective in a fast growing multicultural and globalising world, an adequate model of conflict resolution is needed that lays most emphasis on both the outcome and the process of transformation. This model incorporates two other important approaches such as "cultural competency" and "coaching of parties" or stakeholders in the skills of conflict resolution.

The SIF is programmed to use a pre-forum interaction (or mock forum) to coach the disputants separately on useful skills before bringing them together to a major forum of deliberation. These additional features distinctly differentiate it from the existing problem solving models. Such a combination, if understood, might help the process of predicting the dynamics of interaction between disputing parties and parties towards each other and improve their communicational capability. The role of the third party is therefore, among other things, to ask the right question and listen attentively to the disputants with a view to assisting the parties change their cognitive behaviour and perception about the conflict.

This paper is organised around the discussion of three broad themes. The first part will focus on the nature of intractable conflict. The second part will

3 Herbert Kelman, 'Interactive Approach To Conflict Resolution and its Application to Israeli-Palestinian Relations,' *International Interaction*, Vol. 6, 2008, pp. 99–122; Herbert Kelman, 'Interactive Problem Solving: Informal Mediation by the Scholar Practitioner,' in *Studies in International Mediation Essays in Honor of Jeffery Z. Rubin*, Jacob Berkovitch (ed.), New York: Palgrave, 2002.

4 John Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication In International Relations*, London: Macmillan, 1969.

5 Ronald Fisher, 'The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution,' Richard L. Merritt (ed.), *Communication in International Politics*, Urbana: University of Illinois press, 1972.

examine in detail the concept of the SIF and the process. The third part will discuss the important components of the conflict resolution process. This approach is a pragmatic and strategic mode of interaction and problem solving that will empower disputing parties to decide how to resolve their conflict satisfactorily.

The Nature of Intractable Conflict

The most difficult thing in conflict theory is the definition of conflict itself. Understanding conflict is important in order to identify the kinds of human behaviour that are conflictual as well as how to resolve them.

Conflict is defined as a struggle between social groups that see each other as incompatible. These social groups with different frames of mind, beliefs, perceptions, values, and feelings fight or compete with each other over basic needs, with the intention to “prevent, interfere, and injure, or in some way makes (resolution) less likely or less effective”.⁶ In some instances, aggrieved communities will use whatever means there are at hand to attain their desired goals. Trailing in the footsteps of pioneers in the field, Wilmot Hocker defined conflict “as an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatibility goals, scarce resources, and interference from others in achieving their goals.”⁷

When groups are embedded in conflict, they tend to think differently about the other side and the causes underlying their dispute. The first thing that happens is trying to give meaning and a framework to events around them and by so doing justifying whatever their actions might be as the right reaction. This kind of absolute belief in one’s behaviour is continuously reinforced, and given life by stereotyping, and other inimical attitudes projected towards opponents. A society in this situation is schooled to imbibe a particular imagined belief of superiority through socialisation, and distance from other opposing views and interpretations. In this vein, the virtue of own group and worth reifies a more dominant attitude.

In conflict, a major distortion of perception of the presumed enemy tends to be prevalent. This behaviour can lead to the psychological need to dehumanise the other and create a “we” and “they” dichotomy. Furthermore, enemies are stigmatised as outsiders, or those who do not belong to the community, or are power hungry, seeking dominance, and even as evil. This social dichotomy and attitude often underlie the formation of national, ethnic or group identities and behaviour as well as determine whether group relationship will be based

6 Michael Deutsch, *The resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 10 .

7 William W. Wilmot, Joyce L. Hocker, *Interpersonal conflict*, Magraw Hill: New York, 2001, p. 41.

on cooperation or conflict. Furthermore, the experience of communities and groups dominated by a majority ethnic group often plays a significant role in escalation of conflict. When the defeats, suffering and humiliation experienced are recalled, they affect how people and individuals interpret the present. This greatly influences the conflict, giving it a connotation of a historic and intractable conflict. Conflict interaction can be productive or destructive depending on the kinds of communication and perception used to wage it. In a situation where all participants think they have lost as a result, then the conflict is classified as destructive⁸ and might also become intractable.

Intractable conflicts are therefore defined as conflicts that are persistent and destructive despite repeated attempts at resolution.⁹ According to Coleman,¹⁰ these conflicts are deadlocked and may escalate. In his earlier studies Burton¹¹ describes them as “deep rooted” conflicts, while Azar¹² labeled them “protracted social conflicts”. Intractable conflicts though they are similar to other conflicts are probably the most complex and difficult to resolve.

The socio-psychological processes that intractable conflicts often trigger increases the possibilities of escalation of hostility or further violence. Conflicts like a cancer worm spreads faster to destroy the social fabric of a nation. In the literature, many protracted conflicts do not begin as intractable, but can become destructive through escalation, negative sentiment, and hostile cognitions that change the interactions and dynamics of the conflict.¹³ Some of these conflicts involve multiple stakeholders,¹⁴ complex issues like religion, culture, identity and more especially “the satisfaction of basic needs such as those of recognition, and distributive justice.”¹⁵ The enduring antagonistic set of perception and interactions, between communal groups in conflict, conditioned by fear and another belief system, may set the stage upon which one group tries to marginalise the other by using all available adversarial means including armed force to eliminate the opponent.

8 Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict...*, p.73.

9 Barbara Gray, Peter Coleman and Linda L. Putnam, ‘Intractable Conflict: New Perspectives On the Causes and Conditions for Change,’ *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 50, No. 11, July 2007, p. 1415.

10 See. Peter Coleman, ‘Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: towards the Development of a Meta-Frame work, Peace and Conflict,’ *Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 9, No.1, 2003, pp. 1–37.

11 John Burton, *Resolving Deep-rooted conflict: A Handbook*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.

12 Edward Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*, Hampshire, UK: Dartmouth.

13 Gray, Coleman and Putnam, ‘Intractable...,’ p. 1416.

14 Coleman, ‘Characteristics...,’ p. 428.

15 Azar, *The Management...*, p. 2.

Intractable conflicts also involve tangible or negotiable issues such as resource distribution disputes, or competition for power and self-determination.¹⁶ In Africa and other parts of the Developing world, such conflicts have surfaced and threaten democratisation and economic development. In the literature, deep-rooted conflicts become intractable and complex when combined with other volatile cleavages like religion and culture. The conflict pervades all aspects of people's lives and they see no way to exit than to continue fighting until their opponent is eliminated or weakened. Moreover, the destructive conflagration, especially those in Africa, defies any means and strategies to manage it. Cases in point are the genocidal conflict in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Dafur in Sudan. Intractable conflicts also have destructive consequences. Over time the conflict if not resolved weakens the civil society, delegitimises governmental institutions, destroys the economy and frustrates developmental goals. As the situation worsens, poverty, crime, youth unemployment and lack of basic needs drives events on the ground along destructive paths towards "relative deprivation", often a precursor for ethnic conflict.

Parties in intractable conflicts systematically attempt to construct the views of their society's members in such a way as to present their society as being moral, just, and their opponents as immoral, belligerent, intransigent, irrational or extreme. Each side therefore views itself as the victim of the conflict, and this might linger for a long time. Good relationships and communication are very critical requirements in resolving conflicts and any strategy that fails to address these issues might not be effective in the long run. Instead, the psychological and social dynamics of group interactions that develop over a long period of time might produce a template for institutionalized behaviour whereby people would feel that the way they treat others who are not like themselves are normal and acceptable in the society.

In the literature scholars agree that "behaviour becomes institutionalised when the conscious cognitive process that underlies it becomes commonly used, taken for granted, and reciprocated by disputants."¹⁷ What this definition shows is the importance of seeking the causes of destructive conflicts through the prism of institutionalization, namely that "reflects repetitive, habitual patterns of actions that are reinforced by social consensus."¹⁸ Such behaviour in a society is realisable through a coercive mechanism such as shunning or shaming, through culturally prescribed norms of how to behave.¹⁹ Scholars

16 Louis Kriesberg, 'Intractable Conflict,' in *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, Eugene E. Weiner, (ed.), New York: Continuum, 1999, p. 332.

17 Richard W. Scott, *Institutions and Organizations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001, p. 48.

18 Gray, Coleman and Putnam, 'Intractable...', p. 1421.

19 Scott, *Institutions and Organizations...*, p. 48.

suggest that the institutionalised patterns of intractable conflicts can explain how such conflicts often continue in a state of a virtual 'lockdown'. Furthermore, this guides one towards finding strategies and means of resolving the conflict as well as de-institutionalising such habitual patterns of behaviour.

In this respect, this article concurs with Coleman,²⁰ that "our greatest hope in dealing with intractable conflicts is to find the means to avert them" and replace them with constructive regulation and institutionalised behaviour capable of sustaining ethnic group co-existence. If we understand conflict as a cancer that a society has developed, then it necessitates the conducting of proper analysis and treating the root causes of the conflict, and not the symptoms. Beyond certain ascribed simplistic ideas for dealing with conflicts is the need for a strategy to resolve the pertinent intangible and tangible needs involved. A major cog-in-the-wheel for resolving conflict is the mind frame that disputes can be resolved in a certain setting. In prolonged and intractable conflicts, where animosities, hatred, and emotions have accumulated over time, a new approach is required that is capable of addressing the entire psychological backlog that has been generated.

The Sequential Interactive forum Process

Sequential Interactive forum is a model for conflict resolution that is facilitated by a neutral third party in collective brainstorming, and analyses to bring about change in the behaviour of the disputants at a dialogue table. The presence of different types of unresolved conflict in Africa and elsewhere indicates that much has to be done in testing new models of problem solving not only in international conflicts but also in intra-ethnic group conflicts. Previous scholar²¹ have introduced several problem-solving approaches that form the bedrock of major studies about resolving ethnic conflicts in the field. Most of these early scholars have borrowed from the pioneering work of John Burton,²² who first applied it to a third party interpersonal level of analysis known as "controlled communication."

Professor Herbert Kelman and colleagues added to the study and application of an interactive problem solving model especially in their popular work on Israeli and Palestinian conflict,²³ and followed up with the

20 Peter Coleman, 'Power and conflict,' in *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Morton Deutsch and Peter Coleman (eds.), San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2000, p. 449.

21 Ronald Fisher, 'The Problem Solving Workshop In Conflict Resolution,' in *Communication in International Politics*, Richard L. Merritt (ed.), Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972.

22 John Burton, *Conflict and Communication...*

23 Herbert Kelman, Patrick Cohen, 'The Problem-Solving Workshop: A Social Psychological Contribution to the Resolution of Conflicts,' *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 13, 1976, pp.79-90.

“problem-solving forum,”²⁴ and a “continuing workshop.”²⁵ Irrespective of the different names these eminent scholars have ascribed to their models, they have not differed much from common definitions and characteristics of the concept. Interestingly, their work has produced plausible strategies in conflict resolution that emphasises the process and roles of the third party mediator, the behaviour of participants and the type of environment the dialogue is convened in. Uniquely, these models are non-agreement oriented problem-solving. However, they are tailored to identify commonalities among stakeholders and help them understand themselves by sincere and open communication, a prerequisite for making peace.

According to Fisher, interactive conflict resolution is a strategy “for direct intervention in situations of inter-group conflict, consisting of small group problem solving discussions organised by social science practitioners in the role of a third party.”²⁶ This discussion, according to Fisher,²⁷ is not tailored only to help conflicting parties deal with the negative aspects of their dispute but help parties restore impaired relationships. While concurring with such views Kelman,²⁸ added that it is also “a vehicle for change in national policies and in the larger conflict system.”

The SIF therefore is a model of problem solving that provides an unfettered climate and template for stakeholders and participants to attain the desired goal of reaching rapport and understanding, rather than immediate resolution of a dispute. This method of conflict resolution is not mediation, although it employs the expertise of mediators. It only serves as a foretaste for a future joint mediation process, which is more focused on reaching agreement. Scholars have made known and discussed some of these differences²⁹ in comparing their “consultation”, “controlled communication” and “problem solving” methods with other traditional strategies of conflict resolution. Contrastingly, the SIF facilitated by third party neutrals “lies in human relations skills, of sharing feelings and perceptions, understanding the dynamics and social relationships and being knowledgeable of the sources and processes of conflict and methods of resolution.”³⁰

While the mediator facilitates exchanges of views and deals with evaluation of ideas regarding specific issues, the third party professionals

24 Azar, *The Management...*; John Burton and Frank Duke, *Conflict Reading in Management and Resolution*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1990; Fisher, ‘The Problem Solving...’

25 Kelman, ‘An Interactive Approach...’, pp.99–100.

26 Ronald Fisher, ‘Third Party Consultation as a Method of Inter Group Conflict Resolution. A Review of Studies,’ *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, 1983, p. 301.

27 Fisher, ‘Third Party...’, p. 301.

28 See. Kelman, ‘Social Psychological Dimensions...’

29 See. Fisher, ‘The Problem Solving Workshop...’

30 Fisher, ‘Third Party...’, p. 305.

must first establish trust in order to encourage the sharing of participants' ideas about their perception and basic relationships. However, irrespective of these differences in roles, Scholars³¹ still believe that professionals on both sides do almost the same thing but with different approaches and methods. This kind of "unofficial" interaction between groups or stakeholders in a dispute lays great emphasis on improving disjointed lines of communication, which has contributed to the escalation of animosities, analysing basic relationships between the groups, and material resources in a way that might help resolve their problems, and influence public opinion.³² According to Fisher,³³ the approach is decidedly non-coercive, non-evaluative, relatively non-directive, and seeks exploration and creative problem solving with respect to basic relationships; rather than settlement of specific issues through negotiation." This kind of conflicts often involve intangible demands as well as tangible ones, such as claims over scarce resources, distribution of economic and political benefits which is also associated with power imbalances. They are also based on denial of basic needs.

In any interactive forum dialogue needs time and cannot be rushed, and very importantly it is an interaction between equals³⁴ where power relations need proper adjustment. Crucially, it's worth noting that the flexibility and objective of this sequential process of problem solving is distinguished from other conflict resolution models like arbitration. The SIF is therefore a change-oriented and analytical process of conflict resolution facilitated by a third party that is an unbiased and multi-culturally sensitive professional, social scientists, and mediators in order to assist disputants identify salient issues in their conflict. This is only realisable through good communication, which leads the parties towards changing their attitude and perceptions of themselves and repairing strained relationships.

Irrespective of the circumstances and the nature of a conflict, the SIF as a socio-psychological model of problem-solving is a continuing process drawn over time to account for all major issues in conflict and more especially to guarantee equal participation of all disputants and their representatives, giving them chances to be heard. Though in some situations issues might be resolved in one meeting, this might demand persistence and continued dialogue in other conditions before a rapport can be reached to end hostilities.

A major cog-in-the-wheel of resolving conflict is the mind frame that a dispute could be resolved at one sitting. In prolonged and intractable

31 James Wall, 'Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25, 1998, pp. 157–180; see. Fisher, 'The Problem Solving workshop...'

32 Fisher, 'Third Party...', pp. 301–302.

33 Fisher, 'The Problem-Solving Workshop...', p. 67.

34 David Bohm, *On Dialogue*, Reprinted, Routledge: New York, 1991.

conflicts, where animosities, hatred, and emotions have accumulated, the hope that parties will easily discuss all that is involved at one sitting may send the wrong signals to the parties and the public. The SIF takes cognizance of all these while at the same time uses each stage of the meeting to coach disputants and stakeholders separately on basic conflict resolution skills that are necessary for the smooth facilitation of the process. This new quality is also a combination that distinguishes this approach from pioneering methods. These are very important skills parties will be using all the time in the future to resolve different kinds of community problem, family issues and inter-personal conflicts without the help of a mediator or third party.³⁵ In view of the effects of emotional outbursts during the process, scholars agree that coaching stakeholders can present a “perspective using neutral and non-provocative language.”³⁶ In conflict resolution skills such as good communication, listening, acknowledgement of the other, and controlling emotions prepare the parties to enter into a forum with confidence and without fear, thus creating a harmonious atmosphere.

The SIF and Multi-Cultural Competence

Conflict resolution requires us to communicate appropriately and creatively in different conflict interactive situations. It requires us to be knowledgeable and respectful of different world views and ways of dealing with a conflict situation.³⁷ Emphasis on acquiring communication skills is a key to any successful interactive problem solving “consultation” or forum. Convening an interactive problem solving discussion might be jeopardised by cultural insensitivity of the norms and values of the host society. Understanding people’s cultural behaviour can assist in promoting better relations among cultural groups. Scholars concur that from culture we learn the language of relationships that connect us to others, confirming our belonging and deepening our purpose. The SIF as a model affirms the metaphor of culture as a life source that both animates and heals conflict³⁸ and at the same time informing the capacities, practices, and tools to resolve it.

In the socio-psychological literature, cultural competence is integrally connected to professional competence and without it a helping professional is unable³⁹ to perform. In this vein we see the need for additional skill

35 Gregorio Billikoff, *Helping Others Resolve Differences*, University of California: Modesto, 2004, p. 31

36 Karin, S. Hobbs, ‘Attention Attorneys! How to Achieve the Best Result in Mediation’, in Gregorio Billikoff, *Helping Others...*, p.118.

37 Ting Toomey, ‘Towards a Theory of Conflict and Culture,’ in *The Conflict and Culture Reader*, Park Chew (ed.), New York: New York University Press, 2001, p. 396–7.

38 Michelle Lebaron, ‘Cultural Fluency,’ in *Conflict. Currencies and Starting Points, Bridging Cultural Conflicts*, Jossey – Bass, 2003, p.4.

39 Hilary Weaver, *Exploration In Cultural Competence: Journey to the Fourth Direction*, United States: Thomson Brooks and Cole, 2005.

development in cultural competency relevant for expert social scientists and mediators in the problem-solving process. Sue and colleagues have provided a comprehensive definition of multicultural competence to depict “a helping professional having an awareness of his or her own assumptions, values, and biases; understanding of the world view of culturally distinct clients (parties), being able to develop appropriate intervention strategies and techniques.”⁴⁰ According to Chen and Starosta, “intercultural competence concerns getting the job done and attaining communication goals through verbal and nonverbal behaviours in intercultural interaction.”⁴¹

Pioneering scholars in interactive problem solving drew attention to the sensitivity of professionals and social scientists in the field.⁴² In his seminal work cited by Fisher⁴³, John Burton posits: “Professional knowledge presumes knowledge in a number of areas of conflict theory, group processes, perception communication, sensitivity training, attitude formation and change, conflict management practices, and general knowledge specifically related to the system within which the third party is working.”⁴⁴ It therefore suffices to say that inducing “mutual positive motivations”, treatment of issues in conflict, and regulating of the overall interaction of disputants are tied to the sensitivity of the values and cultures of a given area, among other things. This partly explains the relevance of providing a conducive atmosphere for dialogue as a major condition for a successful SIF, process, one that takes cognizance of norms, cultural fluency as tool for decoding and moving through conflicts and deepening a sense of collaborative problem solving, limiting escalation of violence or disputes and transforming it into a learning experience for both disputants and professionals alike.

Succinctly, LeBaron and Pillay agree that “to be fluent with culture is to recognise it as a series of underground rivers that profoundly shape not only who we are but how we cooperate and engage conflict.”⁴⁵ Based on this conviction, the SIF incorporates cultural competence in the various stages of the process. Professional social scientists and mediators who can demonstrate ability to communicate effectively across a diversity of cultures, ethnicity

40 Derald Wing Sue, Robert T. Carter, J. Manuel Casas, Nadya A. Fouad, Allen E. Ivey, Magaret Jensen, Teresa La Fromboise, Jeanne E. Manese, Joseph G. Ponterotto, Ena Vazquez-Natal (ed.), *Multicultural Competency Counseling Competencies: Individual and Organizational Development*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 63–64.

41 Guo Ming Chen and William Starosta, *Inter Cultural Communication, A Reader*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000, p. 407.

42 Burton, *Conflict and Communication...*

43 Fisher, ‘The problem Solving Workshop ...’, p. 75.

44 Burton, *Conflict and Communication...*

45 Michelle Lebaron and Vanashri Pillay (ed.), *Conflict Across Cultures. A Unique Experience of Bridging Differences*, Boston: Intercultural Press, 2006, p. 12.

and faith traditions stand a better chance of success. In view of this, there is the need for third party facilitators to show understanding and respect for cultural identities, beliefs, different world views, and different spiritual frames of reference. A culturally competent mediator/professional must be capable of building trust and interacting freely with the stakeholders of a conflict situation.

Conflict resolution is premised on the cultural fluency⁴⁶ of practitioners, facilitators, social scientists, conflict management practitioners and mediators. Without cultural competency these professionals will find it very difficult to build bridges and restore confidence especially in multiethnic societies.

The absence of a competent professional can impact the success of any process of conflict resolution. Conflict is a cultural challenge and challenges professional practitioners and mediators to sharpen their skills in working across cultures, recognising that there is a wider community of interests and that the history of the dispute itself may provide many insights into how perceptions have formed and how to deal with them effectively, rather than just focusing on immediate resolution. The SIF model of problem solving is useful for diagnosing and analyzing conflict by focusing on creating a harmonious atmosphere for repairing strained relationships.

Coaching Disputants Problem Solving Skills

The SIF as a conflict resolution approach attaches greater importance to coaching disputants in the skills of problem solving. And it is the novelty of combining this with the process that distinguishes SIF from other conflict resolution methods. Conflict resolution expert Bernard Mayer agrees: “Seldom however is there any provision for advice...coaching, or any other assistance to help make these direct meetings productive. Too often the assistance that is available is either adversarial or focused on the substance rather than the process.”⁴⁷

In complex group conflicts where an ethnic group's relationships have been impaired, communication links broken, and emotions are running high, the importance of ensuring a harmonious atmosphere for the process and its successful outcome cannot be overemphasized. Intractable conflicts bring with them psychological baggage such as fear, insecurity, emotional outbursts, uncertainty and cognitive perception of others. These are the live ammunitions of conflict which should be diffused to ensure harmonious deliberations. In other words, the psychological safety of the disputants is cardinal to this model. The combination of coaching in SIF came from the conviction that

46 Lebaron, Pillay, *Conflict Across...*, p. 19.

47 Bernard Mayer, *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution. A Practitioners Guide*, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 2000, p. 227.

coaches can prepare people to deal with aggressive behaviours. Some well-meaning conflict resolution processes have failed because of insensitivity to some of these intangible issues underlying conflict.

Coaching all stakeholders before the joint session of the forum can help them deal with aggressive behaviours and to be both strong and conciliatory at the same time. The combination of coaching in the SIF process is not aimed at helping the belligerents to resolve their conflict, but it can play a major role in enabling them in the conducting of a harmonious process. The professionals can help the parties consider their alternatives, plan how to frame their concerns, suggestions, and consider how to listen and acknowledge other parties even as they disagree with them. In the conclusion of his work, Billikopf⁴⁸ confirmed the importance of coaching before the beginning of any process or forum. According to him, “one mediator role is helping participants develop and strengthen these critical skills. These are the very skills they will need in the future, when they negotiate through conflicts without the help of a mediator.”⁴⁹ It has been recognised that participants who have some of these skills will participate cordially in any interactive forum and are less likely to damage the process.

Educating groups earlier will definitely add new values and quality to the overall SIF process, which might help defuse anger. Teaching parties how to communicate effectively while presenting a perspective without using non-provocative language and without causing the other to lose face is considered paramount to understanding the issues in conflict. Coaching participants in conflict resolution skills is usually important in the pre-forum sessions if grievance procedures and dialogues are to function effectively. The combination of coaching to this process is deemed relevant in problem-solving, and this integration into the SIF evidently differentiates the forum from other known approaches.

The ability of listening to others is a skill that might assist clients to look inward and critique their own actions and decisions. In a problem solving workshop active listening creates an atmosphere of great respect, which lets the other person know you hear and understand him or her. As far as building relationships are concerned this skill of trying to understand others is useful. Good communication skill is required to encourage stakeholders to talk directly to each other and show empathy. Though much emphasis is placed on basic communication skills, there are other “process management skills... These are helping disputants talk in turns, restating, being non-judgmental and

48 Billikopf, ‘Helping Others...’, p. 31.

49 Billikopf, ‘Helping Others...’, p. 31.

paraphrasing each other's statement."⁵⁰ It suffices to state that incorporating coaching skills in the SIF not only offers the parties tools for conflict resolution to be used all the time, but also increase the probability of reaching a rapport required for a joint agreement oriented forum stage.

The SIF recognizes wider stakeholders' participation

In most intractable conflicts that have lasted for a long period of time multiple stakeholders are likely to emerge claiming to represent and protect the interests of their communities. But through proper stakeholder analysis and mapping, professionals will be able to identify and invite only those influential representatives of their people, government officials and members of civil society, among others to the interactive forum. Stakeholder mapping will also assist in accommodating formally marginalised groups whose absence might spoil the peace-building process. The neutral professionals and mediators in this process employ the use of open-ended questionnaires to determine the willingness of disputants to participate in the dialogue and identify organisational handicaps that might impact on the success of any SIF process.

Additionally, adequate analysis of parties, their affiliations and interests, gives the professional facilitators the knowledge base to advise stakeholders on the viability and different approaches to their conflict. Scholars believe that at this stage the group can then create a mission statement, frame the issues, and develop technical information that will guide deliberations for a long time.⁵¹

Problem solving or negotiations have failed primarily because professionals do not start by collecting and analysing stakeholder's data and information about a given dispute. The SIF emphasises stakeholders' analysis as a continuing process until the end of the forum because of how it might affect the dynamics of the situation. It employs useful techniques to draw out the relevant participants and use their energy to explore deeper into the solution they envisage and move the deliberation into a constructive path of creativity. However, critical to the success of the process is also recognising the equality of all parties in brainstorming and problem analysis, bearing in mind that what draws people to opposition in a process is when they feel marginalised or isolated. If the parties understand that their presence and voices matters, they tend to show a high level of commitment in the whole process.

50 Robert D. Haris, 'Unlocking the Learning Potential in Peer Mediation: An Evaluation of Peer Mediator Modeling and Dispute Learning,' *Conflict Resolution quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Winter 2005, pp. 149–150.

51 Susskind Mackearman and Thomas Lamar, *The Consensus Building Handbook: A comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement*, Sage: Thousand Oaks, 1999.

Commitment to the process

One of the determining factors for a successful forum will be the level of commitment invested in the process by the professional mediators and experts. This commitment is necessary to move the SIF forward in cognizance of the cost of abandoning the dialogue for even flimsy reasons. In a complex and emotion-laden conflict professionals advisably ought to put more time in the forum to show their sense of responsibility and determination to see the parties reach rapport by improving communication links. Engaging stakeholders and encouraging continuing dialogue, communities and government officials alike can find creative ways to resolve the selected issues on the table.

In recognition that parties to the forum differ and have different expectations about the length and outcome of the process, fruitful deliberation cannot be aimed at achieving success at any cost, but to a commitment with “modest expectation about what is achievable and what constitute success.”⁵² According to Hampson, the lack of ‘staying power’ or the inability to muster the resources that are needed to build a secure foundation for settlement or some process of inter-communal re-conciliation,⁵³ hampers deliberations.

While staying committed to help disputants is emphasised, professionals should not set the goals too high or low, which might attract criticism and give the other party an impetus to withdraw when the assignment is only half done. Unlike any government-organised meeting or conference, the SIF provides all parties the opportunity to vent emotion, save face, reframe the issues in the conflict and make suggestions about how to stop the violence in their communities.

Ethical challenges during the process

Third party professionals facilitating the SIF will be confronted with the issue of ethical behaviour. Professionalism demands that parties be treated with utmost respect, fairness and equality without any sign of favour. We are aware of the controversy in the field of conflict resolution concerning whether a mediator or professional should remain “neutral” or “impartial.”

In this vein, “neutrality refers to the relationship that the mediator has with the participants. If the mediator feels, or any one of the parties or their attorneys states, that the mediator’s background or personal experiences would prejudice the mediator’s performance, the mediator should withdraw from mediation unless all parties agree to proceed.”⁵⁴ In order to avoid the “murky” waters of

52 Fen Osler Hampson, ‘Third Roles in the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict,’ *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1997, pp. 749–750.

53 Hampson, ‘Third Roles...’, p. 749.

54 Susan McCorkle, ‘The Murky World of Mediation Ethnic: Neutrality, Impartiality, and

ethical ambiguity in conflict resolution I prefer to use the word “impartiality” in this process, which means an “unbiased relationship with each disputant.”⁵⁵

The SIF is composed mainly of those third party professionals whose ethnic identities are perceived as impartial in the eyes of all participants. Importantly, as practitioners share information with parties, great emphasis is also placed on confidentiality. This is a prerequisite for building trust among participants. No confidential information is divulged without the permission of the party concerned. Because the forum will concentrate in leading the parties to understanding their dispute and restoring relationships, documents that parties will like to keep confidential will not be discussed or shared openly. Problem-solving experts and mediator assistants will therefore strive to avoid any dealing or relationship that might be misconstrued as biased behaviour. Such unethical behaviours that will compromise or appear to compromise third parties’ impartiality are capable of holding up the harmonious flow of the interactive exchange between stakeholders. The SIF must be harmonious and free of acrimony when third party professionals declare any relationships and connections they might have with the parties and their representatives that could raise eye brows during the forum. Moreover, the parties must therefore decide whether to continue the deliberation or not, in order to maintain the integrity of the forum.

Conclusion

This study envisages hope in resolving intractable conflicts that inundate many countries around the world, by organising the sequential interactive forum for all stakeholders. This is because the process has the possibility of generating new ideas, transforming impaired relationships and restoring strained communication links between government officials and groups in conflict.

Strained communication links often handicap even well-intentioned proposals to resolve a dispute. Exiting such a situation is possible through sincere and open interaction facilitated by the cultural competent that third party professionals can offer in small sequential forums. The importance of any problem-solving process should be to help people find approaches that avoid destructive choices of resolving intractable conflict. The problem of resource distribution and power sharing conflicts in many parts of the developing world should become a thing of the past if this method is applied to complex conflicts. This is because, SIF provides the template and conducive atmosphere

Conflicts of interest in States Code of Conduct,’ *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No.2, Winter, 2005, p. 170.

55 McCorkle, ‘The Murky World...,’ p.166.

for sharing responsibilities and helping people understand that they have real influence over their nation's future development and prosperity.

Although this method is not flawless, it serves policy makers as an efficient tool for promoting mutual gain in decision making and resolving some of the more intractable conflicts, facing their countries. The attractiveness of the SIF as a conflict resolution model has been presented in this article as a pragmatic tool that will empower communities, adversaries and governments discover creative solutions to intractable conflicts. The approach can help guide parties in the way of repairing strained communication links, impaired relationships between government agencies and states, local governments, community leaders, traditional rulers, militant warlords, and young people, as the case may be.

The importance of integrating cultural competency and coaching into this model of problem solving stems from the belief that the success of the process depends on mutual knowledge on the values and cultural origins of the participants, which is an important ingredient for building trust and confidence. Pertinently, this novelty in the field of conflict resolution will awaken the latent desire of parties and individuals to fully participate in the peace process. Furthermore those who perceived themselves to be powerless will rediscover the latent potentials in them to reframe and express their conflict constructively for overall beneficial outcome. This realisation illuminates the important contribution that the field of conflict resolution makes not only to help stakeholders learn new skills, attitudes and knowledge, but also that in order to develop meaningful engagement they need to resolve future conflicts.

Kurds' Activism and Middle East Regional Security Complex

Abstract

In the last century, the various Kurdish groups and movements in the Middle East struggled perhaps hardest of all national groups in the region against the political division of Middle East known as “Sykes-Picot.” Kurds thus fought to change the situation in three different countries, namely in Iraq, Turkey and Syria. The global, regional and domestic changes of the last two decades have made the Kurds a determining factor the region's security. In Iraq, the Kurds' efforts to change the Sykes-Picot borders, establish a new country and also change the centralized political system into a semi-centralized (federal) system raised concerns in the above-noted countries, especially those with their own Kurdish populations, in turn driving even greater cooperation between them. The changes have led to alterations in the classical security structure of the region and positioned the Kurds as a key factor in establishing regional security. On the one hand, they are thus seeking to change the current order and on the other, the regional players of the region want to preserve the current situation.

Keywords: Kurds, Middle East, Security, Middle East, Regional.

Introduction

In the last century, the various Kurdish groups and movements in the Middle East struggled perhaps hardest of all national groups in the region against the political division of Middle East known as “Sykes-Picot” and consequently have taken advantage of every opportunity to disrupt the order that has all but ignored them and dispersed them across various countries. In recent years, as a result of international and, especially, regional developments including the Arab Spring in North Africa and its spread to countries such as Syria, intensification of bipolar tensions due to the Shiite-Sunni rivalry in the region led by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, intensified competition among regional powers over status as the hegemonic state or at least increase their sphere of influence, the rise of ISIS and further weakening of most regional states, especially the Syrian and Iraqi governments, Kurds in these two countries have found a unique opportunity to increase their activism

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and in practice, Kurds have become the operational arm of the international coalition against ISIS, led by the United States of America, which in Syria transformed the Kurds from a silent or, in other words, ‘forgotten’² group into semiofficial and influential players that have practically followed the path of the Iraqi Kurds in the 1990s in paving the way for the creation of a decentralized system, and in Iraq, thanks to the opportunities provided due to the great threat posed by ISIS along with other vulnerabilities, Kurds have managed to gain full control over more than 97 percent of the disputed regions, including Kirkuk Province (except for Al-Hawija District).

On the one hand, these developments have led the Kurds to demand independence in Iraq and an autonomous region in Syria, and, on the other hand, they have resulted in close cooperation of the governments of Iran, Turkey, and Iraq, and at times Syria, to prevent the fulfillment of these demands and changes in the Sykes–Picot borders. This has given rise to political, diplomatic and military cooperation among these countries.

In fact, drawing on ideas developed by the Copenhagen School, especially Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by Barry Buzan, the present research seeks to answer the question: “What impact has the Kurds’ (increased) activism in Iraq and Syria changed the current situation and what impact has it had on the Middle East regional security complex?”

The Middle East from the perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory

In recent decades, especially following the collapse of the bipolar world system, we have witnessed the introduction of new theories to explain international relations and security from a regional perspective, such as Buzan’s Regional Security Complex Theory out of the Copenhagen School of international relations, according to which the international system is divided into various security regions that are interrelated and affect one another, yet have their own security distinctions. In order to create a security order or complex in the Middle East, it should be noted that various elements at international, regional, national and domestic levels have influenced security as well as issues and relations associated with it in the Middle East. In Regional Security Complex Theory, based on four key variables of boundary, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction for the Middle East, Buzan posits a main security system and three security subsystems including the Arab-Israeli security subsystem in the Levant, the Persian Gulf security subsystem with two different power cores (including states located on the southern periphery of the

2 This term was first used by Kerim Yildiz, researcher on Kurdish issues, in his book *The Kurds in Syria: The Forgotten People*, London: Pluto Press, 2005.

Persian Gulf) and the northwest of the Persian Gulf (between Iran, Iraq, and Syria), and a third security subsystem in North Africa (the Maghreb).³

But as mentioned, as a result of the events that have occurred over the past three decades, the abovementioned security systems have undergone considerable change. Among the most significant of these changes has been the increasing Kurdish involvement in the Middle East and its impact on security and diplomatic relations; so much so that it could be claimed that, although the Kurds are currently operating in four separate national units with regional impacts, combined they have formed an autonomous security subsystem in the region. This is a security subsystem that has direct impacts on four neighbouring and regional players including Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, and at the same time, has involved other regional and transregional players.

Regionalism in the international system and the Middle East

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and consequently, the end of the bipolar era in the international system, many international relations thinkers and theorists have argued that the international system has faced some kind of regionalism. "The end of the Cold War has provided new opportunities for more cooperative regional orders. Now, regional countries are more responsible for resolving their disputes, and in some areas, they have begun to accept the challenge."⁴ In this regard, other scholars are also largely of the same opinion, including Papayouanou, who argues: "In the post-Cold War world, the constraints and coercions of the great powers system are more limited. As a result, regionalism and the influence of regional powers and players is more than ever before."⁵

"With the end of the Cold War, there is now only one major power – the United States – that is able to control and influence the region, but even the continued presence of the United States depends on the goodwill and cooperation of regional actors, because security in this era has become an increasingly regional issue."⁶ Bilgin, in his book entitled *Regional Security in the Middle East*, also emphasizes that "regionalization of security in the Middle East and creation of orders and processes as well as various security complexes are among the effects of the end of the Cold War on the Middle East."⁷

3 Samuel Morris, Khogir Wirya and Dlawer Ala'Aldeen, 'The Future of Kirkuk: A Roadmap for Resolving the Status of the Governorate,' Middle East Research Institute, Policy Report, September 2015, p. 1–40.

4 David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan, *Regional Orders: Building Security In A New World*, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 21.

5 Lake, Morgan, *Regional Orders...*, p. 180.

6 Lake, Morgan, *Regional Orders...*, p. 114.

7 Pinar Bilgin, *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*, New York: Routledge, 2019.

Theorists and exponents of the Copenhagen School, who have focused their studies and research on security and regionalism studies, also emphasize this issue. For instance, Barry Buzan argues that after the Cold War, the regional level has become a geometrical place for governments to engage in conflict or cooperation, and for researchers seeking to explain contemporary security issues, it has become a level of analysis.⁸ This approach can be seen as a post-Cold War law that is rooted in two assumptions: First, that the reduction of competition between superpowers reduces the impact of the interests of global powers elsewhere; and, second, that internal dynamics of superpowers deter the international system from military conflict and strategic competition in the most troubled parts of the world and allow regional governments and communities to regulate their military and political relations with less interference by major powers than in the past.

Improving the status of the Kurds in the Middle East

The Kurdish issue in the Middle East, particularly since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of new states in the region based on the Sykes-Picot secret agreement between Britain and France and later the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 that divided Kurds among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria such that, alongside the Kurds of Iran, they had to continue their political and social life in four separate political units, has been one of the most important security issues in the region over the past century as different Kurdish groups in these countries have been dissatisfied with the status quo and taken advantage of every opportunity to change the situation. In the meantime, the increased involvement and active role of various Kurdish groups over the past two decades, especially in Iraq (since 2003) and Syria (since 2011), have been among the most important political and security developments in the Middle East.

A. Iraqi Kurds

Undoubtedly, the most active Kurdish nationalist group and movement has operated in Iraq; a movement that has taken every opportunity not only to protest the current situation and strengthen itself, but also to gain independence or at least autonomy. The distinctive geographical location of Iraqi Kurdistan and its having access to all three other Kurdish areas, along with its high population ratio to the total population of Iraqi residents as well as regional political developments and competition of Iraqi governments with other countries, have increased the active role and influence of Iraqi Kurds.

8 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Domestic developments that led to five wars between 1961 and 1975 when border tensions with Iran increased, along with the eight-year war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s and then the First Gulf War between Iraq and the United States and its international allies in the early 1990s and the imposition of a no-fly zone as well as crippling sanctions against the country's central government, all promoted and then stabilised the status of the Iraqi Kurdistan. With the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, a new era of significant empowerment of the Kurds in Iraq began. Official and legal recognition of the Kurdistan region including Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah provinces, enactment of Article 140 of the Constitution⁹ to determine disputed areas status and the Kurds' claim to Diyala, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk and Nineveh provinces,¹⁰ holding the position of president and important ministries such as the foreign ministry (2003 to 2014) and finance ministry (2014 to 2016), and allocation of 17% of Iraq's total budget to Iraqi Kurdistan along with the right to have its own military (Peshmerga) and security (welfare) units, having relative authority to sell oil and relatively independent foreign relations, have been significant achievements for the Kurds at this point.

The demands and goals of the Kurds in Iraq have varied over the past century; when Sheikh Mahmoud led an uprising, he demanded the independence of Kurdistan, but during the later periods, Iraqi Kurds dropped the struggle for independence and stated that their only goal was to create an autonomous state within Iraqi borders. In an article entitled "The Logic of Separatists," Donald Horowitz states: "Iraqi Kurds have repeatedly denied that their goal is independence. Despite the war and massacres in the 1960s and 1970s, they have avoided setting their goal as anything but regional autonomy. There is probably a tactical reason behind this; if Iraqi Kurds had declared their goal to be independence, it might have triggered the hostility of neighbouring regimes in Syria, Iran, and Turkey, all of which have Kurdish minorities. During the 1974 war in Iraq, Iran provided Kurdish fighters with cross-border supplies of weapons and food, and such support specifically ensured that the Kurdish

9 In the initial draft of the Iraqi Constitution, Article 58 was devoted to this issue; however, in the final text of the Iraqi Constitution adopted by the parliament in 2005 and approved by the people of Iraq in a nationwide referendum, this article was changed to Article 140. Iraq's Constitution 2005, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en (accessed 20 October 2019).

10 Although the aforementioned article mandated the Iraqi central government to enforce its provisions, including the return of the original residents of the disputed areas, the return of the current deported residents to their former areas of residence and a referendum on self-determination in 2007, to date, this Article has not been enacted and has been one of the reasons for the growing conflict between Erbil and Baghdad and the intensification of divergence between the Kurds and other Iraqi residents. Iraq's Constitution 2005, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005.pdf?lang=en (accessed 20 October 2019).

movement only demanded autonomy.”¹¹ In the recent period, Kurds have also pursued the path to independence, and paved the way for realization of this goal, and in this regard they held two separate referendums, in 2005 and 2017, without the consent of the central Iraqi government.

Kurdish leaders led by Massoud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Region (2005–2017), on several occasions have officially delivered speeches on “Kurdish right to self-determination,” “termination of the Sykes-Picot agreement,” and “making Kurdistan’s independence dream a reality”¹² and they have set deadlines for this purpose. These moves have been partially supported by other Kurdish parties and almost unanimously by the Kurdish community.¹³

B. Syrian Kurds

Also in Syria, especially after the spread of the wave of Arab Spring protests to this country and its entry into a period of insecurity and civil war and the emergence of ISIS, Syrian Kurds found an opportunity to organise and arm themselves and operate extensively due to increased competition among regional and international actors in this country and consequently, within a short period of time, influenced by the ideas of Abdullah Ocalan, they established a kind of regional political system in the three northern parts of the country (Qamishli, Kobane and Afrin), known as the Democratic Autonomous Cantons. Their alliance with the United States and their cooperation with Russia led the Kurds to call for the establishment of a decentralized federal system in Syria, especially in the northern part of this country. During the current Syrian crisis, Syrian Kurds, in close cooperation with the United States, dominated at least 30 to 35 percent of Syrian territory between 2014 and 2019.¹⁴

Iraqi Kurdistan and seeking independence

Just a few weeks after ISIS’s total defeat in Iraq and Nineveh (Mosul), September 25, 2017, was a historic day for Iraqi Kurds. On this day, Massoud Barzani, the then leader of the Kurdish region, called for a referendum and despite various internal opposition (among Kurds), national opposition (in

11 John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith, *Nationalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 382.

12 Rudaw.net TV news channel, <https://www.rudaw.net> (accessed 20 October 2019).

13 In the independence referendum in 2005, more than 95 and in the independence referendum in 2016, more than 92.5 percent of the people voted “yes”. See: Dylan O’Driscoll and Bahar Baser, ‘Independence Referendums and Nationalist Rhetoric: the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,’ *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 40, Issue 11, 2019, pp. 2016–2034.

14 Patrick Clawson (ed.), *Syrian Kurds as a U.S. Ally: Cooperation and Complications*, Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016, pp. 29–38.

Iraq), and regional and transnational opposition, a referendum was held in Kurdish areas including Erbil, Duhok and Sulaimaniyah provinces as well as disputed areas in Diyala (Khanaqin), Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Nineveh, asking the question whether an independent state named Kurdistan should be formed.

Regional response to the Iraqi Kurds' demand for independence

Although Massoud Barzani and other Iraqi Kurdish leaders insisted that the referendum was a formality and did not mean that the Kurds were definitely seeking independence, and stressed that the problems between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government had to be resolved, the reactions from neighbouring leaders was inflexible. Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of Iran, meeting Haider al-Abadi, the then Iraqi Prime Minister, stated: "The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a neighbouring state, is opposed to talks of holding a referendum for separation of a part of Iraq and considers advocates of this referendum to be the enemies of the independence and identity of Iraq."¹⁵ In addition, Iranian and Turkish presidents meeting in Tehran to discuss the same issue, not only explicitly announced their opposition to Iraqi Kurdistan's independence, but also mentioned their punitive measures against the Kurds' demand. In this regard, "on Wednesday October 4, Hassan Rouhani, sitting next to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, told reporters that the two countries pledged to ensure that no changes were made to the borders of the countries in the region."¹⁶ In line with these measures, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the two countries in Iran and then in Turkey, once again announced serious measures to prevent the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan. After meeting with his Turkish counterpart in Ankara, Bagheri said: "both Turkey and Iran seriously oppose partition of Iraq and changing political boundaries and will take the necessary measures to prevent it."¹⁷

Within less than a month on October 16 of the same year, Iraqi army troops and the Popular Mobilization Units (al-Hashd ash-Sha'bi) militias with regional support from both Iran and Turkey entered the Kurdish-controlled areas, and when part of the Kurdish forces gave up resistance in a secret agreement with Iraq and Iran, the Kurdish leadership was forced to announce a retreat that led to the loss of Kurdish control of the strategic city of Kirkuk and other

15 'Barzani middleman for Zionists to partition Islamic countries: Velayati,' PressTV, 26 September 2017, <https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/09/26/536571/Iran-Iraq-Kurdistan-Ali-Akbar-Velayati-Massoud-Barzani-Zionists-KRG-independence-referendum> (accessed 15 October 2019).

16 Official website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 September 2019, <http://www.president.ir/en/111249> (accessed 10 October 2019).

17 Official website of the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran...

disputed areas. The October 16 operation resulted in the loss of 51 percent of the Kurdish-controlled territory and 65 percent of the oilfields, which was a major blow to the Kurds and their dream.¹⁸

Why and how were the Iraqi Kurds defeated?

If we consider the withdrawal without resistance and the loss of a significant portion of the territory and oil fields, as well as the demand for military and political independence, a defeat for the Kurds, we should ask about the cause of this defeat. In response, it should be noted that Iran and Turkey's deep dissatisfaction with the Kurds' independence on the one hand and lack of transregional supporters such as the US, on the other hand, were the major causes of the Kurds' defeat.

Dozens of meetings between Iranian and Turkish military and security officials, joint maneuvers conducted by the two sides, the deployment of security forces to the border, closing land and aerial borders, stepping up pressure on the Iraqi government to respond, participating in the operation to take Kirkuk out of Kurdish control, increasing pressure on the Kurdish united groups (some of them members of the Patriotic Union Party) and forcing them not to resist were among a series of effective security and diplomatic measures by Tehran and Ankara against the Kurds' demand for independence and change of the Sykes-Picot borders.

Syrian Kurds and Democratic Autonomous Administration

In 2014, while ISIS was trying to capture the last areas of the small Kurdish town of Kobane (Ras al-Ayn), Syrian Kurdish forces reached an agreement with the US government and the International Coalition against ISIS brokered by Iraqi Kurds. The agreement provided significant and effective air support for the Kurdish troops by the International Coalition forces and since then we have witnessed the gradual defeat of ISIS by the Kurdish-American dual alliance in a way that in 2017 they took control of 30 to 35 percent of Syrian territory and immediately established a political system they dubbed "democratic autonomy" in these areas.¹⁹ The Kurds also used other ethnic groups such as Arabs, Armenians and others in their administrative, political, and military system and formally called for the creation of a decentralised system for the future of Syria.

18 'Leaders of Iran, Turkey Stress Opposition to Kurdish State,' *Voanews*, 4 October 2017, <https://www.voanews.com/world-news/middle-east-dont-use/leaders-iran-turkey-stress-opposition-kurdish-state>(accessed 18 October 2019).

19 Patrick Clawson (ed.), *Syrian Kurds as a U.S. Ally: Cooperation and Complications*, Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016, pp. 29–38.

Regional response to the Syrian Kurds' demand

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, the Turkish government has pursued various strategies and goals. It first sought to assist the opposition to Bashar al-Assad and overthrow the Baathist regime in Damascus and establish a political system close to the Muslim Brotherhood and the ideas of the AKP. In this endeavor, however, Turkey faced a strong barrier, that is, Iran, which is a strategic ally of the Syrian government. Iran's military support for Syria, Damascus and Tehran arming Syrian Kurdish forces (in 2012), followed by Russia's involvement in the Syrian crisis in 2015 on the one hand, and US failure to comply with Turkey's demand to overthrow the Damascus government, on the other hand, led to Turkey's failure to achieve its original purpose.

In 2016, Turkey pursued a new course of action in the Syrian crisis, suddenly marginalised its differences with Tehran and Moscow, and created a triple alliance aimed at establishing stability and security in northern Syria. At this time, Turkey was deeply concerned about the successive victories of the Syrian Kurds. Kurds who had a direct organisational and intellectual connection with the PKK forces. Increasing disagreement between Turkey and the US also added to the suspicion of Turkish officials. All these issues led Turkey to accept keeping Bashar al-Assad in power as an undeniable reality in the short term in line with the demands of Iran and Russia, and, instead of trying to overthrow him, Turkey sought to prevent the Kurds from gaining more power in Syria.

In 2017, in coordination with Russia, Turkey attacked the western part of the Euphrates and the Kurdish-dominated area of Afrin, and in 2019, following the initial US green light, it attacked the Kurdish-controlled eastern Euphrates, which is an ongoing situation.

Conclusion

A series of developments in Iraq and Syria, the increased power of the Kurds and the efforts by some of them to change the borders set by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and efforts by others to establish a decentralised federal system in Syria has increased the sensitivity of regional actors and created a series of complicated diplomatic, military, and even economic relations against the Kurds' demands. This has created a new regional security subsystem in the Middle East led by the Kurds focused on changing the existing order, which has forced the regional powers to try to maintain the status quo.

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1. Ivor Wilks, *Wa and Wala. Islam and Polity in North-Western Ghana*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p.70.
2. John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p.23.
3. Raymond Hinnebusch, 'Syria under Bashar: Between Economic Reform and Nationalist Realpolitik,' in *Syrian Foreign Policy and the United States: from Bush to Obama*, Raymond Hinnebusch, Marwan J. Kabalan, Bassma Kodmani and David Lesch (eds), St. Andrews: University of St. Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies, 2010, p. 20.
4. Zygmunt Komorowski, *Kultury Afryki Czarnej* [Cultures of Black Africa], Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1994, pp.89–90.
5. Larry J. Dimond, 'Rethinking of Civil Society,' *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 3, July 1994, p. 4.

6. 'Tunisia's al-Nahda to Form Party', *Aljazeera*, 1 March 2011, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/%20middleeast/2011/03/201131132812266381.html> (accessed 10 November 2011).
7. *Sudan Peace Act Report: 21 April 2003*, Washington DC: Department of State, 2003, www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rpt/2003/19790.htm (accessed 23 August 2013).

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8. Hinnebusch, 'Syria under Bashar...', pp. 20, 22.

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